Chateloin v. Singletary, 95-4217

• Citation: 89 F.3d 749
• Decision Date: 26 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-4217,95-4217
• Parties: Emilio J. CHATELOIN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, Secretary, Department of Corrections, State of Florida, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Page 749

89 F.3d 749

Emilio J. CHATELOIN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, Secretary, Department of Corrections State of Florida, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 95-4217.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

July 26, 1996.

Brenda Bryn, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Kathleen Williams, Federal Public Defender, Christine Stebbins Dahl, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Miami, FL, for Appellant.

Robert W. Butterworth, Florida Atty. General, Fleur J. Lobree, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, FL, for Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before HATCHETT and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and WOOD ^*, Senior Circuit Judge.

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, the court affirms the district court's ruling that trial and appellate counsel did not render ineffective assistance to the appellant.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 7, 1986, Emilio J. Chateloin and Angel Rodriguez agreed to kidnap Geraldo Del Pino and Esteban Lemus and hold them for ransom believing that they had cheated them in a drug transaction. Later that day, Chateloin and Rodriguez accompanied Lemus and Del Pino to an unknown destination. While riding in the back seat of Lemus's Cadillac, Chateloin shot Lemus and Del Pino in the back of the head. After the shooting, Rodriguez got into the driver's seat, and he and Chateloin began driving around the city in search of a place to drop off the bodies. After removing all the jewelry from the victims, Chateloin and Rodriguez threw their bodies off the Julia Tuttle Causeway into the water. Later that evening, Lino Marante attempted to dispose of Lemus's car. Marante drove the car to a residential neighborhood, ignited a sock and placed it into the gas tank of the car. Residents in that neighborhood notified the police of the burning car. After extinguishing the fire, the police discovered large quantities of blood and brain matter in the vehicle. The police also found wet sand on the floor of the vehicle underneath the steering wheel. On February 8, 1986, the police found Del Pino and Lemus's bodies on the shore along side of the Julia Tuttle Causeway. Sometime later, the police arrested Marante, Rodriguez, and Chateloin.

On May 29, 1986, Marante pleaded guilty to arson, accessory after the fact, and conspiracy.

                On June 1, 1986, a state grand jury returned an indictment charging Chateloin and Rodriguez with first-degree murder in violation of Florida Statutes § 782.04, armed robbery in violation of Florida Statutes § 812.13, conspiracy to commit armed robbery and kidnapping in violation of Florida Statutes §§ 812.13, 787.01, 775.087, and 777.04, and possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense in violation of Florida Statutes § 790.07.   On October 22, 1986, the state court held a pretrial hearing.   At the pretrial hearing, the state represented that it would not seek the death penalty against either Chateloin or Rodriguez, at which time Rodriguez's counsel stated:  "We waive a twelve-person jury."   Chateloin's trial counsel, Vance Carr, did not speak at the hearing.   The next day, on October 22, 1986, Rodriguez entered into a negotiated plea with the state agreeing to plead guilty in exchange for a ten-year sentence
                

On November 12, 1995, the state tried Chateloin before a six-member jury. Rodriguez and Marante testified and identified Chateloin as the instigator of the kidnapping plot. Rodriguez also identified Chateloin as the shooter. On November 14, 1986, the case went to the jury. Shortly after jury deliberations commenced, the jury submitted the following note to the trial court: "Please explain if the defendant is guilty of [possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense as charged in] the indictment if the state does not prove who held the gun." The trial judge responded: "The law is as clear as I can make it. You must apply the law to the facts and reach a decision." Two hours later, the jury found Chateloin guilty on all counts. On January 22, 1987, the trial court sentenced Chateloin to consecutive life sentences with fifty years minimum mandatory. Chateloin also received fifteen years concurrent on the robbery charges and five years concurrent on the conspiracy and possession of firearm charges.

On February 20, 1987, Chateloin filed a timely notice of appeal to the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida (Third District). Sometime later, the state appointed Chateloin appellate counsel. On August 27, 1987, Chateloin's appellate counsel filed a brief stating that he could discern no appealable issues. The Third District upheld Chateloin's conviction in a per curiam memorandum opinion. In November of 1989, Chateloin filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, claiming ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and denial of equal protection in the trial court. The trial judge denied Chateloin's motion. On February 4, 1991, Chateloin appealed the trial court's denial of 3.850 relief to the Third District. The Third District affirmed the trial court without an opinion.

On September 21, 1992, Chateloin filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the Southern District of Florida pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 asserting that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. ^** On March 23, 1994, a magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing on Chateloin's petition for writ of habeas corpus. On December 28, 1994, the magistrate judge issued a report recommending to the district court that it deny Chateloin habeas corpus relief. Chateloin timely filed objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. On January 24, 1995, the district court, adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, denied Chateloin habeas corpus relief.

CONTENTIONS

Chateloin contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel waived his right to a twelve-person jury after the state had independently decided not to seek the death penalty. Chateloin argues that trial counsel's waiver of the right to a twelve-person jury was objectively unreasonable because he gave up a fundamental right of great importance while receiving nothing in exchange for the waiver. Chateloin also contends that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because appellate The state contends that Chateloin's trial counsel made a strategic decision to waive the right to a twelve-person jury. The state also contends that appellate counsel's failure to raise the lack of personal waiver and the lack of trial counsel's express waiver of the twelve-person jury fell within the wide range of professionally competent assistance.

counsel, on direct appeal, failed to argue that the record did not show his personal waiver and failed to argue that the record did not show any expressed waiver from his trial counsel.

DISCUSSION

We review the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief de novo. Agan v. Singletary, 12 F.3d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir.1994). The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063-64, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show: (1) that his counsel's assistance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense such that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064; Matire v. Wainwright, 811 F.2d 1430, 1435 (11th Cir.1987) ("The standard for ineffective assistance is the same for trial and appellate counsel."). A strong presumption exists that the challenged action constitutes sound trial strategy. Courts therefore must review the reasonableness of counsel's assistance in light of the facts of the particular case at the time of counsel's conduct.

A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. In this case, Chateloin contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at both the trial and appellate level. We first address Chateloin's ineffective assistance claim against his trial counsel.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Chateloin contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his trial counsel waived the right to a twelve-person jury without receiving anything in return for the waiver. Florida law guarantees criminal defendants a twelve-person jury in all capital cases. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 913.10 (West 1985). Where the state waives its right to seek the death penalty in a capital case, the defendant may agree, with the consent of the state and the approval of the court, to a jury of six persons. State v. Griffith, 561 So.2d 528 (Fla.1990).

In this case, the district court assumed for the purpose of Chateloin's claim that, as a matter of law, a trial counsel's performance is objectively unreasonable under Strickland where counsel waives his client's right to a twelve-person jury and receives nothing in return. The district court found, however, that Chateloin's trial counsel waived the right to a twelve-person jury in exchange for the state's waiver of the death penalty. Chateloin argues that the district court's finding that Carr waived the twelve-person jury in exchange for the waiver of the death penalty is clearly erroneous because Carr did not testify that he had to waive the twelve-person jury to secure a death penalty waiver. In fact, Chateloin notes that Carr testified that he had no...