Matthews v. Jones

• Decision Date: 20 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-5249,93-5249
• Citation: 35 F.3d 1046
• Parties: Scott L. MATTHEWS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Leon E. JONES, Sr., Jefferson County Police Department, and Unknown Police Officer, Jefferson County Police Department, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 1046

35 F.3d 1046

Scott L. MATTHEWS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Leon E. JONES, Sr., Jefferson County Police Department, and Unknown Police Officer, Jefferson County Police Department, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 93-5249.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued March 24, 1994.

Decided Sept. 20, 1994.

William M. Radigan, Walker & Radigan, Louisville, KY (argued and briefed), for plaintiff-appellant.

N. Scott Lilly, Jefferson County Atty's Office, Dave Whalin, Landrum & Shouse (argued and briefed), William Dennis Sims, Office of Legal Affairs, Jefferson County Police Dept., Raymond J. Naber, Jr., Naber, Joyner, Schardein & Stinson, Louisville, KY, for defendant-appellee.

Before: NELSON, SUHRHEINRICH, and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges.

BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Scott L. Matthews brought this action on May 24, 1991, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleging that in the course of his arrest he was severely bitten by a police dog and that the use of the police dog constituted an unconstitutional use of deadly force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. On August 19, 1991, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint in order to add Officer Robert Michael Watkins as a named defendant. The district court denied plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint finding that Officer Watkins did not receive notice of the filing of the suit until after the statute of limitations had run. On January 25, 1993, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Leon E. Jones, Sr. finding that the use of force against plaintiff was reasonable under the circumstances. We affirm the district court because we hold that the facts as alleged by Matthews do not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

I

On May 26, 1990, in the wee hours of the morning, plaintiff Matthews was driving his motor vehicle in Jefferson County, Kentucky, when a police officer, believing that Matthews was speeding and driving recklessly, began to pursue him in a marked police car. Matthews, who had been drinking and was driving on a suspended license, fled from the pursuing officer. Eventually, Matthews pulled his car off the road and ran into nearby woods. Officer Watkins, a canine handler, and his assigned canine, a Rottweiler named Roscoe, arrived at the scene within one minute after Matthews fled from his car. A police helicopter also arrived on the scene but could not locate Matthews because he had fled into heavy trees and undergrowth. At this point, the officers did not know the extent of the crimes Matthews might have committed, whether he was armed, or why he fled his vehicle.

When the officers on the scene were unable to locate Matthews, they called out orders for him to surrender; Matthews did not respond. Officer Watkins and Roscoe then began to track Matthews. Roscoe was on a leash during the entire tracking period. Eventually Roscoe stopped at the edge of a swampy, heavily wooded area and reacted as if the suspect were nearby. Officer Watkins ordered Matthews to surrender and warned that the dog would be released if he did not. Matthews did not respond. Watkins warned Matthews again and again there was no response.

Watkins then released Roscoe from his leash and Roscoe ran approximately fifty feet into the woods, stopped and alerted. Watkins shined his flashlight in the immediate area near Roscoe and discovered Matthews lying on his stomach in the weeds, his hands underneath his body. Watkins ordered Matthews not to move and informed him that if he remained still the dog would be recalled. Instead of complying with Officer Watkins's order, Matthews quickly rose to his knees; Roscoe reacted to the sudden movement by biting Matthews on the arm and holding him there. Matthews struggled with the dog, causing Roscoe to reposition his bite. At that point, Watkins ordered Roscoe to release Matthews and took Matthews into custody.

Matthews was arrested and charged with driving under the influence, reckless driving, attempting to elude, resisting arrest, and operating on a suspended license. On June 18, 1990, he pled guilty to public intoxication, resisting arrest, and operating on a suspended license.

Matthews originally filed his complaint in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Kentucky, on May 24, 1991, naming Capt. Leon E. Jones, Sr. and an "unknown police officer" as the only defendants. Matthews's complaint contends that the canine officer's use of a police dog, which resulted in extensive and severe injury to Matthews, constituted the use of deadly, or, alternatively, excessive force, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Matthews also alleges that his injuries were the result of inadequate training of the police dog and of police officers in the Jefferson County Police Department. Matthews later moved to amend his complaint; that motion was denied, as was a motion for reconsideration. The district court then granted Chief Jones's motion for summary judgment, and this appeal followed.

II

Matthews argues on appeal that the district court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, and in denying his motion to amend. We address first the granting of summary judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. A district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Pinney Dock & Transport Co. v. Penn Central Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1472 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 488 U.S. 880, 109 S.Ct. 196, 102 L.Ed.2d 166 (1988).

Matthews sued Chief Jones only in his official capacity as the Chief of the Jefferson County Police Department. A suit against an individual in his official capacity is the equivalent of a suit against the governmental entity. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 68, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2310-11, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Since the Police Department is not an entity which may be sued, Jefferson County is the proper party to address the allegations of Matthews's complaint. See Smallwood v. Jefferson County Government, 743 F.Supp. 502, 503 (W.D.Ky.1990); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. Sec. 95.010(e) (Baldwin 1989); see also Brown v. Marshall County, 394 F.2d 498 (6th Cir.1968). The County may be held liable for Matthews's injuries only if those injuries were the result of an unconstitutional policy or custom of the County. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

Matthews appears to argue on appeal that the use of the police dog Roscoe to apprehend him was pursuant to a policy or custom of the County to use deadly or excessive force in the form of a police dog to apprehend suspects not known to be felons or to be armed. He further claims that the County had a policy of not adequately training the police canine officers or the police dogs as to the circumstances in which the police dogs should be used. Matthews can withstand the motion for summary judgment only if he can demonstrate that there are genuine issues of fact remaining for trial relative to such policies or customs of the County.

Matthews has neither alleged in his complaint nor presented any evidence in response to the motion for summary judgment that Officer Watkins used Roscoe to apprehend him pursuant to a Jefferson County policy governing the use of police dogs. Nor has Matthews pled or presented evidence that Jefferson County had no regulations whatsoever governing the use of police dogs, and that the lack of any regulations was the functional equivalent of a policy of permitting unregulated use of police dogs. Because the County cannot be held liable for the excessive use of force of one of its police officers in the absence of some policy or custom which resulted in the excessive use of force, we hold that Matthews has wholly failed to state facts giving rise to an excessive use of force claim under Sec. 1983, and summary judgment was properly granted on that claim. ¹

Matthews also argues that the Jefferson County Police Department has a policy of inadequately training police officers, including the canine officer and the police dog in this case, and that the lack of proper training resulted in the excessive use of force to apprehend Matthews and the injuries which Matthews claims. In order to hold the County liable under Sec. 1983 for failure to train adequately, the plaintiff must prove that the training program is inadequate to the task an officer must perform; that the inadequacy is the result of deliberate indifference; and that the inadequacy is "closely related to" or "actually caused" the plaintiff's injury. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390-91, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1205-06, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989); Hill v. McIntyre, 884 F.2d 271, 275 (6th Cir.1989).

The record contains no evidence that Roscoe was inadequately trained, and, to the contrary, contains evidence of considerable training. The record also contains evidence of extensive training for Officer Watkins. Matthews has offered no evidence that this training was inadequate to the tasks which a canine officer is required to perform, ² that there was deliberate indifference by the police department, or that inadequate training caused Matthews's injuries. It is clear that Matthews's own actions in attempting to rise when he was told not to move caused his injury. ³ The police department is not liable for Matthews's injuries due to inadequate training of its officers.

Finally, Matthews claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to amend his complaint to name Officer Watkins as a defendant. The district court denied the motion on procedural grounds. We decline to reach the procedural question, but hold that, for the reasons which follow, the motion was properly denied.

First of all, Matthews's proposed amended complaint makes no effort to name Officer Watkins in his individual capacity,...