Chase v. Epps
| Decision Date | 07 August 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-60516 Summary Calendar.,01-60516 Summary Calendar. |
| Parties | RICKY R. CHASE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CHRISTOPHER B. EPPS, COMMISSIONER, MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; MIKE MOORE, Attorney General of the State of Mississippi, Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi (3:97-CV-744).
Before JOLLY, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
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Petitioner-Appellant Ricky R. Chase, a Mississippi death row inmate, petitions us for an expansion of the Certificate of Appealability ("COA") granted by the district court and appeals the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief. We decline to expand the COA, and we affirm the district court's denial of habeas relief.
Chase and Robert Washington entered the home of Elmer and Doris Hart while Elmer was away, bound Doris, and ransacked the home. When Elmer Hart came home and attempted to free his wife, Chase fatally shot him in the head. Chase was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for that murder. Chase's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Mississippi Supreme Court on direct appeal, see Chase v. State, 645 So. 2d 829 (Miss. 1994), and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. See Chase v. Mississippi, 515 U.S. 1123 (1995). Thereafter, the Mississippi Supreme Court denied Chase's application for state habeas corpus relief. See Chase v. State, 699 So. 2d 521 (Miss. 1997).
Chase next filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, asserting 32 claims of error in connection with his trial and sentencing. That court denied the petition but granted a COA on one issue, viz., whether Chase's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to have Chase properly evaluated for mental retardation.
Although the district court granted Chase a COA on the issue whether defense counsel had Chase properly evaluated for mental retardation, Chase actually argued in both state and federal court that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of his mental retardation at his suppression hearing, at trial, and at sentencing. As this is the argument that Chase briefed and that the district court addressed, we construe the grant of COA as encompassing the issue of counsel's handling of the retardation evidence.
A federal application for a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411-12 (2000). A state court acts "contrary to" federal law if it "appl[ies] a rule that contradicts a rule laid down by the Supreme Court." DiLosa v. Cain, 279 F.3d 259, 262 (5th Cir. 2002). "[A] federal habeas court making the `unreasonable application' inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Williams, 529 U.S. at 409.
"[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect or erroneous application of federal law. Id. at 412. "[A] federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. In addition, the federal court must assign a presumption of correctness to a state court's factual determinations, and the burden is on the petitioner to rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We apply the same standard of review to the state court's decision as does the district court. We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 255 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 945 (2001). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo. Lockett v. Anderson, 230 F.3d 695, 710 (5th Cir. 2000).
Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to have Chase examined by a psychiatrist to aid the defense and its presentation of mitigating circumstances. Chase argues that his pre-trial mental examination showed that he was mentally retarded, but that, despite this evidence, trial counsel failed to present it at either the suppression hearing or during the sentencing phase of the trial.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Chase must show (1) that his counsel's performance was so deficient that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Chase's defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-94 (1984). To show Strickland prejudice, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's errors were so serious as to "render[] the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair." Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993).
The record reflects that here defense counsel did not fail to investigate Chase's mental status; and we conclude that his performance does not fail the Strickland test for failure to investigate this aspect of the case. Counsel actually obtained two mental evaluations of Chase. He was first examined by Dr. John W. Perry, Jr., a psychologist, who found that Chase has a Full Scale IQ of 71, a Verbal IQ of 77, and a Performance IQ of 64. Dr. Perry concluded that Chase was "mildly retarded" on his Performance IQ but "borderline" on his Full Scale IQ. As the district court noted, Dr. Perry's assertion that the Performance IQ was in the mildly retarded range is undercut by the observation of Dr. Perry that next followed, i.e., that Chase did not seem to be performing at his best on that particular part of the test. Dr. Perry found no indication of a thought disorder and concluded that Chase was competent to stand trial and had been capable of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the offense. Dr. Perry concluded that Chase is "literate and has intellectual ability at least in the borderline range." (Emphasis added). Dr. Perry found "no evidence of a mental disorder in observing him and in reviewing his history" and did not see a need for further tests.
Chase was subsequently examined by Dr. S. Ray Pate, a psychiatrist. Dr. Pate's report further erodes Chase's claim of mental retardation, as this physician offered his expert opinion that Chase did not have a mental illness and did not present a history compatible with having a mental illness at any time in his life.
The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded that Dr. Perry's report did not present powerful evidence in favor of Chase and that counsel appeared to be following a strategy at sentencing of showing the good in Chase to justify sparing his life rather than trying to portray Chase as a victim. This conclusion by the state court was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law and was not an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence, given the weak nature of the mental retardation evidence. Counsel's failure to develop and present mitigating evidence of a defendant's low IQ and borderline retardation does not fail the Strickland test for effective assistance. See, e.g., Jones v. Johnson, 171 F.3d 270, 277 (5th Cir. 1999); Boyd v. Johnson, 167 F.3d 907, 910-11 (5th Cir. 1999); Williams v. Cain, 125 F.3d 269, 277 (5th Cir. 1997); Andrews v. Collins, 21 F.3d 612, 624 (5th Cir. 1994); Duhamel v. Collins, 955 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1992); compare Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101, 1102-03 (5th Cir. 1986)(counsel was ineffective by failing to present any mitigating evidence where habeas proceedings demonstrated that prosecution and defense agreed defendant was mentally retarded with a full scale IQ of less than 41).
Chase also argues that defense counsel was deficient in failing to present evidence of his mental retardation at the suppression hearing. We note, as did the Mississippi Supreme Court, that Chase was not examined, and Dr. Perry did not issue his report, until after the suppression hearing. See Chase, 699 So. 2d at 529. Trial counsel could not be ineffective for failing to present evidence that did not exist at the time of the suppression hearing; and Chase does not argue that counsel should have obtained a mental evaluation sooner.
As for Chase's contention that his post-arrest statement was not voluntary and that defense counsel should have presented evidence of his retardation when his statement was referenced at trial, the state supreme court held that the trial court was privy to Dr. Perry's report and that counsel was not ineffective for failing to use Dr. Perry's report differently. Id. Chase has not shown that the state court's resolution of this issue was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
On federal habeas, Chase sought permission to obtain a psychiatric examination at his own expense. The district court initially granted Chase permission, directing that the evaluation be conducted at the Mississippi State Penitentiary in Parchman, Mississippi. When nine months elapsed without counsel for Chase having obtained an evaluation, however, the district court reasoned that there was no basis for counsel's delay and withdrew permission for this evaluation. Chase argues that the district court erred by failing to provide transportation to Jackson,...
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