Chapman v. Greenville Chamber of Commerce

• Decision Date: 10 December 1923
• Docket Number: 11370.
• Parties: CHAPMAN v. GREENVILLE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ET AL.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

120 S.E. 584

127 S.C. 173

CHAPMAN v. GREENVILLE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ET AL.

No. 11370.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

December 10, 1923

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Greenville County; Thos J. Mauldin, Judge.

Action by Judson W. Chapman, in his own right, and as a citizen etc., against the Greenville Chamber of Commerce, Greenville County, and others. From the judgment rendered, plaintiff and defendant Greenville County appeal. Affirmed.

The decree of Circuit Judge T. J. Mauldin was as follows:

By act of the Legislature approved February 2, 1923 (33 St. at Large, p. 688), Greenville Chamber of Commerce is given the sole and exclusive control until March 31, 2023, of the former courthouse belonging to Greenville county, situate on the east side of Main street, in the middle of Court street in the city of Greenville, together with the land upon which the building is situate, and such other land adjacent thereto as may be considered by the directors of the Chamber of Commerce advisable for erecting a new building thereon, if the city council of Greenville shall consent to the occupation of such additional land. The Chamber of Commerce is authorized to borrow money to erect a new building, and to mortgage the land and new building up to March 31, 2023, at which time the control of the property by the Chamber of Commerce shall cease, and the site and building become the absolute property of Greenville county, free of all incumbrances. The building may be used by the Chamber of Commerce; but it shall provide a rest room or rooms for the people of Greenville county and an office for the county demonstration agent. Any portion of the building not needed for those purposes may be leased by the Chamber of Commerce all surplus income to be equally divided between the Chamber of Commerce and the county of Greenville. The city council has agreed to execute to the Chamber of Commerce a quitclaim deed to a strip of land immediately in rear of the present building. Part of this strip is occupied by a flower bed inclosed by a curbstone; the remainder is a part of East Court street. The Chamber of Commerce has negotiated a loan of $250,000 from an insurance company for the erection of the new building.

The plaintiff asks an injunction upon the ground that the said act of 1923 is unconstitutional in that it attempts, in violation of article 3, § 31, of the Constitution of 1895, to authorize a donation to a private corporation of public property which is either owned or controlled by the state of South Carolina, or by Greenville county, or by the city of Greenville, or the beneficial use of which is vested in Greenville county, subject to the control of the General Assembly; also, that said act relates to more than one subject, and thus contravenes article 3, § 17, of said Constitution.

The answer of Greenville county attacks the act upon the same grounds, and upon the ground that the act purports to empower the county to engage in the renting of property to private individuals, to engage in private business outside the scope of county government, and to participate in the rents and profits of the building to be erected, thus engaging in joint ownership and partnership with a private corporation, and violating section 6 of article 10 of said Constitution.

The land in question and all other land in that portion of what is now the city of Greenville formerly belonged to Lemuel J. Alston. His unknown heirs were made parties defendant and served by publication. No answer has been filed on behalf of any of them. The defendant city of Greenville answered, admitting that it has agreed to execute to Greenville county a quitclaim deed conveying all its interest in a certain strip of land immediately in rear of the building in question for the sole purpose of permitting the Chamber of Commerce to erect thereon an eight or ten story office building. The answer alleges that this strip of land and the lot upon which the building in question now stands are portions of Court street, and were laid out and dedicated to the public for street purposes by Lemuel J. Alston. It denies that Greenville county is the owner of the land upon which said building now stands, or that the land was ever dedicated to the county for the purpose of erecting a courthouse thereon. It alleges that the land so dedicated to the county for a courthouse was in the center of Main street, in front of the building in question.

The defendant Greenville Chamber of Commerce answered, denying any infringement of the Constitution.

By agreement, the case was argued and submitted to me at chambers on August 3, 1923. The fundamental question submitted for the decision of the court is whether the land now occupied by the old courthouse (sometimes referred to as the "Record Building") and the land immediately in rear thereof were dedicated by Lemuel J. Alston to the public, and, if so, for what purpose. Upon this foundation the whole superstructure rests.

It is admitted that no deed to this property was executed by Mr. Alston, and that the decision of this question depends upon plats. It is admitted that the plat filed in the office of the register of mesne conveyances for Greenville county in Deed Book E, at page 62, is the original "chart of the village of Pleasantburg," by which the village (now the city of Greenville) was laid out by Lemuel J. Alston, and which is referred to in numerous subsequent deeds. On this plat the courthouse is shown in the middle of the intersection of two streets, now known as Main street and Court street. The courthouse is shown on said plat as surrounded by an open space, from which the plaintiff and the county of Greenville argue that such open space must necessarily be considered a public square or courthouse square (though no such words appear on the plat), and that the inference is irresistible that such open space was dedicated for that definite specific purpose. This inference appears forced and unsupported by anything appearing upon the plat. Just east of the courthouse the jail is indicated on said plat in the middle of what is now Court street. If the mere placing of the courthouse in the middle of an open space makes that space "courthouse square," it may be said with equal force that the placing of the jail in an open space renders that open space "jail square." Both the Courthouse and the jail were moved long ago to other locations. It is admitted that the spaces on said plat then occupied by the courthouse and jail have been used as streets for about 100 years. A glance at the plat will show that the open spaces immediately surrounding both the courthouse and the jail must necessarily have been used as streets at that time; otherwise both streets would have been completely blocked at those points, and the public could not have used them at all. At the time (prior to 1795) when Lemuel J. Alston laid out the village and had this plat made, he must have intended, therefore, that the open spaces surrounding the courthouse and the jail should be used as streets. This conclusion is rendered inevitable by an inspection of the plat. Mr. Alston could not possibly have intended to interrupt absolutely the two main streets of the village. It is equally clear that those open spaces must have been used by the public, not only to obtain access to the courthouse and to the jail, but to pass along what is now Main street and along what is now Court street; in no other way could the public have used either of these streets. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the open spaces surrounding the courthouse and the jail were dedicated by Mr. Alston to the public for street purposes, and were so accepted by the public, and that when the courthouse and the jail were removed from the sites on which they were shown on said plat, those sites also became portions of the streets.

The burden is upon the plaintiff and upon Greenville county to establish by the greater weight of the evidence their claim that the open space surrounding the former site of the courthouse was definitely and specifically dedicated to the public as a "square" or "courthouse square"; for they are attacking the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature presumed to be valid unless the contrary shall appear. This presumption of validity extends to everything in the Act and to everything upon which the act is based. If the plaintiff and Greenville county claim that the dedication was not general in its nature, or for street purposes, but was clearly and definitely for some other purpose, it is incumbent upon them to show that such was the case, and to prove the specific purpose for which the dedication was made and accepted. They have submitted no proof as to any specific purpose. They have not even introduced testimony tending to contradict the dedication for street purposes. The word "square" does not appear upon the original chart in question, nor upon any of the subsequent city plats introduced in evidence; nor is there any testimony before the court tending to show that the open space in question was ever called "courthouse square."

It being clear that the dedication of the open space by Mr. Alston was for street purposes, it cannot be asserted that Greenville county has any special or peculiar interest in or control over the open space in question. The dedication was not to Greenville county, but to the public at large, though the land is situated in the county of Greenville and in the city of Greenville. 3 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.) 1122.

Under the general laws of South Carolina, these public highways were under the control of Greenville county until the incorporation of the village of Greenville by act of December 17, 1831 (see 6 St. at...