Chase v. State, Dept. of Motor Vehicles

• Decision Date: 24 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. AC,AC
• Citation: 45 Conn.App. 499,696 A.2d 1299
• Parties: Marvin CHASE v. STATE of Connecticut, DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES. 16114.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

Page 1299

696 A.2d 1299

45 Conn.App. 499

Marvin CHASE v. STATE of Connecticut, DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES.

No. AC 16114.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Submitted on Briefs March 6, 1997.

Decided June 24, 1997.

Brian W. Prucker and Robert Fitzgerald, Manchester, filed a brief for appellant (plaintiff).

Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, and Matthew B. Beizer and William J. McCullough, Assistant Attorneys General, filed a brief for appellee (defendant).

Before FOTI, LAVERY and SPEAR, JJ.

SPEAR, Judge.

The issue in this workers' compensation case is whether the plaintiff's notice of injury was sufficient to trigger the statutory twenty day period ¹ within which an employer may file a notice contesting liability for the claim. The trial commissioner ruled that the notice, sent to the "Department of Motor Vehicles" rather than to the "State of Connecticut, Department of Motor Vehicles" was insufficiently addressed to impose an obligation on the defendant to file a notice contesting liability within the twenty day period. The commissioner, therefore, denied the plaintiff's motion to preclude the defendant from contesting liability and, thereafter, dismissed the claim. The compensation review board (review board) affirmed the trial commissioner's decision denying the motion to preclude, ² and this appeal followed.

The plaintiff asserts that the notice of injury was sufficiently addressed so that his employer, the state of Connecticut, had an opportunity to make a timely investigation of the claim. Therefore, the trial commissioner improperly denied the motion to preclude. The defendant asserts that the plaintiff's contention is contrary to the applicable precedent of the review board and is supported only by nonbinding dicta from a Supreme Court case. As alternative grounds for affirmance, ³ the defendant contends that the motion to preclude was properly denied because (1) the claim here is not bona fide, (2) the alleged date or dates of injury were too vague and ambiguous to allow the timely investigation contemplated by the twenty day rule of General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 31-297(b), and (3) the plaintiff did not provide evidence that established the sufficiency of his notice. We reverse the decision of the review board because we conclude that the notice of claim was sufficient to trigger the twenty day period.

The following facts are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On July 19, 1989, the plaintiff was employed by the state department of motor vehicles (defendant). On July 26, 1989, the plaintiff mailed a notice of claim to the defendant. The notice was addressed to the "Department of Motor Vehicles" at 60 State Street in Wethersfield. It stated that the plaintiff "while in the employ of Department of Motor Vehicles at Norwich, CT, on the 19th day of July, 1989, or sometime prior thereto, sustained injuries arising out of and in the course of his ... employment as follows ... Repetitive Trauma/Repetitive Act and/or Trauma to Back, and Repetitive Trauma/Repetitive Act and/or Trauma to Left Knee." The defendant received the notice of claim on July 28, 1989.

On September 1, 1989, thirty-five days after it received the notice of claim, the defendant sent a notice contesting liability to the plaintiff and to the workers' compensation district office. On September 26, 1990, the plaintiff filed a motion to preclude the defendant from contesting the compensability of his alleged injury because the defendant failed to comply with the twenty day time limit set forth in § 31-297(b). The workers' compensation commissioner denied his motion on September 13, 1991, because the notice failed to identify the defendant as "State of Connecticut, Department of Motor Vehicles." ⁴

I

The purpose of the preclusion statute is to "ensure (1) that employers would bear the burden of investigating a claim promptly and (2) that employees would be timely apprised of the specific reasons for the denial of their claim. These effects would, in turn, diminish delays in the proceedings, discourage arbitrary refusal of bona fide claims and narrow the legal issues which were to be contested." Menzies v. Fisher, 165 Conn. 338, 343, 334 A.2d 452 (1973).

Before an employer's obligation to respond is triggered, a plaintiff must first file a notice of claim. See General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 31-294. Until our Supreme Court decided Pereira v. State, 228 Conn. 535, 637 A.2d 392 (1994), the review board, in judging the sufficiency of a notice of claim, consistently adhered to a rule of strict compliance ⁵ with § 31-294. See, e.g., Fuller v. Central Paving Co., 5 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 92 (1988). In Pereira, however, our Supreme Court addressed, in dicta, the issue of what constitutes a sufficient notice of claim "to clarify a misconception on behalf of the review [board] regarding the standard by which the sufficiency of a notice of claim to trigger an employer's obligation to respond under § 31-297(b) should be judged. The rule of strict compliance adopted by the review [board] is not supported by either the plain language or the legislative history of § 31-297(b). To the contrary, § 31-297(b) is remedial legislation that should be liberally construed to accomplish its humanitarian purpose.... [I]t was enacted to require a prompt and thorough investigation of the employee's claim so as to yield a specific disclaimer of liability and to avoid unnecessary delay in the adjudication of workers' claims. As a result, if the notice of claim is sufficient to allow the employer to make a timely investigation of the claim, it triggers the employer's obligation to file a disclaimer." (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Pereira v. State, supra, at 542-43 n. 8, 637 A.2d 392. ⁶

After the Pereira decision, the review board retreated from its rule of strict compliance and adopted this relaxed standard. See Bell v. Dow Corning STI, Inc., 13 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 109, 111 (1995). Although the relevant language in Pereira is dicta, we are disinclined to resolve the same issue on virtually identical facts contrary to such clear and persuasive guidance from our Supreme Court. We fail to discern how the addition of the words "State of Connecticut" would have added to the effectiveness of the notice here. The defendant's notice contesting liability states that it knew of the injury on July 19, 1989, and it is undisputed that the department received the plaintiff's notice on July 28, 1989. Indeed, in the notice contesting liability the defendant lists the name of the employer as "Motor Vehicles," an even more cryptic description than the plaintiff's. The address of the employer is listed on the disclaimer as 60 State Street, the exact address that the plaintiff used.

Any lack of opportunity to investigate the claim apparently resulted from internal misdirection of the notice. Contrary to the defendant's assertion, we do not read General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 31-294 ⁷ as requiring a plaintiff to send notice to a legal agent for service or to some other person who "could reasonably be expected to handle this sort of notice." Because the notice went to the same place to which it would have gone if "State of Connecticut" had been added to the address, the defendant had an opportunity to make a timely investigation of the claim. The notice contesting liability came too late and the defendant should have been precluded from contesting the compensability of the claim.

II

The defendant asserts as alternative grounds for affirmance that, even if we adopt the Pereira standard, the notice of claim was insufficient because (1) it failed to state a precise date on which the alleged injuries occurred, (2) the claim is not bona fide and (3) the plaintiff did not prove that his notice satisfied the Pereira standard. We find no merit in these contentions.

A

In his notice, the plaintiff alleged that he suffered a repetitive injury and trauma to his knee ⁸ and back on or before July 19, 1989. The defendant was thus on notice that on or before that date the plaintiff sustained one or both types of injuries.

The notice of claim was sufficient to allow the defendant to investigate the claim of repetitive injury in a timely manner. A repetitive trauma, by definition, necessarily occurs over a period of time. See Quinn v. Knapp, 12 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 334 (1994). The review board has consistently held that where a notice of claim alleges a repetitive trauma, the lack of a precise date of injury is not fatal to a notice of claim. See id., 336.

The notice was also sufficient to enable the defendant to investigate the plaintiff's allegation that he incurred a traumatic injury on or before July 19, 1989. Unlike those cases in which a plaintiff alleges an inaccurate date of accidental injury; see, e.g., Simmons v. Bonhotel, 13 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 234 (1995); Pickard v. Manchester Gardens Condominium Assn., Inc., 10 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 216 (1992); in this case, the defendant does not claim that the date in the notice is inaccurate. ⁹ Rather, it asserts that the notice of claim was insufficient because it was "impossible ... to focus its investigation on any particular time." We are unpersuaded by the defendant's assertion. If the results of the defendant's investigation did not reveal an accidental injury on the precise date given in the notice, or in the several days prior thereto, the defendant reasonably could have disclaimed liability for the traumatic injury. ¹⁰

We conclude that the date in the notice of claim was sufficient to enable the defendant to make a timely investigation in order to determine whether to contest liability.

B

The defendant next asserts that the denial of the plaintiff's motion to preclude was proper because he is not a bona fide plaintiff. The merits of his case have been adjudicated and his case was dismissed. As such, the defendant asserts, "he should not be entitled to...