Chassereau v. Stuckey, 0664
| Citation | 342 S.E.2d 623,288 S.C. 368 |
| Decision Date | 17 February 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 0664,0664 |
| Parties | , 86 A.L.R.4th 255 Larry CHASSEREAU, Respondent, v. Elizabeth G. STUCKEY, Executrix of the Estate of F.L. Stuckey, Jr., deceased, Appellant. . Heard |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
J. Leeds Barroll, IV, Columbia, for appellant.
Robert J. Hallman, Columbia, for respondent.
Chassereau (lessee) sued Stuckey (lessor) to enforce the terms of a real estate lease. The subject lease provided in the demising clause that the property was "to be used primarily as an automobile dealership." The lessee sublet the property to a sublessee who used it solely as a saloon. The lessor, acting upon an ejectment order of a magistrate which was later set aside, demised the subject property to the same tenant to whom the lessee had sublet it. The new tenant then paid the rent to the lessor. The appealed order provided that the lessee be reimbursed for the rent collected by the lessor and awarded damages of $10,000. We affirm.
The sole issue of merit on appeal is whether the trial judge erred in holding that the lessee had not breached the lease by subletting the premises for use as a saloon.
The crux of the decision to be made is to establish the intent of the parties. The question is whether the quoted statement in the lease pertaining to the use to be made of the premises implies a covenant not to use the premises for other purposes. The entire lease, not merely the provision in question, must be read to determine whether a restriction was intended. In order to establish a restriction, express language or language from which a restriction is clearly implied must be shown. In the absence of proof of an independent agreement to the effect that a restriction on the use of the premises was a consideration of inducement to the execution of the lease or in the absence of clear language in the lease indicating a restriction, the terms of the lease not limiting the use of the premises must govern and the lessee has the right to use the premises for any lawful purpose for which they are adapted or may be adapted. 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant, Section 337(b) (1975). Ordinarily, in the absence of an exclusion of other purposes, a lease for a specific purpose will be regarded as permissive instead of restrictive and does not limit the use of the premises by the lessee to such purposes. Id.
Applying the above rules to the lease at hand, we concur with the trial judge in...
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PSC Metals, Inc. v. Shelby Land Co.
...restrictions in leases will not be implied and will be construed against the landlord." (citations omitted)); Chassereau v. Stuckey, 342 S.E.2d 623, 624 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) ("Ordinarily, in the absence of an exclusion of other purposes, a lease for a specific purpose will be regarded as pe......
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Warren v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc.
...of other purposes, a lease for a specific purpose will be regarded as permissive instead of restrictive." Chassereau v. Stuckey, 342 S.E.2d 623, 624 (S.C.Ct.App.1986). Such leased property may be used for any lawful purpose for which the property may be adapted. Id.; see Shropshire v. Praha......
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Walton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., WAL-MART
...as permissive instead of restrictive and does not limit the use of the premises by the lessee to such purposes." Chassereau v. Stuckey, 342 S.E.2d 623, 624 (S.C.Ct.App.1986) (holding that a use clause stating property was "to be used primarily as an automobile dealership" was permissive); a......
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Shropshire v. Prahalis, 1844
...to the penalty for using the premises as a used car lot." In support of his argument, Mr. Shropshire relies on Chassereau v. Stuckey, 288 S.C. 368, 342 S.E.2d 623 (Ct.App.1986). There, the Court held that, depending on the intent of the parties, language in a lease pertaining to the use to ......