Chase v. Seattle Taxicab & Transfer Co.

• Decision Date: 20 March 1914
• Citation: 139 P. 499,78 Wash. 537
• Parties: CHASE v. SEATTLE TAXICAB & TRANSFER CO.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

139 P. 499

78 Wash. 537

CHASE v. SEATTLE TAXICAB & TRANSFER CO.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 20, 1914

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Boyd Tallman Judge.

Action by Frank Chase against the Seattle Taxicab & Transfer Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Brightman, Halverstadt & Tennant, of Seattle, for appellant.

Wm Brueggerhoff, of Seattle, for respondent.

GOSE J.

The plaintiff was struck by a taxicab owned by the defendant, and driven by one of its agents, and in this action seeks redress for his injuries. There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $1,000.

The appeal presents four questions: (1) The negligence of the appellant; (2) the contributory negligence of the respondent (3) the correctness of the instructions; and (4) were the damages awarded excessive?

The respondent, 58 years of age, a longshoreman by occupation, on the 11th day of December, 1912, at about the hour of 6 o'clock a. m., was struck and knocked down by one of the appellant's taxicabs, at a point about 3 feet from the curb, at the northwest point of intersection of Jackson street and Fifth avenue, in the city of Seattle. Jackson street runs east and west; the avenue runs north and south and is 42 feet in width between the curb lines. A double-track electric car line is operated upon both the street and the avenue. Main street is one block north of Jackson street. The respondent, with a companion, was walking west on Jackson street. When he was at the east rail of the east car track, he saw the light of the taxicab at Main street. He continued west along the avenue without further observation of the car, and was struck at the point indicated. He and his companion and another witness who saw the accident say that the driver of the taxicab did not sound his horn or give other warning of his approach. The taxicab continued south on Fifth avenue, and, in making a sharp turn into Jackson street, struck the respondent as above stated. There were no street cars and no other vehicles in the vicinity. The streets were well lighted, and the taxicab had its lights on. There was nothing to prevent the driver of the taxicab from seeing the respondent for at least a half block from the point of contact. The driver said that there was rain upon his wind shield, and that he could not see through it, that he looked around it when about 30 feet distant from the point of contact, saw the respondent, and sounded his horn, that the respondent stopped, and that he did not see him again until he was practically upon him. The respondent said that he did not stop, and that he heard no horn or other warning. The driver said that it rained that morning after he left the garage a few minutes before the accident. This statement is disputed by the respondent and his witnesses. Upon these facts the negligence of the driver is too apparent to merit discussion.

Upon the second proposition it is equally obvious that the question of the contributory negligence of the respondent was for the jury. The respondent saw the taxicab a block to the south, and proceeded in a uniform course, without hesitation or vacillation. Whether his failure to look a second time was such negligence as to prevent a recovery was for the jury. Lewis v. Seattle Taxicab Co., 72 Wash. 320, 130 P. 341; Hillebrant v. Manz, 71 Wash. 250, 128 P. 892.

Counsel for the appellant argues that the Lewis Case is not only wrong in principle, but is in conflict with Minor v Stevens, 65 Wash. 423, 118 P. 313, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1178, and Dimuria v. Seattle Transfer Co., 50 Wash. 633, 97 P. 657, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 471. A reading of the Minor Case will disclose that it was reversed because the jury...