Chapman v. Battle

• Decision Date: 22 December 1905
• Citation: 52 S.E. 812,124 Ga. 574
• Parties: CHAPMAN v. BATTLE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

52 S.E. 812

124 Ga. 574

CHAPMAN v. BATTLE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

December 22, 1905

Syllabus by the Court.

Upon grounds of public policy, communications which would otherwise be slanderous are protected as privileged, if made in good faith in the prosecution of an inquiry regarding a crime which has been committed, and for the purpose of detecting and bringing to punishment the criminal. Statements likewise made in the prosecution of efforts to recover property which has been stolen are also protected as privileged communications.

There was evidence to sustain the verdict, and no sufficient reason has been shown for reversing the judgment.

Error from Superior Court, Warren County; H. M. Holden, Judge.

Action by Sterling Chapman against Amelia Battle. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

L. D McGregor and S. H. Sibley, for plaintiff in error.

E. P Davis, for defendant in error.

COBB P.J.

The charge of the court excepted to sets out a correct statement of the law. "Statements made with the bona fide intent on the part of the speaker to protect his own interest in a matter where it is concerned" are deemed privileged communications. Civ. Code 1895, § 3840, subd. 3. The other principle contained in the charge, that statements made in good faith in the prosecution of an inquiry regarding a crime which has been committed, are privileged communications, is in accordance with the ruling of this court. In the case of Ventress v. Rosser, 73 Ga. 539, where the defendant was sued for slander, the slander being his accusation that the plaintiff had committed larceny, this court said "The declaration sufficiently shows, as does the evidence had on the trial, that the alleged slanderous charge was made in the performance of a public as well as a private duty, both legal and moral; and the jury by their verdicts have found that it was made bona fide. It was therefore a privileged communication." See, also, Newell on Slander and Libel (2d Ed.) 500 et seq.; Townsend on Slander and Libel (4th Ed.) 421 et seq. To hold otherwise would be to raise a barrier between a criminal and detection, and impose a silence upon those whose knowledge might, and often does lead to the arrest and conviction of the wrongdoer. Where a charge of the character involved in the present case is made against a person, and injury results therefrom, his right of action does not depend solely upon his...