Chapman v. Chapman

• Decision Date: 10 October 1895
• Citation: 32 S.W. 564
• Parties: CHAPMAN v. CHAPMAN.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 564

32 S.W. 564

CHAPMAN v. CHAPMAN.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

October 10, 1895.

Appeal from district court, Victoria county; S. F. Grimes, Judge.

Application by Jesse R. White for letters of administration in the estate of Thomas Chapman, deceased. From a decree of the district court adjudging the right to administer to be in Johanna Chapman, as surviving wife, Emma Chapman appeals. Affirmed.

A. B. & W. M. Peticolas, for appellant. Fly & Hill, for appellee.

WILLIAMS, J.

This is a contest over the right to the administration of the estate of Thomas Chapman, deceased. The proceeding was instituted in the county court by the application of Jesse R. White for letters of administration. Appellant appeared, and contested the application, alleging that she was the widow of deceased; that the property to be administered was community property of him and herself, and was exempt to her; and asserting the right, as survivor, to control and administer it. White replied, denying that appellant had ever been the wife of deceased, and alleged that Johanna Chapman, the appellee, had been his only lawful wife, and was his widow, and that she had waived her right to administer in his favor. In the county court appellant was held to be the widow of deceased, and the survivor of the community, and, as such, entitled to administer. From the judgment so ordering, White appealed to the district court. Johanna, who had filed in the county court her waiver of any right to administer in favor of White, filed a plea of intervention in the district court, averring that she was the surviving widow of deceased; that the property in question belonged to the community estate, and that she was entitled to control it as such survivor. She prayed that, in case the court found that there was no necessity for an administration of the estate, the property be turned over to her as the surviving widow. The district court adjudged that Johanna was the lawful wife of Thomas Chapman; that Emma was never his lawful wife; that any alleged marriage between her and deceased was unlawful; and that Johanna, as surviving wife, was entitled to administer the estate. It appeared from the evidence that in August, 1865, without license, Thomas and Johanna were married, the ceremony being performed by a minister, and that they lived together until 1873, when they separated, but were never divorced. They had born to them a son and daughter, both of whom are still living. For a considerable part of the time while they so lived together Emma Wade resided in the same neighborhood, and all of the parties were acquainted with each other. In 1878, Thomas and Emma procured a license in Calhoun county, and the marriage ceremony between them was performed by a justice of the peace in that county, and they lived together as man and wife until the death of Thomas, in 1893. They also had children, who are living. The property in controversy, or most of it, was acquired during the existence of this relation between Thomas and Emma. It consists of 160 acres of land patented to Thomas as a pre-emption in 1889, and some personal property. Upon this land he and Emma lived with their children until his death. His son by Johanna also lived on it. The parties were all colored, and were slaves until the general emancipation of slaves took place. These facts were agreed to between the parties at the trial. A bill of exceptions recites that during the trial appellant offered to prove that she married Thomas Chapman in good faith, believing that he was a single man, and that no impediment to their marriage existed, being so assured by him; that she did not know that Johanna Chapman was then the wife of Thomas Chapman, or had ever been legally married to him; that Johanna lived in the same neighborhood with herself and Thomas from the date of their marriage until his death, knew that they were living together, and never denied the legality of their marriage, or asserted marital rights in herself. This evidence was excluded, but the bill of exceptions does not state the objection or ground on which this was done, nor does it state how the proof was to have been made. The judgment recites that the court suggested that there was probably no necessity for administration, and thereupon counsel for contestant (appellant) suggested that Johanna Chapman should appear and set up her claim to the property involved, so as to have all issues involved fully settled in this proceeding, whereupon, with consent of the court, the plea of intervention was filed. The only adjudication, however, made by the court is that before stated. The conclusions of law of the judge hold that the property in question (which had been inventoried by Emma in connection with her pleading) was the community property of Thomas and Johanna, and that she was entitled to administer on the estate, and that the marriage between Thomas and Emma was illegal and void, and that she was entitled to no part of...