Chapman v. Powers
| Decision Date | 27 June 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 75--31,75--31 |
| Citation | 331 N.E.2d 593,30 Ill.App.3d 44 |
| Parties | Arthur B. CHAPMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John H. POWERS d/b/a Mound House Tavern and Willie C. Franklin, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Goldenhersh & Goldenhersh, Belleville, for defendant-appellant; Michael A. Katz, Belleville, of counsel.
Edward Neville, East St. Louis, for plaintiff-appellee.
This is a suit for personal injury brought against a tavern owner under section 14 of the Dram Shop Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 43, sec. 135) and against the alleged intoxicated person who inflicted injuries on the plaintiff in the defendant's tavern. Judgment for the plaintiff was entered against both defendants. This is an appeal by the tavern owner, John H. Powers.
On April 14, 1969 plaintiff Arthur Chapman, a painter by trade, entered defendant John H. Powers' tavern to meet a person concerning a painting bid on a house. He was not a regular customer of the tavern though he had known Powers for 18 or 20 years. Powers introduced plaintiff to Willie C. Franklin, an everyday customer of the tavern, who had been in the tavern approximately 45 minutes before the plaintiff arrived. Powers suggested that while plaintiff was waiting he bowl with Mr. Franklin. Franklin asked plaintiff what they would bowl for and plaintiff said for a drink. Plaintiff lost the first game and bought a drink for Franklin and his lady friend.
They played six more games--three for $1 each and three for $5 each. Between games plaintiff sat on a bar stool and Franklin sat with his lady friend, three or four stools away from the plaintiff. After the last game plaintiff prepared to leave. When Powers asked why he was quitting and why he did't bowl some more, plaintiff said the machine was out of order, following which there was some argument between him and Powers regarding the condition of the machine. After he had put his coat on but while he was still at the bar, Franklin said he would play one more game--to which plaintiff agreed. Plaintiff put $5 under an ashtray on the bar. Franklin went to the men's room. When he came out he said he was not going to play. The plaintiff reached for his $5 but Powers grabbed it from the bar. At that time Franklin came up behind plaintiff and shot him twice in the back of the neck.
According to the testimony, plaintiff was in the tavern about two hours and had two beers. He was not intoxicated. Franklin had several highballs, though the exact number was not agreed upon. Plaintiff did not know Franklin prior to the incident, had very little to say to him, and did not sit and drink with him in the tavern.
The plaintiff sustained a massive paralysis of his right arm and a severed bronchial plexus with poor prognosis.
At the trial the police officer who investigated the shooting testified over objection by the defendant that he found a .38 revolver at Franklin's home and that Franklin admitted that it was his. He testified, over objection also, that Franklin admitted leaving the scene because he had been drinking. Defendant also objected to admission of the hospital bill in the amount of approximately $1,900.
The issues before us are whether a plaintiff who purchased a drink for his assailant prior to the occurrence is precluded from recovering against defendant under the Dram Shop Act; and whether the trial court ruled correctly in admitting into evidence the hospital bill and the testimony of the police officer regarding admissions made by Franklin.
Section 14 of the Dram Shop Act reads in part as follows:
Appellant argues that if plaintiff purchased even one drink for the intoxicated person he is guilty of complicity and cannot recover for injuries sustained at the hands of an alleged intoxicated person under the provisions of the Illinois Dram Shop Act. We do not agree. Other factors are involved in determining whether or not a plaintiff is an innocent suitor under the Dram Shop Act. While it is true that in Forsberg v. Around Town Club, 316 Ill.App. 661, 45 N.E.2d 513, the court said: 'We believe the rule is uniform that where an injured person contributes in whole or in part to the intoxication of his assailant, he cannot recover.' The plaintiff in Forsberg was himself intoxicated and there was evidence from which the jury could find that he had provoked his three assailants. Furthermore, in Forsberg the plaintiff and his assailant drank and ate together. The court said: 'We believe that by his conduct, plaintiff brought the injuries upon himself and is not such an innocent suitor as the Dram Shop Act * * * contemplates * * *.' Forsberg cites Hays v. Waite, 36 Ill.App. 397, and Bowman v. O'Brien, 303 Ill.App. 630, 25 N.E.2d 544. In Hays the court observed that the plaintiff was an active agent in keeping his assailant intoxicated, and in Bowman the court found an act of provocation on the part of the plaintiff.
In Holcomb v. Hornback, 51 Ill.App.2d 84, 200 N.E.2d 745, cited by the defendant Powers, there were important factors other than intoxication. Plaintiff and her assailant knew each other, had emotional ties, and were 'not getting along.' Prior to the shooting he spent the night with her. The next day, while at the tavern, she would not go out with him, so he shot her and then killed himself. This was a tragedy not wholly encompassed by a Dram Shop Act provision. While at the tavern she purchased no drinks for her assailant but 'participated' in the drinking. This was a minor part of a human scenario which did not depend on the tavern for its unfolding. The court intimates as much when it says: 'Plaintiff had every reason to know or suspect her assailant's condition, having spent the night with him and having observed his conduct during the morning of her injury and immediately before it.' By contrast, in the instant case, the plaintiff did not sit or visit with his assailant, did not know him, had no conversation of any consequence with him, bowled with him at the invitation of the defendant Powers and did nothing which would provoke a shooting.
Likewise in Sapp v. Johnston, 15 Ill.App.3d 119, 303 N.E.2d 429, the plaintiff and his friend Minch spent the night visiting and drinking in bars. Plaintiff went to sleep in the car and 'Michael Minch drove off the road, and the plaintiff woke up in the hospital.' Denying recovery against the tavern, the court said: '* * * the plaintiff voluntarily participated to a material and substantial extent in the drinking which led to the...
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