Chase v. Ladd

• Citation: 29 N.E. 637,155 Mass. 417
• Parties: CHASE v. LADD. LADD v. CHASE et al.
• Decision Date: 08 January 1892
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

155 Mass. 417

29 N.E. 637

CHASE

v.LADD.

LADD

v.CHASE et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

Jan. 8, 1892.

Cross-appeals from superior court, Essex county.

Bill by Thomas M. Chase, administrator de bonis non with the will annexed of Thomas M. Chase, deceased, against Gardner P. Ladd, executor of Ann L. Chase, deceased. Ann L. Chase was the widow of Thomas M. Chase, and had been his executrix. The bill was brought to recover possession of property alleged to belong to the estate of Thomas M. Chase. Gardner P. Ladd, as such executor, also filed a bill against Thomas M. Chase and others, praying that the defendants be compelled to interplead as to their claims to property in his hands as such executor. For former report, see 26 N.E.Rep. 429.

The will of Thomas M. Chase, deceased, provided as follows: “First. My will is that all my just debts and funeral charges shall, by my executrix, hereinafter named, be paid out of my estate, as soon after my decease as shall by her be found convenient. Second. All the rest and residue of my estate, real, personal, or mixed, of which I shall die seised and possessed, or to which I shall be entitled at the time of my decease, I give, devise, and bequeath to my beloved wife, Ann L. Chase, to her use and behoof forever: *** provided, also, that if any of the property which I have given my beloved wife, aforesaid, shall not have been expended by her, for her support and maintenance, during her life-time, then and in that case my will is that so much of said estate as shall remain unexpended at the time of her decease shall be disposed thereof in manner following, to-wit.” Among the assets of the estate was a farm, which Mrs. Chase sold for $2,650, giving a quitclaim deed to the purchaser. Both parties appeal.W.H. Moody and E.B. George, for legatees.

Harry J. Cole, for Ladd, executor.

Jones, Jones & Pingree, for Chase, administrator.

E.B. Fuller, Reed & Baker, and Moody & Bartlett, for defendants.

MORTON, J.

The bill of Gardner P. Ladd, executor, against Thomas M. Chase and others, cannot be maintained as a bill of interpleader, by reason of the interest which the complainant has in the subject-matter of the suit. Daniell, Ch.Pr. (3d Amer.Ed.) 1660, 1668. We think, however, it may be regarded as a bill for instructions, in which case the interest of the complainant in the subject-matter would not be fatal. Batchelder, Petitioner, 147 Mass. 470, 18 N.E.Rep. 225; Stevens v. Warren, 101 Mass. 564. This presents the further question whether a bill for instructions can be brought in the superior court, and we think it can. The jurisdiction of this court in the matter of bills for instructions has been referred to the general equitable jurisdiction in the matter of trusts conferred upon it by statute. Treadwell v. Cordis, 5 Gray, 341, 348; Batchelder, Petitioner, supra; Pub.St. c. 151, § 2. cl. 2, By St.1883, c. 223, § 1, the superior court was given “original and concurrent jurisdiction with the supreme judicial court in all matters in which relief or discovery in equity is sought.” By section 2 of the same act it is provided that “all sections of chapter one hundred and fifty-one of the Public Statutes, except section one, *** shall apply, except as herein otherwise provided, to suits in equity in the superior court.” Original and concurrent jurisdiction with the supreme judicial court would thus seem to have been given to the superior court of all the various matters enumerated in section 2, c. 151, of the Public Statutes. Among them is the matter of trusts, out of which, as we have already seen, the jurisdiction of this court over bills for instructions has come. In Baldwin v. Wilbraham, 140 Mass. 459, 4 N.E.Rep. 829, the court assumed that the equity powers named in Pub.St. c. 151, § 2, were given to the superior court, but held in effect that the statute did not operate to vest the superior court with certain special powers and duties with which the supreme judicial court was charged, and which were not within the general jurisdiction of a court of equity.

We come next to the real questions at issue between the parties. They are-First, the nature of the interest which the widow took in her husband's estate; secondly, whether the conveyance relating to the farm was an execution of the power under the will, or a sale of her own interest merely; and, thirdly, whether, deducting the $300 which it is agreed belong to Joseph S. Noyes, the rest of the funds in her possession at the time of her death belong to the administrator de bonis non of her husband, or partly to him and partly to the executor of...