Chapa v. Adams
Citation | 168 F.3d 1036 |
Decision Date | 23 February 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 98-1869,98-1869 |
Parties | 9 A.D. Cases 65, 14 NDLR P 194 Carlos CHAPA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jura ADAMS, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Michael F. Lefkow (argued), Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
James K. Horstman, David E. Neumeister (argued), Williams & Montgomery, Chicago, IL, for Jura Adams.
Jeffrey I. Cummings, Miner, Barnhill & Galland, Chicago, IL, for Bruce Fletcher, Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Health Plans Inc., Rush-Prudential Health Plans, Inc. and Mental Health for Prepaid Plans, Inc.
Before Easterbrook, Kanne, and Diane P. Wood, Circuit Judges.
After repeatedly coming to work at Peoples Gas Light & Coke Company under the influence of alcohol, cocaine, and marijuana, Carlos Chapa was placed on leave (with full pay) and told that he would be fired unless he completed a substance-abuse program. He completed the first stage of a narcotics and alcohol program at Rush Anchor Health Maintenance Organization and returned to work. Later, however, Rush Anchor expelled Chapa from the program because Jura Adams, a psychiatrist to whom Chapa had been referred when he grew depressed over his precarious economic position and poor prospects for promotion, concluded that Chapa was potentially homicidal. The district court summarized: 1997 WL 414107 at * 2, 1997 U.S. Dist. L EXIS 10599
at * 8. Adams told Bruce Fletcher, who managed the substance-abuse program, about Chapa's statements and her conclusion that Chapa posed a genuine risk; Fletcher banished Chapa from the program and informed Peoples Gas, which fired him.
Two principal claims remain in Chapa's suit: first, that Adams violated federal law by revealing Chapa's threat without prior judicial approval under 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2; second, that Fletcher, Adams, and Rush Anchor violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, by removing Chapa from the substance-abuse program because of his disabilities. The district court concluded that the Rehabilitation Act does not address distinctions among persons with disabilities, see Grzan v. Charter Hospital of Northwest Indiana, 104 F.3d 116 (7th Cir.1997)--and everyone in Rush Anchor's substance-abuse program has a drug problem, so exclusion from the program can't be a form of discrimination against people with drug problems. Summary judgment for the defendants followed. As for the first issue: the judge denied Chapa's motion to amend his complaint to add a claim under § 290dd-2, ruling that the amendment would be futile because there is no private right of action to enforce that statute. The district judge resolved additional claims against other defendants, but these have fallen by the wayside.
Section 290dd-2 is a criminal prohibition, and it has been a long time since the Supreme Court used a criminal law as the basis of a private civil action. Some statutes defining crimes also authorize agencies to file civil suits, and the Court has occasionally held that these may be supplemented by private enforcement--though decisions such as J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 (1964), the prime exemplar of this approach, have been in bad odor since the late 1970s. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979). Today the principal question is whether the statute creates rights in favor of identified persons. If yes, a private action to enforce these rights is apt to be inferred; otherwise not. Compare Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992), and Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 & n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), with Karahalios v. National Federation of Federal Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 109 S.Ct. 1282, 103 L.Ed.2d 539 (1989); Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exchange, 98 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir.1996); and Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd. v. Sanwa Business Credit Corp., 16 F.3d 198 (7th Cir.1994). Criminal statutes, which express prohibitions rather than personal entitlements and specify a particular remedy other than civil litigation, are accordingly poor candidates for the imputation of private rights of action. Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 533, 109 S.Ct. 1282; Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, 444 U.S. at 19-20, 100 S.Ct. 242.
Personal rights could in principle be derived from criminal statutes. The rule "do not rob a bank" implies that a bank has a right not to be robbed. But the Supreme Court has been unwilling to treat criminal laws as implying private entitlements in this fashion and has held that the victims of crime therefore lack any legal right to compel a criminal prosecution. Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 102 S.Ct. 69, 70 L.Ed.2d 65 (1981); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973). That reluctance to form private entitlements from criminal prohibitions blocks the judicial creation of private rights of action as well.
Only once before has the question whether § 290dd-2 supports a private damages action reached a court of appeals: Ellison v. Cocke County, 63 F.3d 467 (6th Cir.1995), held that it does not. We agree with Ellison. Like other criminal statutes, § 290dd-2 creates rights in favor of society, not just particular members of society. Judge Ryan, concurring in Ellison, 63 F.3d at 472, observed that "the statute's broad purpose is to combat, in a number of ways, this nation's crippling drug abuse problem and to do so primarily by encouraging addicts to seek treatment voluntarily." Addicts will be more likely to accept treatment--and the rest of society therefore will be better off--if treatment is...
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