Chapoose v. Hodel

• Decision Date: 22 October 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85-2078,85-2078
• Citation: 831 F.2d 931
• Parties: Haskell Levi CHAPOOSE, as Guardian Ad Litem for and on behalf of his minor children, to-wit: Shaun Thomas Chapoose, JaNae Lyn Chapoose, Dixon Levi Chapoose, Michelle Quitta Chapoose; and Connor Charles Chapoose; Dorthea Unca Sam Garcia, as Guardian Ad Litem for and on behalf of her minor children, to-wit: Maureen Garcia, Murita Garcia, Phillipe Theodore Garcia, and Lora Lynn Garcia, who are minors, and Johnnie Chris Garcia, who is now an adult; Marietta Chapoose Reed, as mother of Ina Charlene Reed and Lori Ann Reed, who are now adults; and Raymond Wissiup, as Guardian Ad Litem for and in behalf of his minor children, to-wit: Raylene Jamie Wissiup, Raymond Wissiup II, and Cynyella Monda Rae Wissiup, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Donald P. HODEL, as Secretary of the Interior and Ken Smith, as Assistant Secretary of the Interior; John Fritz, as Deputy Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs (operations); and/or their successors to office, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 931

831 F.2d 931

Haskell Levi CHAPOOSE, as Guardian Ad Litem for and on behalf of his minor children, to-wit: Shaun Thomas Chapoose, JaNae Lyn Chapoose, Dixon Levi Chapoose, Michelle Quitta Chapoose; and Connor Charles Chapoose; Dorthea Unca Sam Garcia, as Guardian Ad Litem for and on behalf of her minor children, to-wit: Maureen Garcia, Murita Garcia Phillipe Theodore Garcia, and Lora Lynn Garcia, who are minors, and Johnnie Chris Garcia, who is now an adult Marietta Chapoose Reed, as mother of Ina Charlene Reed and Lori Ann Reed, who are now adults; and Raymond Wissiup, as Guardian Ad Litem for and in behalf of his minor children to-wit: Raylene Jamie Wissiup, Raymond Wissiup II, and Cynyella Monda Rae Wissiup, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Donald P. HODEL, as Secretary of the Interior and Ken Smith as Assistant Secretary of the Interior; John Fritz, as Deputy Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs (operations); and/or their successors to office, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 85-2078.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Oct. 22, 1987.

George E. Mangan (Machelle Fitzgerald and Herbert Wm. Gillespie with him on the briefs), Roosevelt, Utah, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Edward J. Shawaker, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C. (David C. Shilton, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C.; F. Henry Habicht II, Asst. Atty. Gen., Brent D. Ward, U.S. Atty., and Joseph W. Anderson, Asst. U.S. Atty., Salt Lake City, Utah, with him on the brief), for defendants-appellees.

Before SEYMOUR, McWILLIAMS, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.

JOHN P. MOORE, Circuit Judge.

Haskell Levi Chapoose and eighteen other Ute Indian children (the Children) appeal the dismissal of their claims for violations of their civil rights and for attorney fees. Appellants' complaint was addressed in sequential motions for summary judgment. In its first order, the district court dismissed the Children's civil rights and Bivens claims for damages and reduced the central issue to the resolution of whether the action of the Secretary of the Interior denying the Children membership in the Ute Indian Tribe is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary to law. In a lengthy opinion, the district court held that the Secretary's interpretation of the 1954 Ute Partition and Termination Act, as amended in 1956, 25 U.S.C. Sec. 677d (the Act), is plainly erroneous and cannot stand. Chapoose v. Clark, 607 F.Supp. 1027 (D.Utah 1985). The court ordered the Secretary's disapproval of the subject enrollment ordinance set aside and the case remanded to the Secretary of the Interior to proceed as indicated in the order. The Children do not challenge that holding and the nature of the relief it provided. In this appeal, the Children maintain the court erred in dismissing their civil rights claims, limiting discovery to the administrative record, and granting qualified immunity to the named agency officials. The Children seek reversal of these decisions to permit them to engage in more extensive discovery which they believe will establish the violation of their civil rights. We have reviewed the record and the district court's orders. While we find no error in the court's conclusions on the civil rights claims, we are compelled to remand the action for the district court to conduct a factual inquiry on the Children's claim for attorney fees in accordance with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

This case began in 1977 when the Tribal Business Committee ¹ of the Ute and Uintah Reservation denied the Children enrollment into the Ute Indian Tribe (the Tribe) because the Children did not possess 5/8ths Ute Indian blood. The Children, who represent four family groups residing on the reservation, then challenged the 1958 Tribal Enrollment Ordinance No. 0-58-1 which had originally set the 5/8ths blood quantum requirement. ² Filing suit in the Ute Tribal Court (the Tribal Court) pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. Secs. 1301 et seq., the Children alleged that their right to tribal membership was fully established under the Ute Tribal Constitution art. II, Sec. 1(b). ³ In 1977, the Tribal Court held that the Ute Tribal Constitution is the primary law of the reservation, preempting any conflicting or contrary ordinance. In 1981, the Ute Tribal Appellate Court affirmed looking both to the Act and its 1956 amendment ⁴ and to the Tribal Constitution. Subsequently, the Tribal Appellate Court reheard the matter and affirmed, directing the Tribal Court enter a permanent injunction enjoining the Business Committee from denying the Children membership and ordering the Business Committee to enroll the Children and apply to the Secretary of the Interior for the appropriate payments out of trust property.

On January 14, 1982, the Tribal Business Committee enacted Res. No. 82-05 declaring that the Act is the controlling authority on the blood-quantum formula for enrollment and requesting the Secretary approve the enrollment of the Children. Mr. L.W. Collier, Jr., Superintendent of the Uintah and Ouray Agency, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior (the Agency), refused to enroll the Children on the ground that the Act supersedes existing requirements and sets the enrollment criteria for the Tribe. The Agency submitted that in addition to being descendants of ancestors listed on the 1956 Final Roll of the Tribe, the Children must possess "a minimum of federally recognized Indian blood in excess of one-half, of which at least one-half thereof must be Indian blood of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation." The Children appealed the decision to Mr. Kenneth Smith, the Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, who agreed that the Act supersedes the Tribe's power to determine and control enrollment. Thus, Mr. Smith concluded, any ordinances the Tribe might pass on the subject of enrollment would be only procedural in nature.

The Children filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah naming as defendants, Secretary of the Interior, James Watt; Assistant Secretary of the Interior, Ken Smith; and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, John Fritz; and/or their successors in office (the Secretary collectively). In their complaint the Children alleged that in denying their enrollment in the Tribe, the Secretary had, "in derogation of their liberty, property and other valuable interests," denied them due process of law, valuable civil rights, and the equal protection of the law. The Children prayed for the court to issue "an injunction in the form of a Writ of Mandamus" directing the Secretary to approve the Tribal Business Committee's enrollment ordinance. In addition, for each of these claims, the Children sought substantial money and punitive damages for the Secretary's wanton disregard of plaintiffs' rights. Finally, the Children claimed entitlement to compensation for attorney fees pursuant to "42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, and/or any and all other applicable statutes and judicial precedents."

In its first order, the district court dismissed the Children's Sec. 1983 claim for lack of jurisdiction, no allegation having been made that the defendants acted under color of state law. In so doing, the court rejected the Children's contention that an Indian tribe is analogous to a "territory" under the language of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. In dismissing the Children's Bivens claim, the court held the complaint failed to state the constitutional right from which this claim must derive. The equal protection challenge was similarly ill-fated. Citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974), the court held that the blood quantum requirement relied on by the Secretary had a rational basis and, thus, was not an unconstitutional classification. Finally, even if the Secretary's interpretation of 25 U.S.C. Sec. 677d was incorrect, the court held, he is entitled to qualified immunity for his action. With these "procedural matters disposed of," the district court ordered the parties to address the merits of the question whether the Secretary's refusal to approve the Children's enrollment is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706(2)(A).

In a second order, the district court set forth the background of the present action and examined the statutory history of Sec. 677d ⁵ and its subsequent Agency interpretation. The district court concluded that Congress manifested a clear intent for the Ute Tribe to retain control over its membership. Chapoose v. Clark, 607 F.Supp. at 1028-37. Thus, the Secretary's interpretation of Sec. 677d, the court held, is plainly erroneous and cannot stand. The Children contend that in the light of this holding and the court's finding that "[f]undamental and precious Indian rights are at stake," ⁶ we should reverse the district court's dismissal of the civil rights claims in order to permit them to extend discovery beyond the administrative record. The Children's complaint does not support this relief.

II. CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS

The Children alleged the Secretary, acting under color of territorial law, violated their civil rights. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. As the district court found, however novel appellants' theory analogizing the Secretary's acting under color of state/territorial law to tribal/territorial law, it is unfounded and specifically rejected in the law. "Indian tribes are not states of the union within the meaning of the Constitution, and the constitutional limitations on states do not apply to tribes." F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 664-65 (1982 ed.). See, e.g., Wardle v. Ute Indian Tribe, 623 F.2d 670 (10th Cir.1980) (Title VII specifically exempts Indian tribes); Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir.1974) (constitutional right to counsel does not apply to Indian tribes). Thus, appellants' attempt to equate tribal action to state or territorial action in order to characterize the Secretary's act is...