Chapman v. Norfolk and Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 27 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. 12718,12718
• Citation: 665 A.2d 112,39 Conn.App. 306
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Donald CHAPMAN et al. v. NORFOLK AND DEDHAM MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

Page 112

665 A.2d 112

39 Conn.App. 306

Donald CHAPMAN et al. v. NORFOLK AND DEDHAM MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

No. 12718.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 6, 1995.

Decided Sept. 12, 1995.

Certification Denied Oct. 27, 1995.

[39 Conn.App. 308] Jon D. Biller, with whom was David Rozwaski, North Haven, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Stephen E. Goldman, with whom, on the brief, were Patricia J. Campanella and Linda L. Morkan, Hartford, for the appellees (defendants).

Before DUPONT, C.J., and FOTI and HENNESSY, JJ.

DUPONT, Chief Judge.

The plaintiffs, Donald and Linda Chapman, appeal from the judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Norfolk & Dedham) and Nygren & Nygren, Inc., on all counts of the plaintiffs' complaint for breach of contract, bad faith, and unfair insurance practices in violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. (CUPTA), and the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act, General Statutes § 38a-815 et seq. (CUIPA). The plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly (1) submitted confusing interrogatories to the jury, (2) admitted evidence that was highly prejudicial to the plaintiffs, and (3) refused to allow the plaintiffs to file a reply to the defendants' amended special defenses. We affirm the judgment.

Certain facts are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiffs jointly owned a home that was insured by Norfolk & Dedham under a comprehensive homeowner's insurance policy. The plaintiffs regularly paid their premiums on the policy. On February 7, 1989, there was a fire at the plaintiffs' home, resulting in damage to their real and personal property. The fire rendered the plaintiffs' home uninhabitable, and the plaintiffs had to live temporarily in a trailer. The plaintiffs notified Norfolk & Dedham of the fire and the resulting loss of property. Norfolk & Dedham hired Nygren & Nygren, Inc., as its adjuster. The defendants investigated the fire claim and concluded that the fire was the accidental result of an electrical problem. The defendants reimbursed the plaintiffs for their losses, but a dispute arose between the parties concerning the proper assessment of the damages sustained, and the plaintiffs claimed that they were not fully reimbursed.

On July 4, 1989, a second fire totally destroyed what remained of the plaintiffs' home. The plaintiffs notified the defendants of the second fire and the resulting destruction of the family home. The defendants conducted another investigation and denied The plaintiffs filed the underlying action on January 8, 1990. The first count of the complaint alleged breach of contract for the defendants' failure to reimburse the plaintiffs fully for the first fire in February, 1989, and for refusing to reimburse the plaintiffs at all for the second fire in July, 1989. The remaining counts of the complaint alleged bad faith, unfair insurance practices in violation of CUTPA and CUIPA, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. ² The defendants denied all of the plaintiffs' allegations and claimed that no further payments were owed to the plaintiffs for the first fire. The defendants also filed special defenses claiming, inter alia, that (1) both plaintiffs had committed fraud and concealed facts and made misrepresentations to the defendants, (2) both plaintiffs had been dishonest as to the cause and origin of the second fire and their financial condition, (3) the July, 1989 fire had been intentionally caused by the plaintiff Donald Chapman, and (4) both plaintiffs had failed to take adequate steps to preserve their property at and after the second fire, thereby rendering the policy void.

reimbursement for the loss resulting from the second fire on the basis that Donald Chapman had intentionally set this second fire and that both Donald and Linda Chapman had committed fraud and had made material misrepresentations to the defendants. ¹

The case was tried to a jury. ³ The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. In response to verdict interrogatories, the jury found that Linda Chapman did not set the second fire, but that Donald Chapman did. The jury also indicated on the interrogatories that both plaintiffs had made misrepresentations to the defendants and had failed to protect their property with respect to the July, 1989 fire. The jury also denied any further payment to the plaintiffs with respect to the first fire.

The plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside the verdict, which was denied. The trial court's refusal to set aside the verdict is entitled to great weight in our assessment of the plaintiffs' claims. Norrie v. Heil Co., 203 Conn. 594, 606, 525 A.2d 1332 (1987).

I JURY INTERROGATORIES

Both parties submitted proposed jury interrogatories to the court. The court rejected both parties' interrogatory forms and submitted its own. ⁴ The jury responded to all the interrogatories against both When the jury verdict was returned, the plaintiffs' counsel requested that the interrogatories be clarified and resubmitted to the jury. ⁵ Counsel for the defendants objected to the proposed resubmission. ⁶ The trial court initially agreed with the plaintiffs ⁷ and indicated it would resubmit the interrogatories. The defendants argued, however, that resubmitting the interrogatories might complicate rather than clarify the record, and further, that there were no inconsistencies in the answers to the interrogatories because the questions as to fraud and misrepresentation were phrased in the plural, and evidence had been presented as to both plaintiffs on those issues. The court then agreed with the The plaintiffs claim that the interrogatories submitted by the court to the jury were improper because they created new defenses that were never tried, misstated the facts and were internally inconsistent because they did not separate the issues and the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs further claim that although the court instructed the jury that Linda Chapman could be an "innocent spouse," the court's interrogatories did not allow the jury to distinguish between the plaintiffs as to the issues of fraud, misrepresentation and failure to preserve and protect property, thereby resulting in prejudice toward Linda Chapman, who might have recovered as an innocent spouse if the jury had considered her separately. The plaintiffs note that the court did distinguish between the two plaintiffs in the interrogatory on arson, ⁹ and they argue that the court should have made a similar distinction in its interrogatories with respect to the other special defenses. The plaintiffs also claim that the court's interrogatories improperly applied the special defenses of fraud, material misrepresentation and intentional concealment to the first fire, when the only issue as to the first fire was whether the plaintiffs had been fully reimbursed.

plaintiffs, with the exception of their finding that Linda Chapman had not started the second fire. The transcript indicates that at some point, off the record, the court, apparently in response to objections by both parties to the form of the interrogatories, had advised the parties that it would not change the form of its interrogatories before submitting them to the jury, but would wait for the verdict, and if there were inconsistent answers, would then resubmit the interrogatories for clarification defendants and ruled that the interrogatories would not be resubmitted. ⁸

The defendants' first response to the plaintiffs' argument is that the plaintiffs failed to preserve this claim for appellate review. We conclude that although it is obvious that many of the pertinent legal arguments were made off the record in chambers, the "trial court record in this case contains the factual basis necessary for appellate consideration" of the plaintiffs' claim, and accordingly, we will review this claim. See State v. Torres, 230 Conn. 372, 380, 645 A.2d 529 (1994). In the alternative, the defendants argue that the verdict should stand because the interrogatory responses are consistent with the verdict. ¹⁰ The defendants argue that if the jury had determined that the defendants did not prove their special defenses with respect to both plaintiffs, they would have answered the interrogatories in the negative. We agree with the defendants.

"The function of jury interrogatories is to provide a guide for the jury's reasoning, and a written chronicle of that reasoning." Hammer v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 25 Conn.App. 702, 710, 596 A.2d 1318, cert. denied, 220 Conn. 933, 599 A.2d 384 (1991). "Where two or more counts have been alleged in a complaint, or when two or more causes of action are incorporated in one count, as here, the defendant has the right to save himself from the implication of a general verdict by seeking from the jury answers to apt and proper interrogatories.... In such situations, it is the duty of the trial court, upon request, to submit such interrogatories as would accomplish this purpose." (Citation omitted.) Hartford v. Anderson Fairoaks, Inc., 7 Conn.App. 591, 594, 510 A.2d 200 (1986). "[A] trial court has broad discretion to regulate the manner in which interrogatories are presented to the jury, as well as their form and content." Hammer v. Mount Sinai Hospital, supra, at 708, 596 A.2d 1318. This court will not uphold interrogatories "Interrogatories 'should generally be few in number, and never so numerous as to confuse or perplex the jury in rendering their verdict. They should be so clear and concise as to be readily understood and answered by the jury. Each question should call for a finding of but a single fact. When practicable each question should be so framed as to call for a categorical answer. Each question should ask for the finding of a fact and never for a conclusion of law. No question should ask for the finding of a purely evidential fact nor an uncontroverted fact. ...