Charles Rubenstein, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Corp.

• Decision Date: 05 July 1957
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 4332.
• Citation: 154 F. Supp. 216
• Parties: CHARLES RUBENSTEIN, Inc., a corporation, and Rubenstein & Kaplan, a partnership of Abraham A. Kaplan, Charles Rubenstein, Anna Rubenstein; and Charles Rubenstein and Anna Rubenstein as Trustees for Arnold Rubenstein and Sheldon Rubenstein, d/b/a Hollywood Theatre, Plaintiffs, v. COLUMBIA PICTURES CORPORATION, a corporation, Loews' Incorporated, a corporation, Minnesota Amusement Company, a corporation, Paramount Film Distributing Corporation, a corporation, RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., a corporation, Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, a corporation, United Artists Corporation, a corporation, Universal Film Exchanges, Inc., a corporation, Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing Corporation, a corporation, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

154 F. Supp. 216

CHARLES RUBENSTEIN, Inc., a corporation, and Rubenstein & Kaplan, a partnership of Abraham A. Kaplan, Charles Rubenstein, Anna Rubenstein; and Charles Rubenstein and Anna Rubenstein as Trustees for Arnold Rubenstein and Sheldon Rubenstein, d/b/a Hollywood Theatre, Plaintiffs, v. COLUMBIA PICTURES CORPORATION, a corporation, Loews' Incorporated, a corporation, Minnesota Amusement Company, a corporation, Paramount Film Distributing Corporation, a corporation, RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., a corporation, Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, a corporation, United Artists Corporation, a corporation, Universal Film Exchanges, Inc., a corporation, Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing Corporation, a corporation, Defendants.

Civ. No. 4332.

United States District Court D. Minnesota, Fourth Division.

July 5, 1957.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Mandt Torrison and Bundlie, Kelley & Maun, St. Paul, Minn., appeared in behalf of the Minnesota Amusement Co., in support of said motion.

Lee Loevinger and Larson, Loevinger, Lindquist, Freeman & Fraser, of Minneapolis, Minn., appeared in behalf of plaintiffs in opposition thereto.

NORDBYE, Chief Judge.

In substance it may be stated that the motion of defendant Minnesota Amusement Company is that, as to it, damages herein be limited to those accruing within two years prior to the commencement of this action, or, in the alternative, that the limitation period be set at six years. In view of this Court's decision in Homewood Theatre v. Loew's, Inc., D.C., 1951, 101 F.Supp. 76, that the six-year statute of limitations is applicable to antitrust suits brought upon claims arising in Minnesota, it follows that only the alternative motion of the defendant need be considered.

This action was brought on November 6, 1952, against eight motion picture distributors and this moving defendant to recover treble damages for the violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq., and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 12 et seq. MAC was incorporated in 1932 and was a wholly owned subsidiary of one of the defendants in this action. For the purposes of this motion, it must be deemed to have entered into the conspiracy alleged in the complaint in violation of the antitrust laws, at least as early as 1936. Furthermore, it appears from the allegations of the complaint that MAC was one of the instruments, so to speak, by which the parent corporation named as a defendant herein benefited from the conspiracy. It is conceded that the parent corporation, as well as the other distributor defendants, are subject to the tolling of the statute of limitations which was suspended when the Government brought an antitrust action against the parent company of MAC and the seven other defendants herein on June 20, 1938. The government suit now has been terminated as to all of these distributor defendants, but the suit was terminated at different times as to each defendant. The question presented to this Court is whether or not the tolling statute operates against MAC, which was not a party to the Government's suit. If it does, then the damages can be sought from MAC for a period prior to six years from the date of the commencement of this action, that is, prior to November 6, 1946. The tolling statute, 15 U.S.C.A. § 16, reads as follows,

"Whenever any suit or proceeding in equity or criminal prosecution is instituted by the United States to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, the running of the statute of limitations in respect of each and every private right of action arising under said laws and based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in said suit or proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof."

It is plaintiffs' contention that this statute tolls the period of limitation on all suits arising out of any matter complained of in the government litigation. But obviously the "matter complained of" pertains to the matters which were in issue between the Government and the named defendants. It would be a surprising theory of construction if the tolling of the statute applies to one who is not a party to the government litigation. It must be remembered that one of the primary purposes of this statute was to give private litigants the benefit of decrees in the government litigation. No decree has been entered as to MAC. The conclusion that the tolling statute applies only to the named defendants in the government litigation is in harmony with the views indicated by the courts which have considered this question. Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, 7 Cir., 1954, 213 F.2d 284, 292; Electric Theater Co. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., D.C.W.D.Mo., 1953, 113 F.Supp. 937, 945; Christensen v. Paramount Pictures, D.C.Utah, 1950, 95 F.Supp. 446, 455.

But plaintiffs argue that if the above construction of the tolling statute is sound, it does not follow that the six-year limitation statute is available to MAC because it was sued within the applicable six-year period of the statute and is responsible, according to plaintiffs' contention, for the total damage sustained by the plaintiffs,...