Chatfield v. Colorado Court of Appeals

• Decision Date: 19 June 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88SC196,88SC196
• Citation: 775 P.2d 1168
• Parties: George E. CHATFIELD, Appellant, v. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS, Chief Judge Aurel M. Kelly, Judge Dale P. Tursi and Judge Karen S. Metzger; Jefferson County District Court and Judge Michael C. Villano; the Colorado Attorney General; and William Wilson, Superintendent, Centennial Correctional Facility, Appellees.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1168

775 P.2d 1168

George E. CHATFIELD, Appellant, v. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS, Chief Judge Aurel M. Kelly, Judge

Dale P. Tursi and Judge Karen S. Metzger; Jefferson County

District Court and Judge Michael C. Villano; the Colorado

Attorney General; and William Wilson, Superintendent,

Centennial Correctional Facility, Appellees.

No. 88SC196.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

June 19, 1989.

Rehearing Denied July 24, 1989.

George E. Chatfield, Canon City, pro se.

Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Robert M. Petrusak, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for appellees.

LOHR, Justice, delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The appellant, George E. Chatfield, seeks review of the district court's discharge of a writ of habeas corpus issued on the appellant's pro se petition. In his petition, Chatfield alleged that his 1977 prosecutions in Jefferson County for conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, felony menacing, and first degree kidnapping were barred by section 18-1-303(1)(b), 8B C.R.S. (1986), ¹ because of the previous dismissal of a federal charge of bank robbery arising from the same incident. The district court discharged the writ without addressing the merits of Chatfield's section 18-1-303(1)(b) claim. We conclude that the district court erred in failing to address the applicability of section 18-1-303(1)(b). However, we determine that Chatfield's claim finds no support in the statute, and we therefore affirm the dismissal of his petition.

I.

A.

On September 7, 1976, Chatfield and an accomplice, James Pardue, attempted to rob the First Westland National Bank in Lakewood, Colorado. Their efforts were foiled when the bank president ran and called out for help. The would-be robbers then tried to make their escape. However, Chatfield was unable to locate the keys to the getaway car, so he and Pardue ran to a nearby parking lot where they accosted a woman entering her car and commandeered the vehicle. Chatfield and Pardue forced the woman to accompany them, but later released her after traveling several blocks from the parking lot.

Chatfield and Pardue were arrested by F.B.I. agents three weeks later. A complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado charging the pair with attempted bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d) (1982). The federal court granted Chatfield's motion for the appointment of a psychiatrist to examine him and determine his competency to stand trial pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1982) (now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (1987 Supp. V)). The court-appointed psychiatrist concluded that Chatfield "probably ha[d] a chronic schizophrenia" and was "quite unable to stand trial" since he could not understand the proceeding against him and could not properly assist in his defense.

Thereafter, pursuant to the United States Attorney's motion, the federal district court dismissed the complaint filed against Chatfield and ordered his discharge to the Denver Police Department to be held for extradition proceedings on a then-pending detainer filed by the state of Missouri. While the record is unclear on the point, Chatfield contends that the federal charge against him was dismissed because the federal prosecutor did not wish to pursue the charge in light of the psychiatrist's incompetency finding. In the instant proceeding, the Colorado Attorney General does not dispute the correctness of that characterization of the reason underlying the dismissal of the federal charge against Chatfield.

Subsequent to dismissal of the federal charge, Chatfield was charged in Jefferson County with conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit theft, attempted aggravated robbery, attempted theft, felony menacing, first degree kidnapping, and violent crime. These charges arose from the same incident at the First Westland National Bank that gave rise to the federal bank robbery charge. Chatfield pled not guilty by reason of insanity to the Jefferson County charges. A jury found him sane. The charges of attempted theft and conspiracy to commit theft were dismissed before the trial on the merits. A jury then found Chatfield guilty of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, and felony menacing. Because the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the first degree kidnapping and violent crime charges, the trial court declared a mistrial on these two charges. On retrial, a different jury found Chatfield guilty of first degree kidnapping and not guilty of a crime of violence. Chatfield was sentenced to a term of forty-five to fifty years incarceration on the kidnapping conviction, an indeterminate to ten year term for conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, an indeterminate to five year term for the attempted aggravated robbery, and an indeterminate to five year term for felony menacing, with all sentences to be served concurrently.

B.

After his trial, Chatfield filed a series of postconviction motions and appeals, which led to the instant habeas corpus proceeding in the Jefferson County District Court. We summarize these postconviction proceedings to provide the context in which Chatfield filed the petition for habeas corpus upon which the present appeal is based.

Shortly after entry of the judgment of conviction, Chatfield filed in the trial court a Crim.P. 35 motion for postconviction relief. The motion was denied, and Chatfield then appealed his convictions to this court. We affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support his kidnapping conviction and that the trial court did not err in failing to suppress certain evidence. People v. Chatfield, 199 Colo. 530, 612 P.2d 516 (1980).

Next, in September 1980 Chatfield filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging fourth amendment search and seizure violations, a double-jeopardy claim arising from the deadlocked jury and subsequent kidnapping conviction on retrial, violations of equal protection and due process of law, and deprivation of fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to a fair trial because of failure to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of second degree kidnapping. The federal district court denied the petition, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Chatfield v. Ricketts, 673 F.2d 330 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 843, 103 S.Ct. 96, 74 L.Ed.2d 88 (1982).

Chatfield then filed a second habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado in December 1983. In this petition, Chatfield alleged that his state prosecutions were precluded by a federal incompetency determination, and that the state prosecutions were barred by section 18-1-303, 8B C.R.S. (1986). The federal district court dismissed the petition for lack of federal jurisdiction since these issues had not been previously raised in the state courts. In dictum, the court also noted that Chatfield's claim was without merit since a federal incompetency determination would not preclude a contrary determination in a state proceeding. In an unpublished order the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal on the jurisdictional ground.

In the summer of 1984, Chatfield filed a habeas corpus petition in the Fremont County District Court, claiming that double jeopardy and collateral estoppel under section 18-1-303(1)(b) precluded his state prosecutions. Chatfield also alleged a conspiracy to convict him and a failure to provide him with exculpatory evidence. The Fremont County District Court dismissed Chatfield's petition on the basis that it should have been filed in Jefferson County. The court did not reach the merits of his claims. Chatfield did not pursue a direct appeal of this dismissal, but instead filed an original proceeding in this court seeking a writ of habeas corpus under C.A.R. 21. We denied Chatfield's petition.

Persisting in his efforts to obtain a postconviction hearing on his section 18-1-303 claims, Chatfield filed a third petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado in October 1984. The federal court again dismissed the petition for want of federal jurisdiction, noting that Chatfield still had a Crim.P. 35 remedy available in state court.

In July 1985, Chatfield filed a Crim.P. 35 motion in Jefferson County District Court, asserting a double jeopardy claim under section 18-1-301(1)(b) ² based on his retrial after the declaration of mistrial on the kidnapping and crime of violence charges. The district court denied Chatfield's motion without a hearing, and the court of appeals summarily affirmed. People v. Chatfield, No. 85CA1352, slip op. at 1 (Colo.App. Nov. 6, 1986) (unpublished).

In November 1985, the habeas corpus petition at issue here was filed by Chatfield in Jefferson County District Court. Chatfield alleged that in the proceedings that resulted in his convictions, the trial court lacked jurisdiction since his prosecution was barred by section 18-1-303(1)(b). He further alleged that because of the purported bar of section 18-1-303(1)(b), the original state prosecution was vindictive and malicious, and that the prosecution failed to turn over "exculpatory evidence" relating to the dismissal of the federal charge against him.

At the hearing on the writ of habeas corpus issued on Chatfield's petition, the district court stated that a habeas corpus proceeding is a "narrow hearing," and the only questions before the court are whether the original trial court had jurisdiction over the case and whether the sentence imposed was within the statutory limits. The district court summarily concluded that the original trial court had jurisdiction and that the sentence imposed was within the legal limits, and it therefore discharged the writ. The district court did not address the specific statutory...