Searl v. Sch.-Dist. No. 2, SCHOOL-DIST

• Decision Date: 03 March 1890
• Docket Number: SCHOOL-DIST,No. 2,2
• Citation: 33 L.Ed. 740,133 U.S. 553,10 S.Ct. 374
• Parties: SEARL v. 1
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

133 U.S. 553

10 S.Ct. 374

33 L.Ed. 740

SEARLv.SCHOOL-DIST. No. 2.¹

March 3, 1890.

School-districtNo. 2, in the county of Lake and state of Colorado, filed its petition in the county court of that county against R. S. Searl, stating that long prior to the 1st day of July, 1881, it had been, and then was, a school-district duly and regularly organized; that on July 1, 1881, one Frances M. Watson was in the actual possession and occupancy, under a deed of conveyance to her, of certain lots in a certain block of an addition to the city of Leadville; that on the same day one Schlessinger was in the actual possession and occupancy, under deed of conveyance to him of certain other lots; that said Watson and Schlessinger then were, and they and their grantors had for a long time prior thereto been, in the actual possession and occupancy of said lots, claiming the ownership thereof; that on that day the board of directors of the school-district, having been duly authorized and directed so to do, purchased the lots from Watson and Schlessinger, and they were conveyed to the district, the said lots being contiguous, and together constituting but one tract or lot, not exceeding one acre; that the lots were situated within the boundaries of the school-district, and were purchased for the purpose of a school lot upon which to locate and construct a school-house for the benefit of the school-district, and the people resident therein; that the school-district entered into possession and occupation of the land on July 1, 1881, and proceeded to and did construct thereon a large, costly, and valuable school-house, and ever since that time had been and now is in the possession and occupancy of said land, using the same for the purposes of a school; that since the purchase and entry into possession by the school-district the defendant, Searl, had acquired the legal title to the lots composing the school lot, the full title to the same having become vested in him on the 2d day of February, 1884; "that he is now the owner of said property, and that the title thereto acquired by your petitioner as aforesaid has wholly failed; that your petitioner made the purchases, entered into the possession; and constructed the school-house aforesaid in good faith, believing that it had good right to do so; that said school-house is located with reference to the wants and necessities of the people of each portion of said district, and was at the time of said purchases and is now necessary for the school purposes of said district, and that said land and school lot contain no more than is necessary for the location and construction of the school-house aforesaid and the convenient use of the school; that the compensation to be paid for and in respect of the property aforesaid, for the purposes aforesaid, cannot be agreed uponb y your petitioner and the said defendant, the parties interested; and that the said defendant is a non-resident of the state of Colorado."Petitioner then averred that the value of the property did not exceed the sum of $2,000, and prayed that the compensation to be paid by it to defendant for and on account of said property be assessed in accordance with the statute.

The defendant appeared, and on his application the cause was removed into the circuit court of the United States for the district of Colorado.Upon the trial before the circuit judge and a jury, it was 'agreed and admitted, among other things, that the premises appropriated were necessary for the petitioner, and were taken for public use.'And the following stipulation in writing was offered and read in evidence: 'For the purposes of the present hearing and trial only of the above-entitled action or proceeding, either in this court, where it is now pending, or in the supreme court of the United States, where it may be taken on appeal or writ of error, the following facts are agreed upon by and between the respective parties hereto, to-wit: First.That a receiver's receipt was issued for the Sizer placer, United States survey No. 388, on the 16th day of April, A.D. 1881, out of the district land-office of the United States at the city of Leadville, in the state of Colorado, to one Isaac Cooper, claimant.Second.That on the 18th day of May, A. D. 1881, a United States patent was issued to the said Isaac Cooper for the said Sizer placer.Third.That the land sought to be condemned in the present proceeding is a part of the said Sizer placer.Fourth.That since the 20th day of November, A.D. 1882, and before the institution of this proceeding, the said Isaac Cooper conveyed to the said R. S. Searl the said Sizer placer, and the said Searl by virtue thereof is now the owner and holder of the said patent title thereto.Fifth.That prior to the application for a patent to the said Sizer placer, and up to the time when the said school board purchased the same and took possession thereof, the land herein sought to be condemned was occupied, possessed and improved, and the ownership thereof claimed, by persons holding under what was called and known as a 'squatter title.'Sixth.That on or about the 1st day of July, A.D. 1881, the said school board purchased and took conveyances of the land now sought to be condemned, with the buildings and improvements thereon, made and erected by the said squatter occupants, from said occupants, and paid therefor the sum of thirty-five hundred ($3,500) dollars.Seventh.That on or before the 30th day of July, A.D. 1881, the said school board went into actual possession of the lots described in the petition herein, and immediately commenced to build; and on the 30th day of January, A.D. 1882, prior to the institution of these proceedings, completed improvements suitable and appropriate for educational purposes, at a cost to the said school-district of forty thousand ($40,000) dollars, which property it has since possessed and occupied, and still occupies, for school purposes.Eighth.That at the time of the commencement of this action and the institution of these proceedings in condemnation, the land described in the petition herein, together with the improvements thereon so made by the school board as aforesaid, was of the value of forty thousand ($40,000) dollars.Ninth.That at the said times of taking possession, and at the time of the commencement of this action and the institution of these proceedings in condemnation, the land described in the petition herein, without the improvements thereon made by the school board, was of the value of three thousand ($3,000) dollars, and that the area of same is less than one acre.Tenth.That petitioner had knowledge of the issuance of a United States patent, covering the property sought to be condemned, prior to the purchase of the title which its ubsequently purchased, and which was known as the squatter title.That prior to such purchase petitioner employed and paid reputable counsel to investigate said title; that the counsel so employed reported in favor of the validity of the so-called squatter title, and against the validity of the United States patent; that, believing said so-called squatter title to be better than the title conveyed by United States patent, petitioner purchased the same; that after said purchase petitioner subscribed to the funds of an association organized for the purpose of endeavoring to defeat said patent title.Eleventh.That, prior to the commencement of and during the erection of the school building now standing on the land sought to be condemned, the board of school directors of petitioner was notified on behalf of respondent, who at that time owned an equitable interest in the said property, and on behalf of respondent's grantors, that any building said school-district might erect on said lots would be erected at the peril of the said school district, and would be claimed, when completed by said respondent and his grantor; but the said school-district, having purchased the said lots of the squatters in possession as aforesaid, and believing that it had the better title thereto, proceeded, notwithstanding such notice, and made and erected said improvements as aforesaid.And in view of the statute, (Dawson's Colo. Code, p. 80, § 253,) and for the purpose of putting as speedy an end to contention as possible, it is further stipulated that the foregoing values may be taken as the actual values at the time of the trial of this suit, and that the property sought to be condemned is for public use, and, within the meaning of the law, is necessary for the school-district.Twelfth.That R. S. Searl is now, and was at the time of the commencement of these proceedings, a citizen and resident of the state of Kansas.'

The bill of exceptions also states that 'the said defendant, R. S. Searl, introduced further evidence tending to show that he became the legal owner of the premises on the 2d day of February, 1884, and commenced his action of ejectment on the 24th of March, 1884, which was at issue and set for trial in this court on the 11th day of June, 1884; that petitioner filed bill for injunction and obtained writ of injunction restraining trial of ejectment suit on the 7th of June, 1884, and commenced these proceedings on the 9th of June, 1884.'The defendant requested the court to give to the jury a number of instructions, which are omitted in view of the grounds of decision here.The court refused these instructions, and charged the jury generally, and instructed them that the form of their verdict should be as follows: 'We, the jury, find—First, that the accurate description...