Charlesbank Homes v. City of Boston

• Decision Date: 22 May 1914
• Citation: 218 Mass. 14,105 N.E. 459
• Parties: CHARLESBANK HOMES v. CITY OF BOSTON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

218 Mass. 14

105 N.E. 459

CHARLESBANK HOMES v. CITY OF BOSTON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 22, 1914

COUNSEL

Karl Adams, of Boston, for appellant.

Edwd. H. Ruby, of Boston, for appellee.

OPINION

SHELDON J.

We do not doubt that the plaintiff is a charitable corporation within the meaning of St. 1909, c. 490, pt. 1, § 5, cl. 3. It has no capital stock, it is not conducted for profit, no part of the income or profits of its business can be divided among members or stockholders. Its object is to provide wholesome and sanitary homes for working people and people of small means at moderate cost. Its charter sets out sufficiently the means by which it undertakes to accomplish that object. It comes strictly within the rule of Franklin Square House v. Boston, 188 Mass. 409, 74 N.E. 675, and Thornton v. Franklin Square House, 200 Mass. 465, 86 N.E. 909, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 486.

But the real estate of a charitable corporation is not always exempt from taxation. Unless purchased for the purpose of removal which is not the case here, the real estate is so exempt only so far as it is occupied by the corporation and its officers for the purposes for which it was incorporated. St. James Educational Institute v. Salem, 153 Mass. 185, 26 N.E 636, 10 L. R. A. 573; Salem Lyceum v. Salem, 154 Mass. 15, 27 N.E. 672; Williams College v Williamstown, 167 Mass. 505, 46 N.E. 394. The real estate here in question consists of a lot of land upon which the plaintiff has erected a large model apartment house, containing besides some general rooms 103 apartments of two, three and four rooms respectively. The apartments are leased to tenants for small rents. The question is whether it can be said that the premises are occupied by the plaintiff within the meaning of that word as used in the statute, or whether the apartments must be held to be in the occupation of their several tenants.

These tenants are not mere lodgers, as was the case in Franklin Square House v. Boston, 188 Mass. 409, 74 N.E. 675. The object of the corporation was to rent the apartments; it is rent that the tenants pay to the plaintiff. They are strictly tenants; as such they have an interest in the respective apartments let to them and they are themselves the occupants thereof. Mathews v. Livingston, 86 Conn. 263, 85 A. 529, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 195. And see the note to this case in 31 Ann. Cas. 200. Their right to possession is exclusive, so long as they pay their rent and comply with the other terms of their leases. Porter v. Merrill, 124 Mass. 534.

But the plaintiff contends that the word 'occupied' in the statute is not used in its natural sense, to import an actual occupation, but merely as a synonym of 'used' or 'appropriated.' It would be hard in any event so to alter the meaning of this word, in view of the rule of construction laid down in R. L. c. 8, § 4, cl. 3. But the contention proceeds upon a misconception of the provisions of St. 1909, pt. 1, § 5, cl. 3. That section first exempts from taxation the personal property of corporations like the plaintiff; then it exempts likewise their real estate 'owned and occupied by them or their officers for the purpose for which they are incorporated'; then it further provides, as a limitation of the two exemptions thus created, that there shall be no exemption of either real or personal property if any of the income or profits is 'divided among stockholders or members, or is used or appropriated for any other than literary, educational, benevolent, charitable, religious or scientific purposes.' It is with reference to the purpose of an occupation by the corporation or its officers and to the application made of its income that the purpose, the use, or the appropriation is material. But there must be an actual occupation by the corporation or its...