Chapman v. Reese

Decision Date08 January 1925
Docket Number(No. 1164.)<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL>
Citation268 S.W. 967
PartiesCHAPMAN, State Com'r of Banking, v. REESE.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Appeal from District Court, Tyler County; J. M. Combs, Judge.

Suit by J. L. Chapman, State Commissioner of Banking, in charge of the affairs of the Tyler County State Bank, insolvent, against M. M. Reese. From judgment giving him insufficient relief, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

W. J. Rogers, of Eastland, for appellant.

Mooney & Smith and J. E. Wheat, all of Woodville, for appellee.

O'QUINN, J.

J. L. Chapman, commissioner of banking for the state of Texas, in charge of the affairs of the Tyler County State Bank, insolvent, sued M. M. Reese, a stockholder in said bank, to recover the sum of $1,991.45, alleged to be a balance due on an assessment levied on the stock owned by Reese. Reese owned 40 shares of the stock of said bank at the time it ceased to do business and was taken in charge by the commissioner. The assessment was in the sum of $4,000. Reese, at the time the bank closed, had on deposit in said bank, subject to his check, $1,008.55. His wife had a checking account in said bank in the sum of $1,000. Both of these were applied on the assessment, leaving a balance of $1,991.45, the amount sued for.

The defendant, Reese, answered by general demurrer, general denial, and plea of payment, as follows:

"III. Further answering herein, this defendant says: That if he ever was indebted to the plaintiff that the same has been fully paid off and discharged during the year 1921, as follows: The sum of $1,040 in cash and another sum of $1,000 in cash, and another sum of $1,000, or which was evidenced by a certificate of deposit issued by the Tyler County State Bank, and which had matured more than three years before the date of its delivery, as aforesaid, and which was due and payable to this defendant out of the guaranty fund, which was then and there in the hands of the plaintiff at the time of its said delivery, and which said certificate was accepted by the plaintiff, or his predecessors in office, as a cash payment of $1,000. That said certificate, so delivered as aforesaid, was retained by the plaintiff, and the proper credit therefor entered on the books of the bank for the benefit of this defendant. That he was thereby deprived of his legal right to enforce his claim against the said department and said guaranty fund until the statutes of limitation would not permit him to enforce the claim aforesaid, and that said plaintiff still has in his possession the said certificate. That on the said date was a further payment of $600 in cash paid to the plaintiff, his agents or representatives, and which was accepted by the said parties as a part payment for whatever sum of money was due and owing by this defendant at the time. That certain Liberty bonds issued by the United States government, a more specific description this defendant is unable to give, for the reason that said property was delivered to plaintiff and no description of which was retained by him of their numbers or face value, and which said property is in the hands of the plaintiff, was accepted by the plaintiff as a payment of such indebtedness as was then due and owing by this defendant, if any, in the sum of $1,000, making an aggregate payment of $4,640 paid to plaintiff, and all of which was accepted by the plaintiff in full settlement, satisfaction, and discharge of any and all obligations due by the defendant to this plaintiff."

The defendant further pleaded:

"IV. This defendant further says that, having accepted the sums of money and property hereinbefore mentioned and prevented this defendant from exercising his legal rights in the protection thereof and collection thereon, he has been deprived of valuable property, which the plaintiff still retains possession of or has converted into cash, and is estopped to deny that he was not authorized to so accept the same, and in the event said plea of estoppel is not sustained, then and in that event this defendant prays for judgment for the value thereof, and especially the time certificate of the value of $1,000 and the Liberty bonds of the value of $1,000, aggregating the total of $2,000, and that such sum of money be adjudged as an offset as against any sum of money which may be found by the court to be due and owing the plaintiff by reason of the alleged assessment set out in plaintiff's petition, and of this puts himself upon the country."

To this answer, plaintiff replied by supplemental petition containing a general denial of the several matters of defense pleaded, and several special exceptions and pleas which need not be set out. The case was tried before the court without a jury, and at the conclusion of the evidence, and before the rendition of judgment, defendant abandoned his plea as to the Liberty bonds, but insisted upon his pleas of all other payments. The court sustained the payment of $600 and $1,040, represented by the time certificate of deposit, and rendered judgment for plaintiff for $351.45. From this judgment, plaintiff has appealed.

At the request of plaintiff, the court made and filed his findings of fact and conclusions of law, which, so far as is necessary to set out, are:

"III. That on the 7th day of April, 1921, the banking commissioner levied an assessment equal to the par value of all outstanding stock, including a $4,000 assessment against the defendant, M. M. Reese.

"I further find, as a matter of fact, that the defendant, M. M. Reese, has paid the total sum of $3,648.55 on said assessment, leaving a balance of $351.45 of the principal sum still unpaid; that said payments were made as follows: That on the 23d day of April, 1921, the banking commissioner, through his agent, charged the checking account of the defendant, M. M. Reese, with $1,008.55, being the balance to his credit in checking account at the time said bank closed, and applied same as a credit on said assessment.

"That on the 23d day of April, 1921, the banking commissioner, through his agent, charged the sum of $1,000 against the checking account of Mrs. M. M. Reese, wife of the defendant, being the amount to her credit in the Tyler County State Bank at the time it closed, and credited same on the assessment of the defendant.

"That prior to the closing of the Tyler County State Bank on March 28, 1921, the defendant, M. M. Reese, had an interest-bearing time deposit of $1,000 in said bank and that at the time of the closing of said bank there was accrued interest on said account remaining unpaid in the sum of $40; that the certificate of deposit evidencing this account was long past due at the time of the closing of said bank; that prior to the closing of said bank by the banking commissioner, as aforesaid, the defendant presented his said time certificate of deposit to the bank for payment, it being then past due, but that payment was refused, the bank officials stating to the defendant that the bank had not sufficient funds available and on hand with which to pay it; that subsequent to the closing of said bank and on or about the 5th day of April, 1921, L. E. Bain, liquidating agent, representing the state banking commissioner in charge of the liquidation of the affairs of said bank, contracted and agreed with the defendant, M. M. Reese, to allow him a further credit in the sum of $1,040, being the amount of principal and interest of the time deposit above referred to; that pursuant to said agreement the defendant Reese surrendered to said L. E. Bain said certificate of deposit which was accepted by said Bain, liquidating agent, as a payment of $1,040. That said L. E. Bain, liquidating agent, made entries on the books of said bank showing said amount of $1,040 on the cash receipt book of said bank...

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6 cases
  • Western Union Life Co. of Houston v. Ensminger
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • February 19, 1937
    ...v. Alamo Nat. Bank, 52 Tex.Civ.App. 561, 114 S.W. 909; Tyler County State Bank v. Shivers (Tex.Civ.App.) 281 S.W. 264; Chapman v. Reese (Tex.Civ.App.) 268 S.W. 967; Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Williams (Tex.Civ. App.) 4 S.W.(2d) 1023; Atwood v. Natural Pet. Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 7 S.W.(2d) 964; ......
  • Tyler County State Bank v. Shivers
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • February 6, 1926
    ...asserted thereunder. Cannon v. Cannon, 3 S. W. 36, 66 Tex. 682; Railway Co. v. Hinzie, 18 S. W. 681, 82 Tex. 628; Chapman v. Reese (Tex. Civ. App.) 268 S. W. 970 (writ refused). Propositions in briefs cannot supply or take the place of valid assignments. Cammack v. Rogers, 73 S. W. 795, 96 ......
  • Garonzik v. Green
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • June 4, 1925
    ...to have ascertained that fact. Besides, the assignment being too general, it cannot be aided by the proposition. Chapman v. Reese (Tex. Civ. App.) 268 S. W. 967 (writ refused). Moreover, the proposition contains a ground of error that was not presented to the court below in the motion for n......
  • Wacasey v. Wacasey
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • December 15, 1925
    ...of Civil Appeals), we think a conclusion that the assignments are objectionable on the grounds urged is inescapable. See Chapman v. Reese (Tex. Civ. App.) 268 S. W. 967; Slaydon v. Fuller (Tex. Civ. App.) 266 S. W. 573; Nogals Oil & Gas Co. v. Bank (Tex. Civ. App.) 264 S. W. 341; Texas Empl......
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