Chase v. Jemmett

• Decision Date: 04 August 1892
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: E. R. CHASE, APPELLANT, v. HARRY JEMMETT AND OTHERS, RESPONDENTS

30 P. 757

8 Utah 231

E. R. CHASE, APPELLANT, v. HARRY JEMMETT AND OTHERS, RESPONDENTS

Supreme Court of Utah

August 4, 1892

APPEAL from a judgment of the district court of the third district and from an order refusing a new trial. The opinion states the facts.

Affirmed.

Messrs Evans and Rogers, for the appellant.

Appellant was entitled to the value of the school house. The United States v. Land in Monterey Co., 47 Cal. 515; Graham v. R. R. Co., 36 Ind. 463, s. c. 10 Am. Rep 56; Searl v. School District, 133 U.S. 553; Hendry v. R. R. Co. (Tex.), 24 Am. and Enq. R. R cases, 286; Harris v. Marblehead, 76 Mass. 40; Crasby v. Dracut, 109 Mass. 206; Meriam v. Brown, 128 Mass. 391; Price v. Ferry Co., 31 N. J. Equity, 31; Emerson v. Western, etc., R. R. Co., 75 Ill. 176; Kimball v. Adams, 52 Wis. 554, and cases there cited.

Messrs. Kimball and Allison, for the respondents.

Cited: Railway Co. v. Stancliff, 4 Utah, 117; Justice v. Ry. Co., 87 Pa. St. 28; Meigs' Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 28; Daniels v. Railway Co., 41 Iowa 52; Morgan's Appeal, 39 Mich. 675; Railway Co. v. Dunlap, 47 Mich. 456; Green v. Railway Co., 26 Minn. 66; Kennedy v. R. R. Co., 22 Wis. 581; Lyon v. R. R. Co., 42 Wis. 538; Railroad Co. v. Boraem, 28 N. J. Eq. 450; Goodin v. Canal Co., 18 Ohio St. 169; Daws v. Congdon, 16 How. Pr. 571; Railroad Co. v. Armstrong, 46 Cal. 86; Jones v. R. R. Co., 70 Ala. 227; Aspinwall v. R. R. Co., 41 Wis. 474; 6 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, 567.

ZANE, C. J. ANDERSON, J., and BLACKBURN, J., concurred.

OPINION

ZANE, C. J.:

The plaintiff brought this suit to recover 80 acres of land in Box Elder county, and the value of its use during defendants' possession. The defendants filed an answer denying the allegations of the complaint, and a cross complaint for the condemnation of a part of the land for school purposes. It appears from the evidence in the record that the trustees of the district erected a school house on the land in 1881; that the district has occupied it as a school house ever since, and that its use by the public is necessary; that the United States issued a patent for the land to the Central Pacific Railroad Company in 1884; that the company conveyed it to the plaintiff in 1886; that there has not at any time been any other occupation of the land or the school house; and that the trustees did not know who owned the land at the time they erected the school house upon it. The issues were submitted to a jury, who found that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the possession of the land and $ 66.80, the value of its use. The jury also found for the plaintiff on the cross complaint, and awarded compensation to him to the value of the land taken, and damages to that not taken, without taking into consideration the value of the school house. The court overruled a motion by plaintiff for a new trial, and entered judgment on the verdict, to which the plaintiff excepted. The plaintiff claims that the defendants committed a trespass in erecting the house upon the ground, and that it became a part of the realty, and vested in the owner of the land, and passed with it to the railroad company by the patent, and to the plaintiff by the deed of the company to him. The only question for special consideration in this opinion is, was the charge of the court to the jury, not to take into consideration the value of the school house in assessing damages to the plaintiff, erroneous. In making their verdict the jurors took into consideration the value of the land taken, and the damage to that not taken; also the value of the use of the land to the time of the trial. But it is claimed that the law gave the owner of the land the building because the defendants committed a trespass in building it. If the entry upon the land is a naked trespass, and from an improper motive, the general rule in a proceeding to condemn is that buildings permanently attached to it become the property of its owner. This rests upon the principle that an individual committing a naked trespass can acquire no right by his tortious acts, and also upon the presumption that a person who erects a building on land that he knows to be another's, and without any color of right, or reasonable expectation of its lawful acquisition, intends it to become the property of the owner of the land. In this case the trustees were acting for the public, and we cannot infer that they intended to erect a building for the United States, which appears to have been the owner of the land; nor do we feel authorized to say that they were actuated by a fraudulent or other improper motive, or that they intended to wrong the owner of the land; in fact, they did not know who was the owner. We may assume that the trustees believed that the owner, when ascertained, would consent to such use of it, or that the title could be obtained by gift, purchase, or condemnation. While the title remained in the United States, the law furnished no process by which it could be acquired and appropriated for such a purpose; yet the trustees might reasonably believe that the government would consent to such use of it, and that its grantee, whoever he might be, would either permit such occupancy or grant the same for a reasonable consideration, or, if not, that the right might be acquired in pursuance of the law of eminent domain. To require the district to pay the plaintiff for the house it erected would, in effect, compensate him for the land taken and all damages to the land not taken, and in addition gave him a house that cost the district $ 800. This, we think, would be giving more than a just compensation, and would be inequitable. We hold that the charge of the court was not erroneous. Justice v. Railroad Co., 87 Pa. 28; Railway Co. v. Dunlap, 47 Mich. 456, 11 N.W. 271; Russel v. Bank, 39 Mich. 675; Meigs's Appeal, 62 Pa. 28; Daniels v. Railroad Co., 41 Iowa 52. In the case of Railway Co. v. Stancliff, 4 Utah 117, 7 P. 530, it appeared that the railway company built its road across a tract of land owned by the United States. Stancliff, the defendant,...