Chase v. United Hospital

• Decision Date: 27 December 1977
• Parties: Beatrice A. CHASE, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. UNITED HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 343

400 N.Y.S.2d 343

60 A.D.2d 558

Beatrice A. CHASE, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. UNITED HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Dec. 27, 1977.

L. Stansky, New York City, for plaintiff-respondent.

A. B. Roth, New York City, for defendant-appellant.

Before MURPHY, P. J., and BIRNS, EVANS and LANE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION.

Order of the Supreme Court, New York County, entered May 17, 1977, denying defendant's motion for summary judgment, unanimously reversed, on the law, and summary judgment granted to defendant dismissing the complaint and summary judgment granted to plaintiff for unreimbursed expenditures, without costs and without disbursements.

The letter of March 26, 1976, upon which plaintiff bases her claim for a two-year contract of employment as Director of Nursing at defendant hospital did no more than to establish an annual rate of salary for plaintiff. It provided for no specific terms of employment, so that even if the letter were considered to be a contract of employment it would still be insufficient in law. Employment contracts which are not for a specific term are terminable at will (Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577, 156 N.E.2d 297; Reale v. International Business Machines Corp.,34 A.D.2d 936, 311 N.Y.S.2d 767, affd. 28 N.Y.2d 912, 322 N.Y.S.2d 735, 271 N.E.2d 565; Powell v. Board of Higher Education, 38 A.D.2d 541, 327 N.Y.S.2d 292, affd. 30 N.Y.2d 889, 335 N.Y.S.2d 438, 286 N.E.2d 921). Because the letter stated no term for plaintiff's employment, defendant had the right to discharge plaintiff at any time (Watson v. Gugino, 204 N.Y. 535, 541, 98 N.E. 18, 20; Cartwright v. Golub Corp., 51 A.D.2d 407, 381 N.Y.S.2d 901). The fact that compensation is measured by a specific period of time does not bind a party to a term of that or any other period (Cartwright v. Golub, supra ). We do not agree with plaintiff's claim that the language of the letter is ambiguous and that parol evidence is admissible to establish that the parties intended to establish a two-year term (see e. g., Intercontinental Planning Limited v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 372, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817, 248 N.E.2d 576; Spector v. Sovereign Construction Co., Ltd., 45 A.D.2d 673, 356 N.Y.S.2d 79). Even assuming plaintiff's allegations concerning "assurances" by defendant that her employment would be for two years were true, the statute of frauds rendered the oral promises void and unenforceable, as the two-year term, obviously, could not be performed within one year (General Obligations Law, § 5-701(1)). We observe that although plaintiff's second cause of action alleges "fr...