Chaster v. Lane

• Decision Date: 30 June 1892
• Citation: 62 Conn. 121,25 A. 464
• Parties: CHASTER v. LANE.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

25 A. 464

62 Conn. 121

CHASTER

v. LANE.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 30, 1892.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Hartford county; Taintor, Judge.

Action by Sylvester Charter against Joseph G. Lane for the conversion of property. Plaintiff had judgment, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

J. Hamlin, for appellant.

J. P. Andrews and C. H. Briscoe, for appellee.

FENN, J. This is an action in the nature or trespass for taking certain liquors, appealed by the defendant from the court of common pleas for Hartford county. The principal defense was that the goods were the property of one Williams, and, as such, lawfully attached. Upon the trial to the jury the plain tiff claimed to have proved that in 1886 he verbally leased a certain building of which he was owner to Williams, to be used for an hotel; that Williams occupied the premises until June, 1888, when he Fold to the plaintiff his interest therein, including the furniture and a stock of liquors in a room in the collar of the building, the conveyance being in writing; that at the time of the sale there were certain liquors in the barroom of the hotel which were not conveyed to the plaintiff or taken possession or control of by him, but which Williams was to be allowed to continue to sell in the barroom under his license; and that immediately after the sale the plaintiff took possession of the liquors in the cellar, receiving from Williams a key to the room in the cellar where they were kept, which was the only key, so far as the plaintiff knew, and also at once took possession of the hotel and its contents, except the barand the liquors in the bar, retaining such possession continuously thereafter in an open, visible, notorious, and exclusive manner. This the defendant denied, and claimed to have proved the contrary. It was admitted that the liquors taken were part of those in the cellar, and embraced in the conveyance. There was evidence tending to show that in the room in the cellar there was a barrel of beer connected with the bar by pipes, so that beer could be drawn from the barrel without entering the room.

Three reasons of appeal were assigned by the defendant. The one which we will first consider relates to the exclusion of evidence. The finding states that the defendant offered Thomas W. Moore as a witness, who testified that he made the attachment in question in the absence of the plaintiff. The defendant then inquired of him what statement one Casey, who had previously been, and then was, so far as it appeared in evidence, in the employ of Williams in the barroom, made concerning the ownership of the liquors which were then in the cellar room as aforesaid. The plaintiff objected to such statement until there should be some evidence introduced that Casey was the agent of the plaintiff; and the court sustained the objection, on the ground that there was no such evidence. The finding further states that "the only evidence of his agency was the testimony of the plaintiff that he asked Casey to put out any horse that might come to the hotel during the plaintiff's absence, and lie would pay him for what he did." The ruling of the court was manifestly correct. Casey was indeed in charge of the bar, but it was conceded that the possession was that of Williams, of whom Casey was the agent. The statement of Williams concerning his ownership of the liquors there, if such ownership had been claimed by the plaintiff and in dispute, might, if made in connection with any act done in reference to such liquors, have been admissible under the authority of Avery v. Clemons, 18 Conn. 306, cited by the defendant. But the principle of that decision, which is that such statements are not received to prove the truth of what is asserted otherwise than as explaining and characterizing the acts which they accompany, being...