Chapman v. Chapman
| Decision Date | 29 November 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 18240,18240 |
| Parties | Carol Cartwright CHAPMAN, Appellant, v. I. B. CHAPMAN II, Individually and as Trustee of the Carol Cartwright Chapman Irrevocable Living Trust, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
This is a bill of review case instituted by a divorced wife to set aside the property settlement provisions of a divorce decree. From a summary judgment in favor of the former husband, the wife has appealed.
We affirm.
In contemplation of divorce, I. B. Chapman II and Carol Cartwright Chapman entered into a separation and property settlement agreement. The agreement purported to divide the community property of the couple into two "roughly equal" shares. During the negotiations antecedent to execution of the agreement, the former husband was represented by counsel and aided by accountants. The wife was not represented by counsel. Shortly after the separation agreement was signed, the wife filed for divorce. In these proceedings the wife was represented by counsel. The divorce was granted, and the decree incorporated the property settlement agreement.
At a later point in time, the husband sought a change in the child support provisions of the divorce decree. In resistance to such attempt the wife hired another lawyer. During a review of the situation with the second lawyer, the wife discovered what she deemed to have amounted to misrepresentations of the husband made in order to induce her to enter into the property settlement agreement. By reason thereof she filed her suit.
In preparation for suit, the wife sought to take depositions of various persons and financial organizations. The wife's notice of intent to take such depositions was quashed by the trial court. On appeal the wife complains that the failure of the trial court to allow her to take the depositions was an abuse of discretion as it denied her right of discovery; and that there was further abuse of discretion by failure of the trial court to grant her motion for continuance. Additionally, the wife complains that the trial court erred in granting or considering the husband's motion for summary judgment because the husband failed to satisfy the requirements therefor under Tex.R.Civ.P. 166-A, "Summary Judgment", and, furthermore, because her own pleadings raised genuine issues of material fact.
We are unable to agree with any of the wife's contentions. The circumstances of the instant case are almost identical to those in Bankston v. Bankston, 251 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1952, mand. overr.). There a wife sought to overturn a property settlement agreement incorporated into a divorce decree on the ground that the settlement was procured by fraud practiced on an unrepresented and unsuspecting wife.
The divorce decree in the instant case is very similar as it embodied a property settlement agreement which was based on valuations of community property, most of which were ongoing business concerns managed by the husband. Here, as in Bankston, the husband had provided the wife with the material information of the value and nature of these concerns; and it was this information on which the wife relied in agreeing to the property division. Such information was contained in a sworn affidavit which set forth the personal financial statement of the husband and the wife.
It is this information which is made the basis of the wife's bill of review under detailed allegations of fraud. The wife alleged that the values assigned to the property were incorrect and were stated so as to benefit the husband. Specifically the wife alleged that (1) her former husband made representations of the value of the properties appearing in the schedules (the personal financial statements), (2) the question of value was a material fact when the property settlement was made, (3) the representations made by the husband were false when they were made, (4) the representations were made to induce her to rely on them so that she would enter into the property settlement agreement, (5) the representations were relied upon and her reliance was the reason she entered into the settlement agreement, and (6) as a result of the representations by the husband, the wife was injured and suffered damages because she did not receive that to which she was justly entitled. The wife did not, however, allege any specific act of fraud on the part of her former husband; nor did she specify any particular property which had been allegedly undervalued, nor its proper value.
The husband's motion for summary judgment was supported by sworn affidavits which included a certified copy of the divorce decree and a sworn statement by his certified public accountant attesting to the valuation of the property included in the property settlement agreement. The sworn statements attested to the method by which the husband's property was valued at the time the divorce was decreed.
In reviewing a summary judgment case, the evidence is to be considered in the most favorable light to the party against whom the motion was granted. In this bill of review case, we must examine the evidence which the wife could or did present to the trial court. The theory upon which the wife sought relief was fraud by her husband. We must carefully scrutinize the facts presented as they pertain to such fraud, in particular to its nature and character, i. e., "intrinsic" or "extrinsic".
The wife made no allegations as to how and when her husband's fraud was discovered, or why it was not discovered sooner than it was. She simply concluded that as a result of the fraud, she would be entitled to more money than was...
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