Chastain v. City of Kansas City Mo.

• Decision Date: 26 January 2022
• Docket Number: 4:20-cv-00694-RK
• Parties: CLAY CHASTAIN, WILLIAM YOUNG, MARY EALON, DENETTA DICKERSON, LATOY MATHEWS, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF KANSAS CITY MISSOURI, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

CLAY CHASTAIN, WILLIAM YOUNG, MARY EALON, DENETTA DICKERSON, LATOY MATHEWS, Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF KANSAS CITY MISSOURI, Defendant.

No. 4:20-cv-00694-RK

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Western Division

January 26, 2022

ORDER

ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 46.)^[1] The motion is fully brief ed. (Docs. 47, 48, 50.) After careful consideration, and for the reasons explained below, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

I. Background

Local Rule 56.1(b)(1) requires that “[a] party opposing a motion for summary judgment must begin its opposing suggestions by admitting or controverting each separately numbered paragraph in the movant's statement of facts.” The rule further provides that “[u]nless specifically controverted by the opposing party, all facts set forth in the statement of the movant are deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment.” Local Rule 56.1(b)(1). In opposing Defendant's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs did not address the statement of facts in Defendant's motion. Therefore, the facts set forth in Defendant's Statement of Uncontroverted Facts (Doc. 47 at 1-4) are deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment.

Plaintiffs are five individuals appearing in this matter pro se both individually and as a committee of petitioners. (Se e Doc. 12 at 1 (“Come now Plaintiff's, the Committee of Petitioners (Pro Se) and (hereinafter “Plaintiffs, who are all electors of the City and represent the 3, 000 voters who signed petition) [sic]”).) Plaintiffs assert this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant,

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City of Kansas City, Missouri ("the City"), regarding Plaintiffs' attempt to enact a city ordinance through the City's initiative petition process. Plaintiffs seek injunctive and monetary relief for Defendant's alleged violation of their First Amendment right to petition the government since the City has failed to place the petition on the ballot for a vote.

Sections 701 through 704 of Kansas City's city charter^[2] provides an initiative process for new ordinances to be submitted to the City Council by petition. The city charter contemplates a committee of petitioners, as Plaintiffs are here, consisting of "five electors of the city" who "shall be officially regarded as filing the petition." City Charter, §731. Section 701 of the city charter requires a petition for a "new ordinance or any ordinance to amend or repeal . . . any existing ordinance" to be signed by "electors of the City" equal to five percent of the total vote cast for Mayor in the last preceding regular municipal election. Once assembled, the committee of petitioners must then file the petition with the City Clerk, who must within ten days examine and certify the sufficiency of the petition. City Charter, §731. If certified by the City Clerk as sufficient, the City Clerk "shall certify and submit the ordinance ... to the [City] Council at its next meeting." City Charter, § 702. Section 702 provides what happens next:

If the [City] Council fails to pass such ordinance within sixty days after such submission, or passes it in a form different from that set forth in the petition, the committee of petitioners... may require that it be submitted to a vote of the electors in its original form. If the committee of petitioners requires the submission of the proposed ordinance to the electors, they shall so certify to the City Clerk within ten days after the final action by the Council or expiration of the sixty-day period

Finally, § 703 provides:

Upon receipt of such certification the City Clerk shall certify the fact to the Council at its next regular meeting The Council shall thereupon submit the proposed ordinance to the electors at the next available municipal or state election held not less than thirty (30) days after such certification by the committee of petitioners for which the City can lawfully provide required notices to the election authorities without seeking a court order

In April 2019, Plaintiff s, as a five-member committee of petitioners, submitted their "Green Transit" initiative petition to the City Council, seeking to place it on the ballot for the election to

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be held November 5, 2019. The ordinance was submitted to the City Council at its meeting held on April 25, 2019. The sixty-day period (ending on June 25, 2019) expired without the City Council passing the ordinance either as contained in the petition or in a different form. The ten-day period in section 702 for the committee of petitioners to certify the submission of the ordinance to be placed before the voters expired on July 5, 2019. On July 18, 2019, more than ten days after the ten-day certification deadline passed, Plaintiffs submitted a certification to the City Clerk with signatures from only three of the five members of the committee. (See Doc. 47-3.) Plaintiffs allege Defendants "released" the petition at that time, "effectively eliminating it from ever being placed before voters by the City" and have not communicated why the City "refus[ed] to place" the petition on the ballot. (Doc. 12 at 3.)

Approximately one month later, on August 15, 2019, Mr. Chastain filed a petition for emergency injunction and misfeasance in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri. The lawsuit was filed on behalf of "Clay Chastain and fellow members of the Committee of Petitioners" and sought "an emergency injunctive order" for the City to place the initiative petition on the November 5, 2019 ballot"in its 'original form.'" (Doc. 47-5 at 1.); Chastain v. City of Kansas City, Case No. 1916-CV22248. The petition alleged the City had "illegally and unjustly block[ed] and delay [ed] a vote, by unduly holding the petition in committee for no stated reason and because the Clerk did not submit the Committee's demand letter to the full Council as instructed by the Charter," and in addition to injunctive relief, sought $1 million in damages. (Id. at 8.)

The City filed a motion to dismiss the state court complaint on August 21, 2019, which the circuit court granted on the following day.^[3]

Finally, on August 26, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting a constitutional claim under the First Amendment. Defendant argues it is entitled to summary judgment because the suit is either precluded under res judicata or collateral estoppel, or alternatively, the petition process in the City Charter does not violate Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights, and Plaintiffs' do not otherwise establish a constitutional violation.

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II. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a movant is entitled to summary judgment on a claim only if he has made a showing that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In applying this standard, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, giving that party the benefit of all inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. Matsushita Elect. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Redo v. Creighton Univ., 521 F.3d 934, 938 (8th Cir. 2008). The inquiry is whether "there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). In resisting summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations in its pleadings, but must, by affidavit and other evidence, set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 527 (8th Cir. 2007) (mere allegations, unsupported by specific facts or evidence beyond a nonmoving party's own conclusions, are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment).

III. Discussion

A. Preclusive Effect of Prior State Court Decision

Defendant first argues it is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiffs' First Amendment claim could have been brought in the 2019 lawsuit in state court. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs are barred by res judicata from bringing this lawsuit and that "collateral estoppel estops the [committee of petitioners] from arguing it was anything but its own incomplete and untimely actions that kept the ordinance from being presented to the voters." (Doc. 47 at 5.)

Under 28 U.S. C § 1738, "a state court judgment is entitled to the same full faith and credit in a federal court as the judgment is given by state law." Medvick v. City of Univ. City, Mo., 995 F.2d 857, 858 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980)). In Missouri, the doctrine of res judicata "operates as a bar to the reassertion of a cause of action that has been previously adjudicated in a proceeding between the same parties." Lauber-Clayton, LLC v. Novus Props. Co., 407 S.W.3d 612, 618 (Mo.Ct.App. 2013) (citations omitted). "Because Missouri recognizes the doctrine of res judicata, a federal court presented with a § 1983 action in Missouri must apply the doctrine to give preclusive effect to a Mssouri court judgment." Medvick, 995 F.2d at 858

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(citations omitted). "The law of the forum that rendered the first judgment controls the res judicata analysis." Laase v. Cty. Of Isanti, 638 F.3d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation and quotation omitted) (looking to Minnesota law to determine whether plaintiff s suit under § 1983 was barred by the doctrine of res judicata based on an earlier state court judgment).

The doctrine of resjudicata applies if four identities are satisfied: "(1) identity of the things sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the persons or parties to the...