Chao Chen v. GEO Grp., Inc.
| Citation | 287 F.Supp.3d 1158 |
| Decision Date | 06 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 3:17–cv–05769–RJB |
| Parties | CHAO CHEN, Plaintiff, v. The GEO GROUP, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
Adam J. Berger, Jamal N. Whitehead, Lindsay Halm, Schroeter Goldmark & Bender, Devin T. Theriot–Orr, Sunbird Law PLLC, Seattle, WA, R. Andrew Free, Law Office of R. Andrew Free, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiff.
Charles A Deacon, Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (San Antonio), San Antonio, TX, Joan K. Mell, III Branches Law PLLC, Fircrest, WA, Mark Emery, Norton Rose Fulbright US LLP (DC), Washington, DC, for Defendant.
ORDER ON DEFENDANT THE GEO GROUP, INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant The GEO Group, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Class Action Complaint for Damages. Dkt. 8. The Court has considered Defendant's motion, Plaintiff Chao Chen's Response, Defendant's Reply, the Complaint, and the remainder of the file herein. Dkts. 1, 15, 16. The Court also considered oral argument held in open court on November 20, 2017.
Mr. Chen was a detainee at the Northwest Detention Center in Tacoma, Washington, a facility that GEO operates under a contract with United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a division of the Department of Homeland Security. GEO uses detainees, including Mr. Chen, to assist in operating the facility under a Voluntary Work Program. In exchange for their work, GEO compensates detainees $1 per day.
The Complaint alleges that Mr. Chen is entitled to compensation of $11 per hour because he is an "employee" as defined by the Washington State Minimum Wage Act. Defendant's motion seeks dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) under two theories: (1) State law is preempted, and (2) the Complaint fails to state a claim that detainees, including Mr. Chen, are "employees" deserving State minimum wage protections.
The following facts alleged in the Complaint are taken as true for purposes of Defendant's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion.
GEO, a private corporation, has owned and operated the Northwest Detention Center, a 1,500 bed ICE facility, since 2005. Dkt. 1 at ¶ 4.2. Northwest Detention Center detainees include Mr. Chen, who was detained pending immigration proceedings from October 2014 until February 2016. Id. at ¶ 3.1. Mr. Chen is a citizen of the People's Republic of China, but has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States since the 1980s. Id. at ¶ 3.1. GEO relies upon detainees for its grounds maintenance, cooking, laundry, cleaning, and other services. Id. at ¶¶ 4.4, 4.5. GEO has compensated detainees, including Mr. Chen, at $1 per day. Id. at ¶¶ 4.7, 4.8. GEO has in some cases alternatively compensated detainees with more and better food. Id.
Washington's minimum wage is $11 an hour. Dkt. 1 at ¶ 4.11. The Complaint alleges that Mr. Chen is entitled to compensation at that rate. Id. at ¶ 4.11.
The Complaint seeks damages for lost wages, fees, and costs1 on behalf of a proposed class, including Mr. Chen and others similarly situated. Dkt. 1 at ¶ 6.4.
The Contract and Voluntary Work Program.
According to Defendant, GEO operates the Northwest Detention Center by "a complex statutory, regulatory, and contractual relationship" with ICE. Dkt. 8 at 8. See Dkt. 1–1 at ¶ 4.3. The contract central to the GEO–ICE relationship ("the Contract"2 ) sets out terms for a ten-year operation of the facility. Dkt. 19 at 47. The Contract requires of GEO, inter alia , that "[d]etainee labor shall be used in accordance with the detainee work plan developed by the Contractor, and will adhere to the ICE PBNDS [Performance–Based National Detention Standards] on Voluntary Work Program." Id. at 86. See also , id. at 49. Further, "the detainee work program shall not conflict with any other requirements of the contract and must comply with all applicable laws and regulations." Id.
The Voluntary Work Program articulates standards, inter alia , prohibiting discrimination, accommodating disabilities, limiting work to "8 hours daily, 40 hours weekly," and compensating detainees. 2011 Performance–Based National Detention Standards, Section 5.8, Voluntary Work Program, available online at http://www.ice.gov/detention-standards/2011/ (last accessed Nov. 30, 2017). The detainee compensation provision of the Voluntary Work Program states:
Irrelevant information.
Defendant highlights facts surrounding the criminal conviction forming the basis for removal proceedings against Mr. Chen. Dkt. 8 at 9. These details are not relevant to resolving Defendant's motion.
Defendant seeks dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on two grounds, preemption and failure to state a claim. Concerning preemption, Defendant argues that the State's minimum wage provision is preempted by (1) express preemption, through 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2), a provision of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), (2) field preemption, because Congress has occupied the field of immigration detention, which includes regulating detainee pay, and (3) conflict/obstacle preemption, because requiring GEO to follow the State's minimum wage creates a clear conflict between state and federal law and frustrates ICE purposes and objectives. Dkt. 8 at 15–22. Defendant argues, in the alternative, that the Complaint fails to state a claim that detainees, including Mr. Chen, are "employees" deserving State minimum wage protections. Id. at 23–29.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) motions to dismiss may be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department , 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). Material allegations are taken as admitted and the complaint is construed in the plaintiff's favor. Keniston v. Roberts , 717 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1983). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 554–55, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citations omitted). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The complaint must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955.
Where a state law claim is preempted by federal law, dismissal may be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). E.g., Cleghorn v. Blue Shield of Cal. , 408 F.3d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 2005) ().
The Supremacy Clause provides that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land[,]...anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Federal law can preempt state law in three ways: (1) express preemption, (2) field preemption, or (3) obstacle/conflict preemption. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. United Airlines Inc. , 813 F.3d 718, 724 (9th Cir. 2016). "Regardless of the type of preemption involved—express, field or conflict—the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone of pre-emption analysis." Id.
Analysis "starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law." Maryland v. Louisiana , 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981). This presumption applies in "all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has legislated...in a field which the States have traditionally occupied." Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr , 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted). "[L]abor standards fall[ ] within the traditional police power of the State." Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne , 482 U.S. 1, 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). See also , RCW 49.46.005(a). The party seeking to set aside state law bears the burden to show preemption. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing , 564 U.S. 604, 634, 131 S.Ct. 2567, 180 L.Ed.2d 580 (2011).
Express preemption applies where Congress explicitly states its intent to preempt state law in the language of a statute. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. , 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992). Where Congress has expressed an intent to preempt state law, the scope of the preemption is determined by examining congressional intent, beginning with the legislative text, "which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress' preemptive intent." CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). Courts also consider the "statutory framework," as well as the "structure and purpose of the statute as a whole." Lohr , 518 U.S. at 486, 116 S.Ct. 2240 (1996). "[W]hen the text of a pre-emption clause is susceptible of more than one plausible reading, courts ordinarily accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good , 555 U.S. 70, 77, 129 S.Ct. 538, 172 L.Ed.2d 398 (2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Defendant points to § 1324a(h)(2) of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) as expressly preempting the State minimum wage provision. Dkt. 8 at 16; Dkt....
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