Chase v. State
| Citation | 227 A.2d 455 |
| Parties | Carl R. CHASE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Maine and Allan L. Robbins, Warden, Maine State Prison. |
| Decision Date | 21 March 1967 |
| Court | Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US) |
Roscoe H. Fales, Lewiston, for plaintiff.
John W. Benoit, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for defendant.
Before WILLIAMSON, C. J., and TAPLEY, MARDEN, DUFRESNE, and WEATHERBEE, JJ.
On appeal. An appeal was taken by the appellant from the findings of a single Justice. The findings are to be tested by the 'Clearly Erroneous' Rule. Rule 52 M.R.C.P.; Harriman v. Spaulding, 156 Me. 440, 165 A.2d 47.
The appellant was convicted of the crime of murder at the November Term, 1952 of the Superior Court, within and for the County of Androscoggin, State of Maine. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. Previous to the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus brought under provisions of 14 M.R.S.A., Secs. 5502-5508 the appellant commenced and prosecuted four other postconviction proceedings. The first was in November, 1954 when a petition for writ of habeas corpus was addressed to the United States District Court for the District of Maine. The complaint in that petition was that the indictment upon which the petitioner was tried was insufficient in law.
Judge Magruder, upon dismissing the writ, said:
'It is apparent from the face of the present petition that the alleged federal question sought to be presented is utterly frivolous.'
In 1954 the appellant presented to the late Justice Dubord a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging the same reason, viz: legal insufficiency of indictment. Justice Dubord denied the writ for the reason that the question had been decided in State v. Chase, 149 Me. 80, 99 A.2d 71.
Again, in 1959, Justice Dubord denied another petition for writ of habeas corpus. The question again was validity of indictment.
This issue of legal sufficiency of indictment has been adjudicated at least four times.
The record discloses that the appellant brought a petition for writ of error coram nobis in December of 1959. The petitioner alleged (1) incompetency of counsel; (2) legal insufficiency of indictment; (3) withholding of evidence prejudicial to the defendant; (4) the denial of right to be confronted by witnesses during the trial; (5) denial of cross-examination; (6) improper conduct of Justice in admitting hearsay evidence; and (7) denial of reasonable time to prepare a defense. The Justice below issued the writ on the issue of incompetency of counsel only. He held that all of the allegations were not properly before the court on coram nobis. The case proceeded to hearing on the one issue. The Justice in his findings said:
The appellant is now before this court attacking the findings of the Justice below because of alleged errors. The Justice made two findings, one he termed 'Interlocutory Findings and Order' which bears date March 19, 1966 and the other, 'Decree' which is dated July 21, 1966. The first hearing upon which the 'Interlocutory Findings and Order' were issued was continued until March 28, 1966. As a result of the continued hearing the Justice filed the 'Decree.' Both findings are under attack here. The appellant in his petition for writ of habeas corpus alleged the following:
'(a) Court appointed Counsel for petitioner at the trial was incompetent for the following reasons:
1-He failed to question the jurors as they were impanelled.
2-He neglected to request the Court to strike petitioner's plea of not guilty to the indictment and file a demurrer thereto.
3-He should not have waived respondent's right to be present at the view which the Traverse Jury took at the trial.
4-He neglected to request that the opening and final argument, including rebuttal, of Counsel for the State be recorded by the Court Reporter.
5-He should not have allowed Custody of Exhibits to remain with Counsel for the State overnight.
6-He permitted to be admitted into evidence the exhibits, the chain of custody of which had not been established.
7-He failed to ask for a mistrial when Mrs. Yorksus remonstrated the petitioner while off the witness stand but in the immediate presence of the jury.
8-He failed to object to witnesses testifying as to conclusions such as 'bloodstains.'
9-He agreed to stipulate the testimony of certain witnesses who could not be obtained to testify in person by the State.
10-He failed to object when the Presiding Justice excused one Juror from the panel shortly before the jury retired to consider the evidence.
11-He failed to prosecute by Bill of Exceptions, the exceptions he had taken to the rulings of the Presiding Justice during the course of the trial.
12-He failed to file a motion to quash the indictment on the ground that eleven of the Grand Jurors were not capable of serving in that capacity.
13-He failed to adequately prepare the case by conducting proper preliminary investigation.
14-He did not continue to represent the petitioner after the verdict but without authority of either the Presiding Justice or the petitioner delegated this responsibility to another attorney.
15-He failed to object to petitioner being tried on Indictment No. 4860 while there was another Indictment No. 4861 pending because the evidence to substantiate both indictments was the same.
16-He was not present when Petitioner was sentenced at the September, 1953 Term of Court.
17-He failed to object to prejudicial statements made by Counsel for the State to the jury concerning testimony of a witness not present to testify which statements of Counsel were not recorded by the Court Reporter.
18-He failed to object to the Presiding Justice's charge to the jury with respect to said Justice's stating that the jury could not bring a verdict of guilty of manslaughter if the killing was committed during the commission of a felony.
19-He failed to object to the foreman of the Traverse Jury being designated by the Court instead of elected by the panel.
(b) The reasons assigned above in Paragraph (a) to substantiate petitioner's contention that Counsel was incompetent are here reiterated as independent grounds to substantiate this petition.
(c) The Presiding Justice did not appoint Counsel for the respondent until after he was arraigned and his plea of not guilty had been entered.
(d) The indictment upon which the petitioner was tried is defective as a matter of law.
(e) Petitioner was not represented by Counsel at the time of the arraignment, was not acquainted with law, and, therefore, was unable to enter a demurrer to the indictment.
(f) He was not represented by Counsel when he entered a plea of not guilty to the indictment at which time he wanted to object to the indictment being found by a grand jury, eleven of whose members were not qualified to sit but he was informed by an official of the Court that such an objection must be filed by Counsel.
(g) He was held incommunicado from November 10, 1952 until time of arraignment by officials of the State of Maine preventing until after arraignment and plea any consultation with Counsel.
(h) On December 1, 1952, at a recess during the selection of trial jurors, he was handcuffed and taken to a room at the back of the Courthouse by Deputy Sheriffs of Androscoggin County and that within this room were witnesses for the State and said witnesses were informed by said Deputy Sheriffs that the petitioner was the party and they should indentify (sic) as the defendant in the case.
(i) Petitioner was sentenced twice for the same crime.
(j) There is no transcript of the proceedings in the court room from arraignment to trial.'
He amended the petition by once more presenting his contention that the indictment was faulty and by charging:
(1) 'That eleven (11) Grand Jurors were (sic) none of them of good moral character, approved integrity, sound judgment, well informed, nor qualified as such, making the entire Grand Jury body incompetent to return a valid true bill by lack of sufficient number to form a constitutional unanimity.'
(2) 'Members of the Sheriff's Department prevented the Petitioner from using the telephone or in any other way get in touch with counsel even though Petitioner repeatedly requested members of the Sheriff's Department to consult with counsel.'
The Justice below found that the allegation regarding insufficient indictment was settled by State v. Chase, 149 Me. 80, 99 A.2d 71; that the following assignments of error were without merit:
'He was not represented by Counsel when he entered a plea of not guilty to the indictment at which time he wanted to object to the indictment being found by a grand jury, eleven of whose members were not qualified to sit but he was informed by an official of the Court that such an objection must be filed by Counsel.'
and,
'That eleven (11) Grand Jurors were (sic) none of them of good moral character, approved integrity, sound judgment, well informed, nor qualified as such, making the entire Grand Jury body incompetent to return a valid true bill by lack of sufficient number to form a constitutional...
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