Chapman v. Inhabitants of Nobleboro

• Decision Date: 21 October 1884
• Citation: 76 Me. 427
• Parties: LAURA E. CHAPMAN v. INHABITANTS OF NOBLEBORO.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

76 Me. 427

LAURA E. CHAPMAN v. INHABITANTS OF NOBLEBORO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

October 21, 1884

ON exceptions by the defendants.

An action for the recovery of damages for personal injuries sustained May 2, 1883, by the plaintiff by reason of defective way in the defendant town.

The writ was dated September 17, 1883. Before going to trial, on motion of plaintiff and against defendants' objections the court allowed amendments of the declaration in plaintiff's writ by interlineation of the following words after the words " travelled way" to wit: " And projecting above the surface of the same nine inches; " and also after the word " root," the words, " or another root lying there embedded and projecting above said way."

There was evidence tending to prove that the distance from the residence of Cyrus Winslow and Judson Genthner, northerly to the defect complained of in plaintiff's writ, was from one hundred and six to one hundred and ten rods. The defendants contended that the location of the defect, which caused the injury, was not sufficiently designated in the written notice required to be given within fourteen days after injury.

The presiding judge among other things instructed the jury, as follows: " Assuming that you find that fact (twenty-four hours notice) in her favor, then it is necessary that she should prove that she gave notice to the town of the injury, state circumstantially how it occurred, the amount of damages which she claims, within fourteen days after the accident occurred. A written notice has been served in this case. I consider it to be an admitted fact, (if I am wrong, counsel will correct me) that that notice was delivered to the proper officer within fourteen days after this accident occurred. I instruct you as matter of law that this notice is sufficient in form. The form of the notice is a question of law for me. I instruct you that so far as the form is concerned it is legally sufficient…. I instruct you as matter of law that the notice was sufficient. It being admitted that it was delivered, you will have no difficulty upon that point."

To the allowance of the amendments and to the said instructions and rulings of the presiding judge the defendants alleged exceptions.

(Notice.)

" Damariscotta, May 15, 1883.

To the selectmen of Nobleboro, gentlemen:

You are hereby notified that on the second day of May, 1883, I met with an injury caused by a defect in the road leading from Genthner's corner in Nobleboro to Jefferson, at a point in Nobleboro about sixty to eighty rods northerly of the residence of Cyrus Winslow and Judson Genthner. The defect consisted of a hole in the travelled part of said road, which had been worn or gulled out ten inches below the surface of a long root over which the travel passed, into which the wheel of the carriage in which I was riding, dropped, and between the spokes of which the projecting end of the root was thrust, causing the carriage to suddenly stop. The carriage was broken, and I was thrown violently out of the carriage upon the ground, striking upon my face and chest, wrenching my neck and shoulders, so that the same was severely strained and sprained, and also severely injuring my spine, and jarring and injuring my whole person; by reason of which I have been and still am suffering great pain and distress.

For these injuries I claim from the town of Nobleboro, the sum of two thousand dollars, as damages.

(Signed.) Laura E. Chapman."

A P. Gould, for the plaintiff.

William H. Hilton, for the defendants, contended that the amendments gave a different description of the defect than that stated in the notice and therefore introduced a new cause of action. Milliken v. Whitehouse, 49 Me. 527.

Only such writings as can be expounded without the aid of extrinsic facts are for the court to interpret. State v. Patterson, 68 Me. 473.

It would seem that the written notices in Larkin v. Boston, 128 Mass. 521, and Rogers v. Shirley, 74 Me. 144, could be expounded and interpreted without the aid of extrinsic facts. In this case the extrinsic facts showed the notice to be fatally defective, but they were not passed upon by the jury.

Might not the jury very properly have considered whether the plaintiff had pointed out to the municipal officers in her written notice the location of the identical defect which caused the injury.

Counsel further contended that the notice in this case was not sufficient as a matter of law, citing: Cronin v. Boston, 135 Mass. 110; Hubbard v. Fayette, 70 Me. 121; Blackington Rockland, 66 Me. 332; Veazie v. Rockland, 68 Me. 511.

DANFORTH J.

The plaintiff was permitted to amend her writ under the objection of the defendant in two respects. The first of the amendments is, not a change in, but an addition to the description of the alleged defect in the way, and the second relates to the manner in which the accident happened; leaving the accident itself and the result of it the same. There is, therefore no...