Chappell v. Palmer

• Decision Date: 22 July 1965
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Carolyn CHAPPELL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Charles Alan PALMER, Donald Russell and Irene Russell, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 452.

Page 686

45 Cal.Rptr. 686

236 Cal.App.2d 34

Carolyn CHAPPELL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Charles Alan PALMER, Donald Russell and Irene Russell, Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 452.

District Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

July 22, 1965.

Paul S. Mosesian and James C. Janjigian, Fresno, for appellant.

McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Coyle & Best, and Robert E. Coyle, Fresno, for respondents.

STONE, Justice.

This appeal is from a judgment entered on an order granting a nonsuit in an action brought by a passenger against a minor driver of an automobile and his parents. The action arose out of an intersection collision occurring October 17, 1959, at approximately 7 p. m. in Fresno County. Plaintiff guest and defendant driver in the front seat, and another couple in the back seat who are not parties to this action, were on their way from Corcoran to Coalinga to attend a football game.

Defendant was driving west on Jayne Avenue, a 'fairly ordinary country road in pretty fair shape.' The other vehicle was southbound on Lassen Avenue, which runs into Jayne Avenue then makes a short offset along Jayne and continues southerly. A cotton gin, gin yard, scale house and office, were located on the northeast corner of the intersection. At the time of the accident a number of cotton trailers, variously estimated from 25 to 100, were parked on the gin property. These and a large tree at the corner obstructed the view of each driver.

As defendant's car entered the intersection it was struck on the right by the other vehicle. Neither driver applied his brakes and neither driver saw the other because of obstructions at the intersection. Defendant, who had been traveling from 45 to 50 miles per hour, entered the intersection without reducing his speed, as neither he nor his passengers knew there was an intersection in the area. Although a diamond-shaped 18-inch by 18-inch warning sign was located on Jayne Avenue some 400 to 500 feet to the east, on one saw it. No one, including plaintiff, complained of the manner of defendant's driving prior to the accident, and no one called defendant's attention to the cotton gin or the intersection.

The record indicates that both vehicles were in good mechanical condition. Although the lights of both cars were burning, defendant testified he could see only 50 to 100 feet ahead, and that visibility even with his lights on was not good, as it was dusk.

Plaintiff presents as her single ground of appeal that the made out a case for submission to the jury. The issue is whether plaintiff produced evidence from which an inference could be drawn that her injury proximately resulted from the wilful misconduct of defendant driver. (Veh.Code § 17158.)

The Supreme Court, for the ostensible purpose of clarifying the distinction between gross negligence and wilful misconduct, stated, in Meek v. Fowler, 3 Cal.2d 420, at page 426, 45 P.2d 194, at page 197:

"* * * Willful misconduct implies at least the intentional doing of something either with a knowledge that serious injury is a probable (as distinguished from a possible) result, or the intentional doing of an act with a wanton and reckless disregard of tis possible result."

This definition has been stated in varying ways since Meek v. Fowler, but this gloss of the guest statute does not provide a standard or test by which the facts of a particular case can be measured to determine whether the conduct complained of comes within the definition. The basic difficulty is that Meek v. Fowler and its progeny define the state of mind of the actor, a subjective finding that can be seldom proved by direct evidence. Therefore the element of intent in wilful misconduct cases is usually inferred from objective or external circumstantial evidence. Thus the question arises, what test should be applied to determine the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence of intent?

The cases say that 'the existence of wilful misconduct is essentially a question of fact,' which, more than anything else, tells us if there is any substantial evidence to support the jury's finding an appellate court will not overturn the verdict. It leaves unanswered the question of what constitutes substantial evidence in a wilful misconduct case. However, the term 'substantial evidence' does provide an intimation of the standard appellate courts have applied, since substantial evidence has been defined as evidence which a fair and reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. (Gerhardt v. Fresno Medical Group, 217 Cal.App.2d 353, 31 Cal.Rptr. 633; Houghton v. Loma Prieta Lbr. Co., 152 Cal. 574, 93 P. 377; Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126.) The substantial evidence rule indicates to us the pragmatic test that has evolved, sub silentio, in wilful misconduct cases is whether a reasonable man under the same or similar circumstances as those faced by the actor would be aware of the dangerous character of his conduct.

Professor Prosser, in discussing factual proof of wilful misconduct, suggests that in practice a finding of...