Chapman v. State of California, No. 95

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtBLACK
Citation87 S.Ct. 824,17 L.Ed.2d 705,24 A.L.R.3d 1065,386 U.S. 18
PartiesRuth Elizabeth CHAPMAN and Thomas LeRoy Teale, Petitioners, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Docket NumberNo. 95
Decision Date20 February 1967

386 U.S. 18
87 S.Ct. 824
17 L.Ed.2d 705
Ruth Elizabeth CHAPMAN and Thomas LeRoy Teale, Petitioners,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA.

No. 95.
Argued Dec. 7 and 8, 1966.
Decided Feb. 20, 1967.
Rehearing Denied March 27, 1967.

See 386 U.S. 987, 87 S.Ct. 1283.

Morris Lavine, Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioners.

Arlo E. Smith, San Francisco, Cal., for respondent.

Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners, Ruth Elizabeth Chapman and Thomas LeRoy Teale, were convicted in a California state court

Page 19

upon a charge that they robbed, kidnaped, and murdered a bartender. She was sentenced to life imprisonment and he to death. At the time of the trial, Art I, § 13, of the State's Constitution provided that 'in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury.' Both petitioners in this case chose not to testify at their trial, and the State's attorney prosecuting them took full advantage of his right under the State Constitution to comment upon their failure to testify, filling his argument to the jury from beginning to end with numerous references to their silence and inferences of their guilt resulting therefrom. 1 The trial court also charged the jury that it could draw adverse inferences from petitioners' failure to testify.2 Shortly after the trial, but before petitioners' cases had been considered on appeal by the California Supreme Court, this Court decided Griffin v. State of California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, in which we held California's constitutional provision and practice invalid on the ground that they put a penalty on the exercise of a person's right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself, guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the

Page 20

United States Constitution and made applicable to California and the other States by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653. On appeal, the State Supreme Court, 63 Cal.2d 178, 45 Cal.Rptr. 729, 404 P.2d 209, admitting that petitioners had been denied a federal constitutional right by the comments on their silence, nevertheless affirmed, applying the State Constitution's harmless-error provision, which forbids reversal unless 'the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.'3 We granted certiorari limited to these questions:

'Where there is a violation of the rule of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, (1) can the error be held to be harmless, and (2) if so, was the error harmless in this case?' Chapman v. California, 383 U.S. 956—957, 86 S.Ct. 1228, 16 L.Ed.2d 300.

In this Court petitioners contend that both these questions are federal ones to be decided under federal law; that under federal law we should hold that denial of a federal constitutional right, no matter how unimportant, should automatically result in reversal of a conviction, without regard to whether the error is considered harmless; and that, if wrong in this, the various comments on petitioners' silence cannot, applying a federal standard, be considered harmless here.

I.

Before deciding the two questions here—whether there can ever be harmless constitutional error and whether the error here was harmless—we must first decide whether

Page 21

state or federal law governs. The application of a state harmless-error rule is, of course, a state question where it involves only errors of state procedure or state law. But the error from which these petitioners suffered was a denial of rights guaranteed against invasion by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, rights rooted in the Bill of Rights, offered and championed in the Congress by James Madison, who told the Congress that the 'independent' federal courts would be the 'guardians of those rights.'4 Whether a conviction for crime should stand when a State has failed to accord federal constitutionally guaranteed rights is every bit as much of a federal question as what particular federal constitutional provisions themselves mean, what they guarantee, and whether they have been denied. With faithfulness to the constitutional union of the States, we cannot leave to the States the formulation of the authoritative laws, rules, and remedies designed to protect people from infractions by the States of federally guaranteed rights. We have no hesitation in saying that the right of these petitioners not to be punished for exercising their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be silent—expressly created by the Federal Constitution itself—is a federal right which, in the absence of appropriate congressional action, it is our responsibility to protect by fashioning the necessary rule.

II.

We are urged by petitioners to hold that all federal constitutional errors, regardless of the facts and circumstances, must always be deemed harmful. Such a hold-

Page 22

ing, as petitioners correctly point out, would require an automatic reversal of their convictions and make further discussion unnecessary. We decline to adopt any such rule. All 50 States have harmless-error statutes or rules, and the United States long ago through its Congress established for its courts the rule that judgments shall not be reversed for 'errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.' 28 U.S.C. § 2111. 5 None of these rules on its face distinguishes between federal constitutional errors and errors of state law or federal statutes and rules. All of these rules, state or federal, serve a very useful purpose insofar as they block setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial. We conclude that there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.

III.

In fashioning a harmless-constitutional-error rule, we must recognize that harmless-error rules can work very unfair and mischievous results when, for example, highly important and persuasive evidence, or argument, though legally forbidden, finds its way into a trial in which the question of guilt or innocence is a close one. What

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harmless-error rules all aim at is a rule that will save the good in harmless-error practices while avoiding the bad, so far as possible.

The federal rule emphasizes 'substantial rights' as do most others. The California constitutional rule emphasizes 'a miscarriage of justice,'6 but the California courts have neutralized this to some extent by emphasis, and perhaps overemphasis, upon the court's view of 'overwhelming evidence.'7 We prefer the approach of this Court in deciding what was harmless error in our recent case of Fahy v. State of Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171. There we said: 'The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.' Id., at 86—87, 84 S.Ct. at 230. Although our prior cases have indicated that there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error,8 this statement in Fahy itself belies any belief that all trial errors which violate the Constitution automatically call for reversal. At the same time, however, like the federal harmless-error statute, it emphasizes an intention not to treat as harmless those constitutional errors that 'affect substantial rights' of a party. An error in admitting plainly relevant evidence which possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant cannot, under Fahy, be conceived

Page 24

of as harmless. Certainly error, constitutional error, in illegally admitting highly prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless. It is for that reason that the original common-law harmless-error rule put the burden on the beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously obtained judgment.9 There is little, if any, difference between our statement in Fahy v. State of Connecticut about 'whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction' and requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. We, therefore, do no more than adhere to the meaning of our Fahy case when we hold, as we now do, that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. While appellate courts do not ordinarily have the original task of applying such a test,10 it is a familiar standard to all courts, and we believe its adoption will provide a more workable standard, although achieving the same result as that aimed at in our Fahy, case.

IV.

Applying the foregoing standard, we have no doubt that the error in these cases was not harmless to petitioners. To reach this conclusion one need only glance at the prosecutorial comments compiled from the record by petitioners' counsel and (with minor omissions) set forth in the Appendix. The California Supreme Court

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fairly summarized the extent of these comments as follows:

'Such comments went to the motives for the procurement and handling of guns purchased by Mrs. Chapman, funds or the lack thereof in Mr. Teale's possession immediately prior to the killing, the amount of intoxicating liquors consumed by defendants at the Spot Club and other...

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23564 practice notes
  • Connecticut v. Johnson, No. 81-927
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • 23 Febrero 1983
    ...determination; it merely permits the state court to do so in appropriate cases.3 This is all the Court held in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Page 89 In this case, the Connecticut prosecutor requested the Connecticut Supreme Court to declare that th......
  • U.S. v. Martinez-Torres, MARTINEZ-TORRE
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • 4 Abril 1990
    ...which objection had been preserved--could ever be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827-28, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 230-31, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963). Thus, the......
  • Bowers v. Walsh, No. 00-CV-6459L.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court of Western District of New York
    • 22 Julio 2003
    ...Id. A court must also find "beyond a reasonable doubt that this constitutional error was not harmless." Id. (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967))4; accord, e.g., Page 219 v. Fischer, 248 F.Supp.2d 251, 260 (S.D.N.Y.2002). Because the determinat......
  • Allen v. Howes, Case No. 05-10304.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Michigan)
    • 25 Febrero 2009
    ...the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the `harmless beyond a reasonable doubt' standard set forth in Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)]." 127 S.Ct. at 2328. Fry overruled Eddleman v. McKee, 471 F.3d 576, 583 (6th Cir.2006), where the Sixth C......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
23559 cases
  • Connecticut v. Johnson, No. 81-927
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • 23 Febrero 1983
    ...determination; it merely permits the state court to do so in appropriate cases.3 This is all the Court held in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Page 89 In this case, the Connecticut prosecutor requested the Connecticut Supreme Court to declare that th......
  • U.S. v. Martinez-Torres, MARTINEZ-TORRE
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • 4 Abril 1990
    ...which objection had been preserved--could ever be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827-28, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 230-31, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963). Thus, the......
  • Bowers v. Walsh, No. 00-CV-6459L.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court of Western District of New York
    • 22 Julio 2003
    ...Id. A court must also find "beyond a reasonable doubt that this constitutional error was not harmless." Id. (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967))4; accord, e.g., Page 219 v. Fischer, 248 F.Supp.2d 251, 260 (S.D.N.Y.2002). Because the determinat......
  • Allen v. Howes, Case No. 05-10304.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Michigan)
    • 25 Febrero 2009
    ...the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the `harmless beyond a reasonable doubt' standard set forth in Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)]." 127 S.Ct. at 2328. Fry overruled Eddleman v. McKee, 471 F.3d 576, 583 (6th Cir.2006), where the Sixth C......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 firm's commentaries
3 books & journal articles
  • BEYOND STRICKLAND PREJUDICE: WEAVER, BATSON, AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT.
    • United States
    • University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 170 Nbr. 4, March 2022
    • 1 Marzo 2022
    ...nature of the right of which the party was deprived."). (24) The canonical constitutional harmless error case is Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,22 (25) Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993); see also Epps, supra note 2, at 2125. (26) Indeed, most do not receive one. See Epps, ......
  • Criminal Justice Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, 2006 Term
    • United States
    • Criminal Justice Review Nbr. 32-4, December 2007
    • 1 Diciembre 2007
    ...S.Ct. 793 (2007) (per curiam) .Carey v. Musladin, 127 S.Ct. 649 (2006).Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).Cunningham v. California, 127 S.Ct. 856 (2007).Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).Fry......
  • Violated Trust: Conceptualizing Prosecutorial Misconduct
    • United States
    • Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice Nbr. 21-3, August 2005
    • 1 Agosto 2005
    ...C. G. (1979). The problem of voluntariness and coercion in the negotiatedplea. Law and Society Review,13, 527-553.Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).Clarke, R. V.,& Felson, M. (Eds.). (1993). Routine activity and rational choice (Vol.5). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.Cohe......

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