Chapman v. Berry

• Decision Date: 28 October 1895
• Citation: 18 So. 918,73 Miss. 437
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: HENRY CHAPMAN ET AL. v. J. P. BERRY

18 So. 918

73 Miss. 437

HENRY CHAPMAN ET AL. v. J. P. BERRY

Supreme Court of Mississippi

October 28, 1895

FROM the circuit court of the first district of Hinds county, HON J. B. CHRISMAN, Judge.

The appellant and judgment debtor, Chapman, was an employee of the garnishee, the Alabama & Vicksburg Railway Company working for wages at $ 81 per month, payable monthly. The railway company was garnisheed on April 8, 1895, when one month's wages were due. This money was retained by the company. Chapman having informed the company that, his credit being thus impaired, he could not live and support the family of which he was the head, unless the company would supply him from month to month from the subsistence car and charge the amount supplied to his wages. If this were done he could continue in its service. To this the company assented, and he was supplied from month to month. On the return day of the writ there was due to him from the company $ 121, being the first month's wages and the monthly balances unexpended. The cause was tried on July 9, 1895, before the court without a jury, and it was held that the garnishee was bound for the four months' wages earned by Chapman since the service of the writ, less $ 100, the statutory exemption, and judgment rendered accordingly. A motion to set aside the judgment was overruled, and this appeal thereupon prosecuted.

Nugent & Mc Willie, for the appellant.

Notwithstanding the contrary view of the court below, we still refer with confidence to the case of Chandler v. White, 71 Miss. 161, as decisive of the question involved in the one at bar.

It is true that by another section of the code of 1892 (§ 2135) the garnishee is required to answer as to all indebtedness that accrues from the time of service to the return day of the writ, but there is no conflict between that provision and the section creating the exemption. Sec. 1962 subdiv. 10 (a). Each month's wages were exempt from garnishment. Whatever can be lawfully stopped is stopped by service of the process, and may be subjected to the payment of the judgment, but no more. Else the law itself must be nugatory. Hall v. Hartwell, 8 N.E. 333, s.c. 142 Mass. 447.

In the similar case of Sullivan v. Hardy, 35 N.E. 103, s.c 160 Mass. 32, the plaintiff sued the garnishee for his wages, notwithstanding the garnishment, and had judgment, the court holding that the garnishment was no defense at all. "The sum not exceeding $ 10, if due for such wages, is payable, notwithstanding the pendency of the trustee process, because in no event can the same be subject to attachment."

The garnishment did not in any way impair the power of the parties to contract, nor relieve the company of its duty to pay its wage-earner his monthly earnings. The existing condition had rendered an alteration in the contract essential; the laborer had the right, and it was his duty, to stipulate for bread in favor of himself and family, and the company could not be prevented from complying with the righteous demand. The creditor had no right in law to garnishee the wages, and by his unlawful attempt to circumvent the statute by a garnishment, should not be suffered to reap any advantage. While men do not live by bread alone, they must have bread to live, and our statute does not intend that a creditor, by garnishment, can deprive the laborer, not to say his little children, of bread. A man can, no more than a horse, work without food, and the statute is not susceptible of a construction that would reduce the head of a family to beggary, and render him unable to provide for those whose maintenance depends upon his daily toil. It is based upon the soundest considerations of public policy and humanity, and should be liberally construed.

A. H. Jayne and J. C. for the appellee.

1. The case of Chandler v. White, 71 Miss. 161, is not authority for the contention of appellant's counsel. The statute can no more be tortured into meaning that $ 100 is exempt each month than that $ 100 is exempt each year. In that case there were several garnishments, and as many answers, and the total of all amounts admitted to be due the defendant exceeded $ 100, and judgment was given for the overplus. In the Massachusetts cases very similar facts existed, and none of these cases are in point. In the case at bar there was only one garnishment, and only one answer by the garnishee. Between the time the writ was served and the filing of the answer $ 324 had accrued to defendant, including what was due at the time of service. Does a single garnishment cover the entire period from service of writ to answer filed? If it does, then the judgment of the lower court is right. A garnishment is in the nature of an attachment, and the moment anything belonging to the debtor comes into the hands of the garnishee, a lien attaches, unless it is exempt, and the garnishee cannot escape liability by paying it or delivering to the defendant or anyone else. Under our statute, as construed, a laborer or wage-earner may be getting more than $ 100 per month and still have a balance due him less than $ 100 when his employer is garnisheed, and claim it as exempt. So, also, if a laborer or wage-earner is getting less than $ 100 per month, and allows it to remain in the hands of his employer until more than $ 100 is due him when the writ is served, only the $ 100 would be exempt, no matter how small his monthly wages might be.

The question in this case is, as stated above, What is included in a single garnishment? Does it include the entire time between the service of the writ and answer filed? We think it means nothing else. Bremer v. Mohn, 32 A. 90. Besides, our statute requires the garnishee to answer on oath "whether he be indebted to the defendant at the time of the service of the writ on him, or have at any time since been indebted." Code 1892, § 2135.

2. If we should be mistaken in the view that the whole amount, less the exemption of $ 100, is subject to the garnishment, we think it is clear that, if at any one time during the pendency of the suit more than $ 100 was due to the defendant, it would not be exempt. The answer says that, at the time it...