Chatham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt

• Decision Date: 17 October 1888
• Citation: 147 Mass. 403,18 N.E. 168
• Parties: CHATHAM FURNACE CO. v. MOFFATT.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

147 Mass. 403

18 N.E. 168

CHATHAM FURNACE CO. v. MOFFATT.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Berkshire.

October 17, 1888

COUNSEL

T.P. Pingree and H.L. Dawes, for plaintiff.

M Wilcox and E.M. Wood, for defendant.

OPINION

C. ALLEN, J.

It is well settled in this commonwealth that the charge of fraudulent intent, in an action for deceit, may be maintained by proof of a statement made as of the party's own knowledge, which is false; provided the thing stated is not merely a matter of opinion, estimate, or judgment, but is susceptible of actual knowledge; and in such case it is not necessary to make any further proof of an actual intent to deceive. The fraud consists in stating that the party knows the thing to exist when he does not know it to exist; and, if he does not know it to exist, he must ordinarily be deemed to know that he does not. Forgetfulness of its existence after a former knowledge, or a mere belief of its existence, will not warrant or excuse a statement of actual knowledge. This rule has been steadily adhered to in this commonwealth, and rests alike on sound policy and on sound legal principles. Cole v. Cassidy, 138 Mass. 437; Savage v. Stevens, 126 Mass. 207; Tucker v. White, 125 Mass. 344; Litchfield v. Hutchinson, 117 Mass. 195; Milliken v. Thorndike, 103 Mass. 382; Fisher v Mellen, Id. 503; Stone v. Denny, 4 Metc. 157; Page v. Bent, 2 Metc. 371; Hazard v Irwin, 18 Pick. 95. And though this doctrine has not always been fully maintained elsewhere, it is supported by the following authorities, among others: Cooper v Schlesinger, 111 U.S. 148, 4 S.Ct. 360; Bower v. Fenn, 90 Pa.St. 359; Brownlie v. Campbell, L.R. 5 App. 953, by Lord BLACKBURN; Mining Co. v. Smith, L.R. 4 H.L. 79, 80, by Lord CAIRNS; Slim v. Croucher, 1 De Gex, F. & J. 518, by LORD CAMPBELL.

In the present case, the defendant held a lease of land in which there was iron ore. The mine had formerly been worked, but operations had ceased, and the mine had become filled with water and debris. The defendant sought to sell this lease to the plaintiff, and represented to the plaintiff, as of his own knowledge, that there was a large quantity of iron ore from 8,000 to 10,000 tons, in his ore-bed, uncovered, and ready to be taken out, and visible when the bed was free from water and debris. The material point was whether this mass of iron ore, which did in truth exist under-ground, was within the boundaries of the land included in the defendant's lease, and the material part of the defendant's statement was that this was in his ore-bed; and the representations were not in fact true in this: that while, in a mine connecting with the defendant's shafts, there was ore sufficient in quantity and location, relative to drifts, to satisfy these representations, if it had been in the land covered by the defendant's lease, that ore was not in the defendant's mine, but was in an adjoining mine, and the defendant's mine was in fact worked out. During the negotiations the defendant exhibited to the plaintiff a plan of a survey of the mine, which had been made for him, and the plaintiff took a copy of it. In making this plan, the surveyor, with the defendant's knowledge and assent, did not take the course of the first line leading from the shaft through which the mine was entered, but assumed it to be due north; and the defendant never took any means to verify the course of this line. In point of fact, this line did not run due north, but ran to the west of north. If it had run due north, the survey, which was in other respects correct, would have correctly shown the mass of iron ore in question to...