Chaney v. Team Techs., Inc.
| Decision Date | 31 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. E2018-00248-SC-R9-WC,E2018-00248-SC-R9-WC |
| Citation | 568 S.W.3d 576 |
| Parties | Katherine D. CHANEY v. TEAM TECHNOLOGIES, INC. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Joseph W. Ballard, Atlanta, Georgia, for the appellant, Team Technologies, Inc.
Jeffrey A. Cobble, Greeneville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Katherine D. Chaney.
The issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether an employer, who did not use an automated external defibrillator (AED) to assist an employee who suffered a non-work related medical emergency, can be liable for workers' compensation benefits. An employee collapsed at work because of a medical condition unrelated to her employment. The employer knew of the employee’s need for immediate medical assistance. The employer had acquired an AED but did not use it to assist the employee while awaiting the arrival of emergency medical responders. Medical responders assisted the employee, but she suffered a brain injury because of oxygen deprivation. We hold that an injury that is caused by an employer’s failure to provide reasonable medical assistance arises out of and in the course of employment when an employee becomes helpless at work because of illness or other cause unrelated to her employment, the employee needs medical assistance to prevent further injury, the employer knows of the employee’s helplessness, and the employer can provide reasonable medical assistance but does not do so. Here, the employee’s claim did not arise out of her employment because her employer provided reasonable medical assistance and had no statutory or common law duty to use its AED to assist the employee. Therefore, the employer is not liable for workers' compensation benefits. We reverse the trial court’s denial of the employer’s motion to dismiss and remand to the trial court for an order of dismissal.
This case involves an employer’s alleged failure to use an AED to assist an employee who presumably suffered cardiac arrest at work. Cardiac arrest occurs when the heart malfunctions and stops beating unexpectedly. An AED is a lightweight portable device that delivers an electric shock through the chest to the heart to restore a normal heart rhythm following cardiac arrest. The chance of a patient’s survival decreases by seven to ten percent for every minute a normal heart beat is not restored.2 Tennessee and many other states3 have adopted statutes to encourage the acquisition and use of AEDs. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-140-401 to -409 (2013); Wallis v. Brainerd Baptist Church , 509 S.W.3d 886 (Tenn. 2016) ( Tennessee’s AED statutes).
In March 2013, Katherine D. Chaney collapsed while at work because of a medical condition unrelated to her employment. Chaney’s heart stopped beating, and she could no longer breathe. Emergency medical responders were called to assist her. Chaney’s employer, Team Technologies, Inc., had acquired an AED but did not use it to assist her. Medical responders revived Chaney, but she suffered a permanent brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation.4
In January 2015, Chaney sued Team Technologies in the Hamblen County Circuit Court, seeking workers' compensation benefits for the injuries resulting from Team Technologies' failure to use its AED.5 Chaney asserted that her employer’s failure to use the AED and/or its failure to train or hire an employee able to use an AED delayed resuscitation efforts, causing Chaney to sustain a brain injury.
Team Technologies filed two motions to dismiss. In the first motion, Team Technologies asked the trial court to dismiss Chaney’s complaint because her injury was unrelated to her employment. In the second motion, Team Technologies argued that, under Wallis v. Brainerd Baptist Church , 509 S.W.3d 886 (Tenn. 2016), an employer has no statutory or common law duty to use an acquired AED. Chaney responded that under the emergency rule, Vanderbilt University v. Russell , 556 S.W.2d 230 (Tenn. 1977), Team Technologies had a duty to provide her with medical assistance, which included using an acquired AED, and that Wallis did not apply because it involved a duty owed to a business invitee, not an employee. The trial court denied the motions, ruling that Chaney had pleaded sufficient facts to set forth a prima facie case that her injury arose out of and in the course of employment; Team Technologies had an obligation to provide her with medical assistance under Russell ; it was a disputed question of fact whether Team Technologies had provided adequate medical assistance under Russell ; and Wallis did not address an employer’s duty to use an AED.
The trial court granted Team Technologies' motion for permission to seek an interlocutory appeal. We then granted Team Technologies' application for permission to appeal under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We address these issues:
Our standard of review in this interlocutory appeal involving a question of law is de novo with no presumption of correctness. See Myers v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc. , 382 S.W.3d 300, 307 (Tenn. 2012) (citing Graham v. Caples , 325 S.W.3d 578, 581 (Tenn. 2010) ). We examine the legal sufficiency of Chaney’s complaint and do not consider the strength of her evidence; that is, we accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and construe them in Chaney’s favor. Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc. , 356 S.W.3d 889, 894 (Tenn. 2011) (citing Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co. , 945 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tenn. 1997) ).
To receive workers' compensation benefits, Chaney has to establish that she suffered an injury that arose out of and in the course of her employment that caused either disablement or death. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(12) (2008) (). There is no dispute that Chaney’s injury occurred in the course of her employment; she collapsed while speaking with a supervisor at work. At issue is whether the facts Chaney alleged in her complaint, if taken as true, are sufficient to establish that her injury arose out of her employment.
To establish that an injury arose out of employment, an employee has to allege enough facts to show "a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury." Blankenship v. Am. Ordnance Sys., LLS , 164 S.W.3d 350, 354 (Tenn. 2005) (citing Fritts v. Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. , 163 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Tenn. 2005) ). An employee cannot merely assert that her injury occurred at work; she has to allege that her injury resulted from a "danger or hazard peculiar to the work or be caused by a risk inherent in the nature of the work." Id. (citing Thornton v. RCA Serv. Co. , 188 Tenn. 644, 221 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tenn. 1949) ).
To meet the "arising out of" employment requirement, Chaney relies on the emergency rule adopted in Russell to assert that her employer had a duty to use an available AED to assist her after she suffered a medical emergency unrelated to her employment. In Russell , a nurse employed by Vanderbilt University Hospital fell while changing bed sheets during her night shift. 556 S.W.2d at 230. Her fall was caused by an "attack," later diagnosed as a stroke. Hospital staff took the employee to the hospital’s emergency room in a wheelchair, but she declined treatment and returned to her station to complete her shift. The employee died less than a week later after having another stroke unrelated to her employment. The employee’s husband sued the hospital for workers' compensation benefits asserting that the employee’s second stroke arose out of her employment because the hospital failed to provide adequate medical treatment after the first stroke. Id. at 231. The trial court awarded benefits, and the hospital appealed. Id. at 230–31.
We held in Russell that when an employee becomes helpless at work because of illness or other cause unrelated to her employment, needs medical assistance to prevent further injury, and the employer can make such medical assistance available but does not do so, then any disability caused by this failure of the employer is considered to have "arisen out of and in the course of employment." Id. The Court based its ruling on the common law rule that when an employee becomes helpless by an unforeseen accident while doing his job, the "dictates of humanity, duty, and fair dealing demand that the employer if cognizant of the injury furnish medical assistance." Id. This duty arises only in extraordinary circumstances where immediate medical assistance is required to save life or avoid further serious injury. Id. By adopting the emergency rule, the Court was following the lead of many other jurisdictions.6
In Russell , the adoption of the emergency rule did not result in an award of workers' compensation benefits. Instead, the Court held that the hospital was not liable for workers' compensation benefits because it had discharged its duty by taking the employee to the emergency room for treatment and advising her not to complete her shift. Id. at 232.
The basic premise of the Russell emergency rule remains good law. "Humanity, duty and fair dealing" still require an employer, if aware that an employee has been rendered helpless, to provide medical assistance. That said, court...
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