Chapman v. Capoccia

• Decision Date: 17 May 2001
• Citation: 283 A.D.2d 798,725 N.Y.S.2d 430
• Parties: THOMAS CHAPMAN, Appellant,<BR>v.<BR>ANDREW F. CAPOCCIA et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

283 A.D.2d 798

725 N.Y.S.2d 430

THOMAS CHAPMAN, Appellant,

v.ANDREW F. CAPOCCIA et al., Respondents.

Mugglin, J.

Decided May 17, 2001.

Peters, J. P., Spain, Carpinello and Lahtinen, JJ., concur.

Mugglin, J.

Defendants do not dispute that they were retained by plaintiff to institute an action for injuries that he sustained in an automobile accident which occurred March 26, 1987. Likewise, defendants do not dispute that they failed to institute that action before it was barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations. The sole defense pursued in this legal malpractice action for defendants' failure to commence a lawsuit with respect to said accident was that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), thus barring the personal injury action. At the close of proof, defendants moved to dismiss for plaintiff's failure to establish the existence of a serious injury and for failure to establish a causal connection between the 1987 accident and plaintiff's claimed injury of posttraumatic stress disorder (hereinafter PTSD). Supreme Court reserved on the motion and submitted the case to the jury. By a vote of 5 to 1, the jury determined that (1) plaintiff suffered a permanent loss of use of a body function or system in the accident, (2) the accident was a substantial factor in causing this permanent loss, (3) plaintiff sustained a significant limitation of use of a body function or system as a result of this accident, (4) the accident was a substantial factor in causing this limitation, and (5) total damages both preverdict and postverdict for pain and suffering were $255,000. Defendants thereafter moved to set aside the verdict pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a). Supreme Court granted defendants' trial motion, upon which it had reserved decision, and dismissed the complaint, prompting this appeal by plaintiff.

As a preliminary matter, although Supreme Court made reference to the posttrial motion in its decision, it is evident from reading the decision that the court did not set aside the jury verdict as against the weight of the evidence but, rather, granted defendants' trial motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to establish a prima facie case on the issues of serious injury and proximate causation. The decision focuses entirely on the latter issues (see, Quinn v Licausi, 263 AD2d 820) and not on the former (see, Rosabella v Fanelli, 225 AD2d 1007, 1008). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Supreme Court incorrectly granted this motion and we therefore reverse.

Our analysis begins by recognizing, as did Supreme Court, that absent a serious injury, there could be no recovery in a personal injury action arising out of a motor vehicle accident (see, Licari v Elliott, 57 NY2d 230). Moreover, as Supreme Court correctly noted, "serious injury must be established through `competent medical evidence based upon objective medical findings and diagnostic tests'" (Uhl v Sofia, 245 AD2d 988, 990, quoting Eisen v Walter & Samuels, 215 AD2d 149, 150), and "[i]t is incumbent upon the court to decide in the first instance whether plaintiff has a cause of action to assert within the meaning of the statute" (Licari v Elliott, supra, at 237). While the physical injuries sustained by plaintiff in this accident undoubtedly would not qualify as serious within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), this Court (see, Sellitto v Casey, 268 AD2d 753; Spinrad v Gasser, 235 AD2d 687), and the other Appellate Divisions of this State (see, Wyman v Giarnella & Son, 170 AD2d 229; Quaglio v Tomaselli, 99 AD2d 487; Arno v Kennedy, 88 AD2d 754), have all recognized that an emotional injury, causally related to an automobile accident, can constitute a serious injury sufficient to maintain a cause of action to recover damages for noneconomic loss. Thus, this record must be examined to determine if there is objective medical evidence of PTSD within the guidelines of these cases.

This record contains the testimony of plaintiff's treating orthopedist, his treating psychiatrist and the psychiatrist who examined plaintiff twice, once in 1988 concerning no-fault benefits and once in 1999 for his independent medical examination relative to this trial. Plaintiff established a prima facie case, sufficient to permit the...