Chastain v. Litton Systems, Inc., B-C-80-267

• Decision Date: 01 October 1981
• Docket Number: No. B-C-80-267,B-C-80-268.,B-C-80-267
• Citation: 527 F. Supp. 527
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina
• Parties: John Boyd CHASTAIN, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of Marilyn Gail Chastain, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. LITTON SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant. Grady Allen INGLE, Administrator of the Estate of Lucille C. Ingle, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. LITTON SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant.

527 F. Supp. 527

John Boyd CHASTAIN, Jr., Administrator of the Estate of Marilyn Gail Chastain, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. LITTON SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant.

Grady Allen INGLE, Administrator of the Estate of Lucille C. Ingle, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. LITTON SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant.

Nos. B-C-80-267, B-C-80-268.

United States District Court, W. D. North Carolina, Bryson City Division.

October 1, 1981.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Herbert L. Hyde, Asheville, N. C., for plaintiffs.

Landon Roberts, Asheville, N. C., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

WOODROW W. JONES, Chief Judge.

The Plaintiffs, John Boyd Chastain, Jr. and Grady Allen Ingle, Administrators of the estates of Marilyn Gail Chastain and Lucille C. Ingle, deceased, respectively, and residents of North Carolina, instituted these diversity actions against the Defendant, Litton Systems, Inc., a Delaware corporation which owns and operates a manufacturing plant in Cherokee County, North Carolina, seeking compensatory and punitive damages under the North Carolina Wrongful Death Statute G.S. 28A-18-2. These lawsuits arise from a motor vehicle accident on December 21, 1979 in which a van driven by George Beck, the Defendant's employee, collided with an automobile occupied by Marilyn Gail Chastain, as driver, and Lucille C. Ingle, as passenger. Both women died as a result of the injuries sustained in said collision.

These matters are now before the Court upon the Defendant's motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) and for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A hearing on these motions was held by the Court in Bryson City on July 20, 1981. For the purposes of this opinion the Court will consider the two cases together. After a careful consideration of the pleadings, affidavits, answers to interrogatories, briefs and argument of counsel the Court now enters its findings and conclusions.

The following facts are not in dispute. The Defendant, Litton Systems, Inc., hereinafter Litton, owns and operates a manufacturing plant in Cherokee County, North Carolina and is not engaged in the manufacture, sale or distribution of alcohol for pecuniary profit or for any other reason. On December 21, 1979, Litton hosted on its Cherokee County premises the annual pre-Christmas party for 861 of its employees called "Rebellion Day." Employees were to check in at or after 8:00 a. m., were to clock out at any time thereafter without performing any work, and were paid for a full eight hours of work. The party schedule consisted of music, snacks, and non-alcoholic beverages served from 8:00 a. m. to 10:00 a. m. and a luncheon served from 10:00 a. m. to 12:00 noon. Litton had its security guards on duty and they were aware of the well established company policy not to allow alcohol beverages on the premises. George Beck, a twenty-five year old male employee of Litton clocked in after 8:00 a. m. and proceeded to the machine shop where someone had spiked the punch with alcoholic beverages and had brought into the machine shop some bottles of whiskey. He began drinking these beverages along with some of the other employees and then clocked out of the plant at 10:00 a. m. At about 10:30 a. m. Beck passed by the plant in his van and was flagged down by a fellow employee, David Taylor, and asked if he needed someone to drive him home. Beck replied that he was fine and refused an offer to come inside to have a cup of coffee. Thereafter Beck drove away and approximately one hour and twenty minutes later and some distance from the plant ran a red light and struck the automobile occupied by the decedents.¹ Litton admits that the security guards stopped six employees from driving from the plant and had other employees driven home because of their inebriated condition.

The Plaintiffs contend that the Defendant was negligent in furnishing or allowing alcohol on its premises and in permitting Beck to become intoxicated and to leave the premises in his van with the Defendant's knowledge of his intoxicated state. They further contend that Litton violated various North Carolina liquor laws and that these violations constitute negligence per se. The Defendant counters by denying that it furnished or allowed alcohol on its premises or that it violated any liquor laws. Further, it argues that even if the Defendant did furnish the alcohol, it is not liable in common law negligence for the wrongful acts of Beck.

The Court has considered matters outside the pleadings and therefore will treat the Defendant's Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, F.R.C.P. Smith v. Blackledge, 451 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1971). Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), F.R.C.P. Even if certain facts are in dispute, summary judgment is appropriate if, considering the disputed facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1969); Jennings v. Edwards, 454 F.Supp. 770 (M.D.N. C.1978); Wilson v. Continental Group, Inc., 451 F.Supp. 1 (M.D.N.C.1978).

The issue is whether a social host who gratuitously furnishes alcohol to an able-bodied adult is liable for personal injuries and death inflicted on an innocent third party by that intoxicated adult.

This is a case of first impression in North Carolina. North Carolina does not have a dramshop act² and the common law principles that have not been abrogated or repealed by statute are in full force and effect in this State. N.C.G.S. § 4-1; Mullen v. Sawyer, 277 N.C. 623, 178 S.E.2d 425 (1971).

At common law it is not a tort to sell or give intoxicating liquor to an able-bodied person and there is no cause of action against one furnishing liquor in favor of those injured by the intoxication of the person drinking the liquor. The reason for the rule is that the consumption of the liquor, and not the furnishing of it, is the proximate cause of the injury. Alsup v. Garvin-Wienke, Inc., 579 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1978); Megge v. United States, 344 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1965); 45 Am.Jur., Intox. Liquors § 553.

The Court in Megge v. United States, supra, stated:

The common law knows no right of action against a seller of intoxicating liquors, as such, for "causing" intoxication of the person whose negligence or wilful wrong has caused injury. Human beings, drunk or sober, are responsible for their own torts. The law (apart from dramshop statute) recognizes no relation of proximate cause between a sale of liquor and a tort committed by a buyer who has drunk the liquor.

State For Use of Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951).

Responding to the argument to create a common law duty on social hosts furnished alcohol, the Court, in Cartwright v. Hyatt Corp., 460 F.Supp. 80 (D.D.C.1978), stated

... There is now no jurisdiction in the United States where, absent an explicit civil damage or "Dram Shop Act," a social host is held liable for having served liquor to an intoxicated adult who, as a result, causes harm to a third person. Valid policy considerations exist on both sides of this issue, and the Court is not prepared to adopt for the District of Columbia a rule not judicially imposed by any other court in any other jurisdiction.

If such a rule is to become a part of District of Columbia law, the decision should appropriately be made by the legislature —as it has been done wherever the rule has been adopted. Id. at 82.

In the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the evidence shows that Litton through its employees furnished alcohol to Beck, allowed him to become intoxicated and knowingly permitted him to leave in his van in the intoxicated state. Thereafter, within one hour and twenty minutes and several miles from Litton's plant, Beck while operating his own motor vehicle collided with a motor vehicle occupied by Plaintiffs' decedents causing injuries from which they died.

There are no North Carolina cases on the point in question, but the Plaintiffs cite and rely upon a number of cases which they say support their contentions. Most of these cases are based upon recognized principles of law such as the duties owed by common carriers to their passengers and owners of premises to their customers or invitees. One such case is the recent Supreme Court decision in Foster v. Winston Salem Joint Venture, et al., 303 N.C. 636, 281 S.E.2d 36 (1981) which seems to go further than any other North Carolina case on the question of...