Chapman v. State
| Decision Date | 01 November 1899 |
| Citation | 34 S.E. 369,109 Ga. 157 |
| Parties | CHAPMAN v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. It was error to admit in evidence, against one on trial for a criminal offense, a declaration made by his wife in his presence before the offense was committed,--the same being offered as tending to show a threat on his part,--when the language used by the wife was not affirmatively approved by him, and was not such as to call for a disclaimer by him of any criminal intent or purpose.
2. When the evidence as to threats introduced on the trial of one charged with a crime is by no means clear or satisfactory, it is error for the court to instruct the jury that evidence had been introduced "tending to show threats."
3. After specifying the three statutory methods prescribed in the Code for impeaching witnesses, it was error for the court to instruct the jury that it was their duty to believe witness who had not been impeached by some of these designated methods; there being other legal ways in which a witness may be discredited.
4. In the trial of a criminal case, where the state relied upon evidence of an accomplice, and claimed that it had been corroborated, it was error for the court to charge the jury as follows: "Slight evidence that the crime was committed by the defendant, and identifying him with it, will corroborate the accomplice, and warrant a finding of guilty."
5. The grounds in the motion for a new trial not dealt with above are without merit; there being no error of law committed except as above indicated.
Error from superior court, Hall county; R. B. Russell, Judge.
Tom Chapman was convicted of arson, and brings error. Reversed.
W. B Sloan, J. C. Boone, Estes & Jones, and B. H. Hill, for plaintiff in error.
W. A Charters, Sol. Gen., and Dean & Hobbs, for the State.
The plaintiff in error was placed on trial in Hall superior court under an indictment containing two counts,--the first charging him and one Reuben Priest as principals in the commission of the offense of arson by burning a mill house not situate in a city, town, or village; the second count charging plaintiff in error as being an accessory before the fact to said offense, alleging that he had procured and counseled Reuben Priest to commit the offense of arson. To this indictment the defendant Reuben Priest pleaded guilty, and Tom Chapman, the plaintiff in error, was placed on trial under the issue formed by his plea of not guilty. In the prosecution the state relied for a conviction of Chapman under the second count of the indictment. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, with recommendation to mercy, and the defendant assigns error in his bill of exceptions on the judgment of the court overruling his motion for a new trial. The state relied upon the testimony of Priest for a conviction, claiming that it had been sufficiently corroborated by the facts and circumstances proved on the trial. Priest swore positively to a state of facts which, if true, fastened upon the accused the charge against him,--of being accessory before the fact to the crime of arson. D. T. Quillian appeared as prosecutor. The house burned was on his plantation, and was alleged to belong to him and another. On the trial a witness for the state testified, in substance, that he was at the defendant's house a short while before the burning, and while sitting around the fire, talking with reference to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor against the defendant, who was present with his wife, she remarked, "You will hear of Quillian's losing as much as we have by being prosecuted for selling liquor." This testimony was admitted by the court over the objection of defendant's counsel, and this is one ground of complaint in the motion for a new trial.
1. It is the policy of the law to receive with caution and care even a voluntary confession of guilt made by one charged with crime. Whenever it is insisted that the admission or confession of a party is to be inferred from his acquiescence by silence in the statements of others made in his presence, it is still more important that such testimony should be received with great caution. This is true when the statement directly and clearly charges a criminal offense or criminal purpose, and naturally calls for a denial on the part of the accused. It follows, from this caution with which the law declares the jury should receive such evidence, that, unless the declarations of another naturally call for some reply from the accused, they should not be submitted at all. This principle is clearly recognized in the case of Rolfe v. Rolfe, 10 Ga. 143, and, as far as we have investigated, is recognized by all authorities on evidence, and by the adjudications of all the courts on the subject. See 1 Greenl. Ev. (16th Ed.) § 98 et seq.; 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2nd Ed.) pp. 672-674, and numerous cases cited; Abb. Tr. Brief Cr. §§ 651, 652; Com. v. Kenney, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 235. In the case of Moore v. Smith, 14 Serg. & R. 392, Duncan, J., announcing the opinion of the supreme court of Pennsylvania on this subject, says, "Of all evidence, loose, hasty conversation is entitled to the least weight." Applying this principle of law to the question of the admissibility of the wife's declaration in this case, we think the court erred in overruling the objections made thereto by counsel for the accused. The language used by the wife carries with it no definite or certain significance whatever. It is insisted in behalf of the state that it was susceptible of the construction that the accused would inflict some injury upon the prosecutor. The state claimed that the motive for the burning was revenge on account of a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor against Priest and the accused on trial, and that the prosecutor, whose house was burned, and others, interested themselves in this prosecution. There may have been some ground of suspicion that the wife had reference to some injury that would be inflicted by her husband on the prosecutor, but this is not sufficient to construe his silence into an admission of any criminal intent on his part. The language itself has necessarily no such meaning. It might with equal propriety be insisted that the wife, in the hasty conversation around the fireside, was simply predicting that a loss would overtake the Quillians in the course of the dispensations of Providence, or that in a moment of excitement she thoughtlessly made the remark, without having any definite idea herself of exactly what she meant. Even if she did entertain the idea of doing a wrong or of causing a loss to the prosecutor or his family, there is nothing in what she said, or under the circumstances in which her statement was made, which would lead to the inference that her husband entertained the same thought and reflection that was in his wife's mind. He was simply silent. We think there was nothing in what was said to naturally call for a denial on his part, for the language used did not necessarily imply anything that would tend to inculpate him with a criminal intent or purpose; and the admission of this testimony was therefore error.
2. Exception is taken in the motion for a new trial to the following charge of the court: "There has been some evidence allowed to go before you tending to show threats." A fair inference to be drawn from this expression is that the language quoted had direct reference to the party on trial, and that the court meant there was evidence tending to show he had made threats. We fail to find in the brief of evidence any testimony of a positive threat made by the accused either against the prosecutor or any one else. As above indicated, the declarations made in his presence do not even tend to prove a threat. The only other testimony bearing upon the subject was that...
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