Chaney v. State

• Citation: 237 So.2d 281
• Decision Date: 19 June 1970
• Docket Number: No. 69--215,69--215
• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
• Parties: Floyd CHANEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Page 281

237 So.2d 281

Floyd CHANEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 69--215.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

June 19, 1970.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 6, 1970.

Frederick W. Daily, III, of Ives & Davis, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and J. Terrell Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

REED, Judge.

The defendant appeals from a conviction in the Criminal Court of Record for Palm Beach County, Florida. The primary issue is whether or not the trial court erred in overruling defendant's pretrial motion to suppress certain tangible objects taken from his vehicle shortly after his arrest.

At the time the defendant was arrested, according to defendant's testimony, the arresting officer told the defendant that he was under arrest for 'breaking and entering a telephone'. Defendant argues that this was a misdemeanor under Section 822.10, F.S.1965, F.S.A., and, since it was not committed in the officer's presence, the arrest without a warrant was invalid. The arrest being invalid, it could not have provided according to defendant a predicate for the incidental search which yielded the objects the defendant sought to suppress.

An arrest without a warrant could be made under Section 901.15(3), F.S.1965, F.S.A.;

'When (the arresting officer) * * * has reasonable ground to believe that a felony has been * * * committed and reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed * * * it.'

This statute provides a standard that conforms to the constitutional requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 22 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution of 1885 (now Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Revised Constitution). Whether or not the arresting officer had a reasonable ground to believe that a felony had been committed and that the person to be arrested was the one who had committed the felony is a mixed question of law and fact which must be decided by the court, when this issue is presented in connection with a motion to suppress or by objection to items offered in evidence. The jury plays no part in the resolution of the issue. Urso v. State, Fla.App.1961, 134 So.2d 810; Brown v. State, Fla.1950, 46 So.2d 479. Since this issue is exclusively for decision by the trial judge, the judge has the responsibility of weighing the evidence and determining matters of credibility. It follows that his ruling should not be reversed on appeal where supported by competent substantial evidence. Compare Graham v. State, Fla.1956, 91 So.2d 662, 663, wherein the role of the trial judge in passing on the admissibility of a confession is discussed.

In determining whether or not the arresting officer had a reasonable ground for his arrest, the standard to be employed by the trial judge is the standard of conduct which would have been employed by a reasonable man in the position of the arresting officer at the time of the arrest acting with the knowledge which at that time was possessed by the arresting officer. State v. Outten, Fla.1968, 206 So.2d 392, 397; Henry v. United States, 1959, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 171, 4 L.Ed.2d 134. If a reasonable man in that position would have concluded that he had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had committed a felony, the arrest without a warrant was authorized by Section 901.15(3), F.S.1965, F.S.A.

The validity of an arrest does not turn on the label given the arrest by the arresting officer. Even though the arresting officer may have labeled the cause for the arrest a misdemeanor, such will not invalidate an...