Chatfield v. City of Seattle

• Decision Date: 08 March 1939
• Docket Number: 27130.
• Citation: 88 P.2d 582,198 Wash. 179
• Parties: CHATFIELD et al. v. CITY OF SEATTLE et al. AIRTH et al. v. SAME. ADAMS et al. v. SAME.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

88 P.2d 582

198 Wash. 179

CHATFIELD et al. v. CITY OF SEATTLE et al.

AIRTH et al. v. SAME.

ADAMS et al. v. SAME.

No. 27130.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

March 8, 1939

Actions by Chester Chatfield and others, by A. E. Airth and others and Hugh Adams and others, against the City of Seattle and others, for alleged unlawful deductions in plaintiffs' salaries and for wages during an alleged unlawful layoff which actions were consolidated and tried to the court without a jury. From adverse judgments, defendants appeal.

Judgments reversed with instructions.

MILLARD MAIN, and STEINERT, JJ., dissenting.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Roger Meakim, Judge.

A. C. Van Soelen and Glen E. Wilson, both of Seattle, for appellants.

Colvin & Rhodes, of Seattle (Ralph E. Franklin, of Seattle, of counsel), for respondents.

BEALS Justice.

Three groups of employees of the city of Seattle, who had worked under the direction of the Seattle park board, during the month of May, 1937, sued the city of Seattle and its comptroller, seeking judgment for varying amounts, which the members of the groups, respectively, claimed were due them from the city.

The first action was brought by Chester Chatfield and others, who alleged, in separate causes of action, their employment by the city of Seattle; their civil service status; that the city of Seattle, through its city council, by ordinance enacted November 16, 1931, established their positions, grades and compensation, as employees of the park department; that thereafter, between June 16 and August 5, 1932, the officers of the city illegally deducted from their salaries certain amounts of money; and that plaintiffs, respectively, were forced to accept salaries less in amount than they were legally entitled to receive. Plaintiffs prayed for judgment for the amounts which they alleged had been illegally deducted from their pay. The plaintiffs contend that the statute of limitations was tolled because of duress exercised over them by certain officers and agents of defendant city.

The second action was commenced by A. E. Airth and others, who alleged their employment by defendant city in connection with the operations of the park department; the fixing of their compensation by ordinance, effective January 1, 1932; that unlawful deductions from their pay were made between the dates referred to in the Chatfield complaint; that by ordinance, effective January 1, 1934, their compensation was again fixed by the city council; that in addition to the other deductions mentioned, between September 1, 1934, and June 30, 1935, further deductions from their pay were made; and that they were unlawfully laid off during the year 1935. They prayed for judgment for the respective amounts which they alleged were due them. Plaintiffs seek to avoid the operation of the statute of limitations by the same allegations of duress contained in the complaint of the first group.

The third action was commenced by Hugh Adams and others, who made practically the same allegations as were contained in the complaint of the group last above mentioned, save that no illegal layoffs were charged.

By its answers, the city admitted the enactment of the ordinances referred to, but denied liability to the plaintiffs, or any of them. The city pleaded affirmatively that under its charter the board of park commissioners was vested with exclusive authority to employ and to fix the pay of the employees of the park department, and that plaintiffs had received all sums due them, pursuant to lawful action by that board. The city also pleaded that the respective actions had not been commenced within the time limited by law. The affirmative allegations in the answers were denied by appropriate replies.

The three suits were consolidated and tried to the court sitting without a jury, and resulted in findings of fact and conclusions of law in favor of the respective plaintiffs, followed by judgments against the city, from which the defendants have appealed.

In this opinion, the city will be referred to as though it were the sole party appellant.

Error is assigned upon the court's holding that the board of park commissioners did not, under the city charter, enjoy exclusive authority to fix the pay and hours of work of employees working under its direction; upon the ruling of the court to the effect that Mr. Airth and his co-plaintiffs in the second action above referred to were wrongfully laid off during the year 1935, and that these plaintiffs were not barred by laches from recovering judgment against the city; upon the ruling of the trial court to the effect that respondents were under such duress as tolled the statute of limitations; and upon the refusal of the trial court to hold that respondents could not recover upon any claim which accrued more than three years prior to the institution of the actions. Appellant also assigns error upon the entry of judgment in favor of respondents.

These errors may be discussed under three headings: First, did the board of park commissioners have authority to fix the salaries of men working in that department, the hours of labor of such employees, and their number? Second, were respondents under such duress as tolled the statute of limitations? Third, were any of respondents wrongfully laid off during the year 1935?

We shall first consider appellant's contention that the board of park commissioners has authority to fix salaries and hours of labor of city employees working under its jurisdiction.

Appellant relies upon the following sections of article XIII of the charter, the relevant portions of which read as follows:

'Sec. 3. The management and control of all the public squares and parks of the city and of all park drives, parkways, boulevards, play or recreation grounds of the city, are hereby vested in the board of park commissioners. * * *'

'Sec. 7. The board of park commissioners shall, subject to civil service regulations, have exclusive power to employ and pay all such superintendents, employes and other persons as it may deem necessary for maintaining, improving and controlling all park property, and it shall, on or Before the tenth day of August of each year, prepare and submit to the city council for approval and adoption, an estimate of the amount of money which may be required for the improvement and maintenance of parks, parkways, public squares, boulevards and play or recreation grounds for the succeeding year.'

'Sec. 8. The board of park commissioners shall alone have authority to expend the park fund * * *.'

The following sections of the city charter must also be considered:

Article IV, § 1: 'The legislative powers of the city of Seattle shall be vested in a mayor and city council * * *.'

Article IV, § 19: 'General Legislative Power of Council: The city council shall, in addition to the powers enumerated in the last foregoing section, have all other powers usually exercised by the legislative bodies of municipal corporations of like character and degree with the city of Seattle, and all powers which now are or may hereafter be conferred upon incorporated towns and cities by the laws of this state.'

Article XIII, § 1: 'There shall be a park fund which shall consist exclusively of: (The first three sections not pertinent to this inquiry.) 4. Such annual tax levy as the city council may provide.'

Article XVII, § 2: 'No officer or employe of the city shall receive any compensation for his service as such officer or employe except by salary, which, when not prescribed by this charter, shall be fixed by the city council by ordinance. All salaries shall be paid at such times and in such manner as may be prescribed by ordinance. The salary of an appointive or elective officer shall not be increased after his appointment or election, or during the term for which he shall have been appointed or elected.'

By Laws Ex.Sess.1925, c. 125, p. 204 (Rem.Rev.Stat. § 9000-13 et seq.), the legislature established a budget system for cities of the first class, § 2 of the act (Rem.Rev.Stat. § 9000-14) reading in part as follows:

'On or Before the tenth day of July of each year the heads of all departments shall submit to the finance committee of the city council an estimate of the probable expense of their several departments for the ensuing year. * * *

'Such estimates shall be designated, grouped and assembled under classifications to be prescribed by the state auditor of the state of Washington, and shall be segregated as follows:

'(a) Operating and Maintenance Expenses: This class of expenses shall cover in detail the salaries of every officer and employe * * *.'

Section 5 of this act (Rem.Rev.Stat. § 9000-17) reads: 'After the public hearings shall have been held, as provided in section 4 hereof [section 9000-16], the council shall by proper action determine the changes that have been made in the preliminary budget as published, and, on or Before the first Monday in October adopt as the final budget for the succeeding year the preliminary budget as so amended, and each and every city official or employe shall be limited in the making of expenditures and the incurring of liabilities to the amounts of such detailed budget items, except as otherwise provided in section 7 hereof [section 9000-19].'

In support of its contention that the board of park commissioners is vested with authority to fix the pay and hours of labor of city employees working under the board's supervision, appellant cites the case of Seattle ex rel. Dunbar v. Dutton, 147 Wash. 224, 265 P. 729. In this action, the city sought personal judgments against the members of its board of park commissioners, who had paid $750 to the widow of one of its employees, who had...