Chatham County Bd. of Assessors v. Jepson

• Decision Date: 19 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. A03A0031.,A03A0031.
• Citation: 261 Ga. App. 771,584 S.E.2d 22
• Parties: CHATHAM COUNTY BOARD OF ASSESSORS v. JEPSON et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

584 S.E.2d 22

261 Ga. App. 771

CHATHAM COUNTY BOARD OF ASSESSORS v. JEPSON et al.

No. A03A0031.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 19, 2003.

Certiorari Denied October 20, 2003.

Diane M. McLeod, for appellant.

Bouhan, Williams & Levy, David M. Conner, Walter C. Hartridge, Savannah, Edgar P. Williams, for appellees.

JOHNSON, Presiding Judge.

Robert Jepson, Jr. and Alice Jepson filed this lawsuit seeking a writ of mandamus and, in the alternative, declaratory relief. They complained that when their property was reassessed, the Chatham County Board of Assessors failed to comply with OCGA § 48-5-306(e) by failing to provide "a simple, nontechnical description of the basis for the new assessment." The trial court denied the Jepsons' request for a mandamus, but granted the Jepsons' motion for summary judgment on the issue of declaratory relief. The Chatham County Board of Assessors appeals, arguing (1) the Jepsons' complaint should have been dismissed because they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, and (2) the trial court erred in finding that the Board of Assessors did not provide a simple, nontechnical description of the basis for the new assessment. Because the trial court should not have exercised its equitable jurisdiction when the Jepsons failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, we reverse the trial court's judgment.

1. The Chatham County Board of Assessors contends that the Jepsons' complaint should have been dismissed due to their failure

to exhaust available administrative remedies.¹ We agree.

The issues of reassessment, including the validity of a reassessment, shall be raised within the statutory scheme for tax appeals by an appeal to the county board of equalization or arbitrators.² The superior court's jurisdiction to decide issues raised by tax appeals is limited to those cases which come through OCGA § 48-5-311(g).³ While the statute addressing appeals to the county board of equalization does not specifically address notice deformities, both this Court and the Supreme Court of Georgia have consistently held that the board of equalization is the appropriate forum for deciding not only questions of uniformity, valuation, and taxability, but also a taxpayer's questions addressing constitutional and procedural issues.⁴ These cases establish that as a matter of public policy and judicial economy, tax questions should be resolved first at the local level through the appeal procedures created specifically for that purpose. Moreover, it is well established that an appeal before the board of equalization provides an adequate remedy at law for the determination of county taxpayers' questions, making unnecessary the exercise of the equitable powers of the superior court.⁵

While the principles argued by the dissent hold a certain allure and it is true that the system of appeals set up under the statutory framework can be somewhat burdensome, the legislature and Supreme Court precedents mandate that taxpayers must timely appeal questions such as the one presented here before the board of equalization. Even if the notice sent to the Jepsons failed to provide a nontechnical description of the basis for the new assessment, this failure did not render an effective appeal to the Board of Assessors impossible. The Jepsons could have appealed to the Board of Assessors and argued that the language failed to comply with the requirements of OCGA § 48-5-306, just as they argued in the present case. At that point, the Board of Assessors could have either accepted or rejected their argument, and the Jepsons would have exhausted their administrative remedies.

Moreover, it is clear from the record that the Jepsons' time for appeal to the Board of Assessors had expired before they filed the declaratory judgment action at issue.⁶ Allowing them to avoid the statutory appeal requirements by filing a declaratory judgment action after their administrative appeal time had expired opens the door for many such actions in the future, a burden on judicial resources which the legislature had relieved in enacting the administrative appeal process for cases such as this one. In addition, adopting the procedure the dissent urges would allow the Jepsons to pursue an appeal, their rights to which they had clearly waived by allowing the time for an appeal to the Board of Assessors to expire.

The Jepsons must raise their tax issues, including the issue of whether they received valid notice, before the board of equalization and exhaust their administrative remedies by the statutorily provided appeal. The trial court should have dismissed this suit for failing to state a claim. ⁷

2. Based on our holding in Division 1, we need not address the Chatham County Board of Assessors' contention that the trial court erred in holding that the change of value notice was not accompanied by a simple, nontechnical description of the basis for the new assessment. We note that nothing in this opinion is intended to indicate this Court's views as to the merits of the Jepsons' claim.

Judgment reversed.

SMITH, C.J., BLACKBURN, P.J., RUFFIN, P.J., ELDRIDGE and PHIPPS, JJ., concur.

MIKELL, J., dissents.

MIKELL, Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent, for three reasons. First, the notice sent to the Jepsons fell so far short of the new "nontechnical description" requirement of OCGA § 48-5-306(e) that an effective appeal to the board of equalization ("BOE") was impossible. Second, a declaratory judgment action is not an equitable proceeding and is appropriate in some ad valorem tax disputes. And, third, although resolving tax questions at the local level through the appeal process created specifically for that purpose obviously is a commendable goal, it is unrealistic to pretend that the overworked BOEs, staffed by volunteer laypersons, without legal training, law clerks or law books, can decide constitutional and procedural issues, including the statutory application question raised by the Jepsons. Our Court, and the Supreme Court of Georgia, should reconsider those precedents⁸ which now require the boards to decide issues far beyond their already heavy statutory mandate: uniformity, valuation, taxability, and homestead exemptions.⁹

1. OCGA § 48-5-306(e) specifies that "[w]here ... the value of the taxpayer's real property subject to taxation exceeds the returned value of such property by 15 percent or more, the notice required by this subsection shall be accompanied by a simple, nontechnical description of the basis for the new assessment." It is undisputed that the new valuation exceeded the returned value by more than 15 percent. The trial court found that the explanation given "use[d] terms of art and an abbreviation that is difficult to decipher, is vague and could be interpreted as redundant...." In short, according to the trial court's judgment, the description provided by the Board of Assessors did not provide a "simple, nontechnical description of the basis for the new assessment."¹⁰ The trial court properly framed relief by requiring the Assessors to provide the Jepsons with notices that comply with the statute and staying any collection of taxes based on the increased assessment until the taxpayers had an opportunity for a hearing before the BOE.

Because the notice here failed to comply with the statute, Dillard v. Denson,¹¹ cited by the majority in support of its conclusion that the Jepsons' complaint should have been dismissed because they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, is distinguishable. The taxpayer in Dillard alleged that he never received the notice, although it was sent to him by first class mail to the address he had specified in his request for a building permit. However, the contents of the notice and the method by which it was sent precisely complied with the statute. Accordingly, we held in Dillard that the notice satisfied due process requirements. By contrast, in the case at bar, the taxpayers received a notice, but its contents failed to comply with the statute.

Nor does Chilivis v. Backus¹² warrant reversal of the trial court's judgment. Although Chilivis recited that the validity of notices should be litigated in the BOE, it went on to affirm the trial judge's ruling on the timeliness of the notices and to allow the sending of amended, correct notices.¹³ This is precisely the relief which the trial judge specified in the case at bar. The Chatham Superior Court judgment does not allow the Jepsons to bypass the BOE, nor does it allow them to escape paying whatever taxes they owe. It merely requires the Assessors to provide an adequate, nontechnical notice so that the taxpayers have a fair chance to frame their appeal properly before the BOE.

The trial court's decision accords with the new statutory requirement and with due process of law.¹⁴ "The fundamental idea of due process is notice and an opportunity to be heard."¹⁵ Both the Supreme Court of Georgia and the Supreme Court of the United States have repeatedly emphasized this principle. And, as explained in Gilmore v. Curry,¹⁶ "[a] statute providing for notice, in a case like the present one, where for failure of service[,] a man may be deprived of his property, must be strictly construed."¹⁷ In the case at bar, although the Jepsons received a notice that their assessment had been raised, the reasons given for the increase in their assessment were not written in "simple, nontechnical" language, as required by OCGA § 48-5-306(e). Instead, the notice was worded in codes that necessitated explanation by the county's chief appraiser. Indeed, the Jepsons' expert witness, a real estate appraiser with 25 years of experience in dealing with ad valorem taxation assessments, testified that he had no idea what one of the reasons given, "Neighborhood CD," meant until the chief appraiser defined it at the hearing. How can a taxpayer adequately prepare for his hearing before the BOE when he does not know why his...