Charles v. Verhagen

• Citation: 348 F.3d 601
• Decision Date: 30 October 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-3572.,02-3572.
• Parties: Jerry CHARLES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard J. VERHAGEN and Matthew J. Frank, Defendants-Appellants, and United States of America, Intervenor.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

348 F.3d 601

Jerry CHARLES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard J. VERHAGEN and Matthew J. Frank, Defendants-Appellants, and United States of America, Intervenor.

No. 02-3572.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued May 15, 2003.

Decided October 30, 2003.

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Jerry Charles, Oshkosh, WI, pro se.

Gene C. Schaerr (argued), Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Jody J. Schmelzer (argued), Office of the Attorney General, Madison, WI, for Defendant-Appellant.

Paul D. Clement, Dept. of Justice, Civ. Div., App., Washington, DC for Intervenor-Appellee.

Michael S. Raab, Paul D. Clement (argued), Washington, DC, for Intervenor-Appellee.

Todd R. Marti, Office of the Attorney General, Columbus, OH, for Amicus Curiae.

Before BAUER, COFFEY, and DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Jerry Charles, a Muslim inmate, filed an action against officials with the Wisconsin Department of Corrections' Division of Adult Institutions (collectively, "DOC"), alleging separate violations of his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion as well as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a), because DOC officials prohibited him from possessing Islamic prayer oil in his cell and from celebrating more than one religious feast per year. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the DOC on both of Charles' First Amendment claims and on his religious feast claim under RLUIPA.

The court, however, held that the DOC violated RLUIPA by refusing to allow Charles to possess a reasonable quantity of prayer oil but reserved judgment on the DOC's constitutional challenge to RLUIPA in order to allow the United States to intervene and defend the statute. Following intervention by the United States, the district court held that RLUIPA was a constitutional exercise of Congress' power under the Spending Clause and that it did not violate the Tenth Amendment or the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. As a result, the court entered summary judgment in favor of Charles on his prayer oil claim under RLUIPA. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Charles is a practicing Muslim inmate at the Oshkosh Correctional Institute, a medium-security prison operated by the DOC. According to Muslim practices, Charles prays five times a day and undergoes ritual cleansing or purification, in part to eliminate offensive body odors prior to prayer.¹ This ritual cleansing often involves the application of fragrant prayer oil. In April 2001, the DOC implemented two, revised Internal Management Procedures ("IMPs"), # 6 and # 6A.² These IMPs addressed "Religious Beliefs and Practices" and "Religious Property," respectively.

IMP # 6 identified seven "umbrella religion groups" (including Protestant, Muslim, Native American, Catholic, Jewish, Buddhist, and Wiccan) and established procedures and guidelines for each group. IMP # 6A addressed the quantity and type of religious property that each inmate could possess in DOC institutions and listed specific, approved items for each umbrella religion group. Inmates purchase religious and other personal property with personal funds, managed by the correctional institution in which the inmate is being held. IMP # 6A lists religious books and publications, prayer beads, a prayer rug, and a kufi cap as approved items for Muslim inmates but does not list Islamic prayer oil. DOC officials, therefore, prohibited Charles from possessing any such oil, though other kinds of fragrant body oils and lotions were made available to inmates.

The DOC received approximately 14.5 million federal dollars in fiscal year 2001, which comprised roughly 1.6% of DOC's annual budget, none of which was directed to religious programs. Each time an inmate seeks to purchase a personal property item, the DOC must follow extensive bureaucratic procedures. These procedures are designed to ensure that the requested item is permissible; not a security threat; properly ordered, received, and inventoried by various prison officials; and delivered undamaged to the inmate upon receipt at the correctional institution or following an inmate's transfer between DOC facilities. According to the DOC, in developing IMP #6A, DOC officials consulted and conducted research with religious leaders in order to identify specific, allowable religious property and to create fairness among religious faiths.

Congress enacted RLUIPA following the Supreme Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997), which struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4, under the Fourteenth Amendment insofar as it applied to states and localities. Similar to RFRA, Congress enacted RLUIPA, in part, to protect inmates and other institutionalized persons from substantial burdens in freely practicing their religions. Specifically, RLUIPA provides that,

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 of this title, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person —

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2000).

Rather than rely on the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress invoked the Spending and Commerce Clauses and hinged the applicability of RLUIPA on whether: "(1) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance; or (2) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b). If the sole basis for the applicability of RLUIPA rests in the Commerce Clause power, a defendant can assert an affirmative defense that RLUIPA is inapplicable if the burden at issue "would not lead in the aggregate to a substantial effect on interstate commerce." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(g). Finally, RLUIPA creates a private right of action for individual prisoners and grants the United States power to enforce the statute through injunctive or declaratory relief. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a), (f).

ANALYSIS

We undertake a de novo review of the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Charles, because the parties do not dispute any material facts and present only questions of law for our consideration. O'Kane v. Apfel, 224 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir.2000). Rather than argue the merits of Charles' prayer oil claim under RLUIPA, the DOC urges this Court to determine that Congress' enactment of RLUIPA runs afoul of its Spending and Commerce Clause powers, the Tenth Amendment, and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. We review each claim in turn.

A. Spending Clause Authority

As a starting point, we note that the parties do not dispute that if RLUIPA is constitutional it would apply in this case because the DOC receives federal funding. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b). The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the Common Defence and general Welfare of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Supreme Court has held that Congress may attach conditions to the receipt of federal money incident to its Spending Clause power. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206, 107 S.Ct. 2793, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987). These conditions may be imposed in order to further broad policy objectives, but Congress' power is not unlimited. Id. at 206-07, 107 S.Ct. 2793.

First, under the plain language of the Constitution, use of the Spending power must be in pursuit of "the general Welfare." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Dole, 483 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. 2793. Courts should defer substantially to Congress' determination as to what lies within the general welfare. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. 2793. Second, "if Congress desires to condition the States' receipt of federal funds, it `must do so unambiguously..., enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.'" Id. Third, any conditions attached to federal funding must be related to a federal interest. Id. And fourth, "other constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds." Id. at 208, 107 S.Ct. 2793.

1. Pursuit of the general welfare

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that RLUIPA satisfies the first part of the Dole test in that Congress' attempt to protect prisoners' religious rights is in line with the protections afforded by the Constitution through the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1066-67 (9th Cir.2002). RLUIPA follows in the footsteps of a long-standing tradition of federal legislation that seeks to eradicate discrimination and is "designed to guard against unfair bias and infringement on fundamental freedoms." Id. at 1067 (citing to Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which protect against numerous forms of discrimination in any program receiving federal financial assistance and in employment, respectively, and citing to Title IX, which sought, in part, to eliminate gender inequities in education). Given the Supreme Court's directive to defer substantially to Congress' judgment, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that RLUIPA's attempt to protect prisoners' religious rights and to promote the rehabilitation of prisoners falls squarely within Congress' pursuit of the general welfare under its Spending Clause authority.

2. Unambiguous conditions

The second part of the Dole test...