Chapple v. Franklin Cnty. Sheriffs Officers FCC1 & 2

• Decision Date: 23 March 2022
• Docket Number: 2:21-cv-5086
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio
• Parties: JEFFREY LYNN CHAPPLE, JR., Plaintiff, v. FRANKLIN COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICERS FCC1 & 2, et al., Defendants.

JEFFREY LYNN CHAPPLE, JR., Plaintiff, v. FRANKLIN COUNTY SHERIFFS OFFICERS FCC1 & 2, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:21-cv-5086

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division

March 23, 2022

ALGENON L. MARBLEY CHIEF JUDGE

Elizabeth P. Deavers Magistrate Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Jeffrey Lynn Chapple, Jr., has filed an action alleging violations of his civil rights, presumably under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has named twenty defendants, plus some unknown defendants. (Complaint, ECF No. 1-1, PageID 12, 15, 18.) Defendants all appear to be officers or officials of the Franklin County Sheriff's Office and/or the Franklin County Corrections Centers, where Chapple is currently in custody awaiting trial. (Id.) Chapple is proceeding in this action without counsel and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 22.)

The matter is currently before the undersigned Magistrate Judge to conduct the initial screen required by law. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the following reasons, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Chapple be allowed to PROCEED at this time on his excessive force claims against Defendants Curren, John Jones, Sgt. Neal, Robinson, Bateman, and Sgt. Neely (in their individual capacities). The Undersigned further RECOMMENDS that Chapple be allowed to AMEND the one conditions of confinement claim identified herein and his religious rights claim. The Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the remaining claims against the remaining defendants and non-parties be DISMISSED.

I. Initial Screening Standard

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking “redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity, ” and is also proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to conduct an initial screen of his Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court must dismiss the Complaint, or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

To state a claim for relief, a complaint must set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The Court must construe the complaint in plaintiff's favor, accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and evaluate whether it contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). However, a complaint that consists of “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is insufficient. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Finally, in the interest of justice, this Court is required to construe a pro se complaint liberally and to hold it “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f)). Even with such a liberal construction, a pro se complaint must still adhere to the “basic pleading essentials.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). Specifically, a pro se “complaint ‘must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements' to recover under some viable legal theory.'” Barhite v. Caruso, 377 Fed.Appx. 508, 510 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 716 (6th Cir. 2005)).

II. Claims and Defendants

Plaintiff Chapple's 16-page, handwritten Complaint contains numerous allegations of wrongdoing by Defendants during his pre-trial detention at the Franklin County Corrections Centers (together “FCCC”).^[1] (ECF No. 1-1, PageID 16, 19-27.) Chapple explains elsewhere that he is in custody at FCCC awaiting trial in Franklin County Common Pleas Court.^[2] (Letter, ECF No. 15, PageID 106.)

Chapple does not identify or organize his claims, and does not cite to any legal or constitutional provisions in the Complaint. (ECF No. 1-1, cited hereinafter as “Complaint”). The facts in the Complaint can be generally grouped into the following categories, discussed in the corresponding sections below:

A. Official capacity claims

B. Conditions of confinement claims

C. Personal property claims

D. Disciplinary claims

E. Grievance procedure claims

F. Failure-to-protect claims

G. Religious rights claims

H. Excessive force claims

Chapple asks this Court to investigate his allegations and take action to address his pain and suffering. (Complaint, PageID 17.) He also asks for a jury trial. (Id.)

Although the Complaint does not specify, the Undersigned reads most of the Complaint to attempt to raise claims of constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused by a person acting under color of state law.” Hunt v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 542 F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The specific facts relevant to each category are described in the Discussion sections below.

Chapple names the following individuals as Defendants: Chaplain Chambers; Captain Vince Brammer; Lt. Myers; Penny Perry, Chief of Corrections; Kirkpatrick; Sgt. Neal; John Jones; Curren; Boyd; Sgt. Clyburns; Kaylor; Zalipski; Sgt. Roger Howard; Robinson; Sgt. Neely; Bateman; Lt. D. Johnson; Dorion; McGaryity; and Blake. (Complaint, PageID 12, 15, 18.) He also names unknown “Franklin County Sheriffs' Officers FCCC1 & 2” as defendants. (Id., PageID 12.)

III. Discussion

The Complaint is not entirely legible or comprehensible. (ECF No. 1-1.) It details a number of apparently unconnected events ranging from the inconveniences of custodial life (e.g., not being permitted to shower at the requested time, or not being given clean mop water upon request) to allegations of excessive force and failure to protect Chapple from other inmates' violence. The Complaint lists approximately 33 incidents occurring over approximately 14 months. It presents a diary-like account of daily events at FCCC. The Undersigned has endeavored to group and categorize Chapple's allegations into potential constitutional violations for screening purposes, as detailed below. See Barhite, 377 Fed.Appx. at 511 (citing United States v. McDonald, 326 Fed. App'x 880, 882 (6th Cir. 2009)) (“courts may elect to recharacterize pro se filings for the benefit of the pleader”). Chapple's excessive force claims should survive this initial screening, and the Undersigned recommends that the Court give Chapple an opportunity to amend one identified conditions of confinement claim, as well as his religious rights claims. But even construing the Complaint liberally, most of Chapple's allegations simply do not rise to the level of a constitution deprivation that can be pursued under § 1983.

A. Official Capacity Claims

Before discussing the substance of the Complaint, the Undersigned considers the defendants against whom the claims are made. The Complaint does not indicate whether Chapple is suing the defendants in their official capacities or their individual capacities. “While ‘[p]ersonal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law,' individuals sued in their official capacities stand in the shoes of the entity they represent.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)). Thus, “[a] suit against an individual in his official capacity is the equivalent of a suit against the governmental entity.” Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 68 (1989)). Here, to the extent Chapple has sued the Defendants in their official capacities, his claims are essentially against Franklin County.

A local government like Franklin County “may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “To state a municipal-liability claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege the deprivation (1) of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) that was directly caused by a municipal policy or custom.” Nichols v. Wayne Cty. Mich., 822 Fed.Appx. 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Hardrick v. City of Detroit, 876 F.3d 238, 243 (6th Cir. 2017)). A plaintiff may prove an unconstitutional “policy” or “custom” by demonstrating one of the following: “(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005)).

In this case, Chapple has not alleged any facts from which the Court could conclude that an official policy or custom of Franklin County resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights. The Complaint...