Chattanooga Cotton-Oil Co. v. Shamblin

• Decision Date: 01 October 1898
• Citation: 47 S.W. 496,101 Tenn. 263
• Parties: CHATTANOOGA COTTON-OIL CO. v. SHAMBLIN.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

47 S.W. 496

101 Tenn. 263

CHATTANOOGA COTTON-OIL CO. v. SHAMBLIN.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

October 1, 1898

Appeal from circuit court, Hamilton county.

Action by G. W. Shamblin, administrator of David L. Shamblin deceased, against the Chattanooga Cotton-Oil Company. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Reversed.

Pritchard & Sizer, for appellant.

Cooke Swaney & Cooke and Richmond, Chambers & Head, for appellee.

BEARD J.

This action was instituted to recover damages for personal injuries received by the intestate of the defendant in error while engaged in the service of the plaintiff in error, from the effect of which, it is alleged, he subsequently died. Upon an issue raised by the plea of not guilty, the case was heard, the trial resulting in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff below for $5,000. The record is before us on assignments of error to the action of the lower court. The declaration filed in the cause is in words and figures following, viz.: "The plaintiff, G. W. Shamblin administrator of the estate of David L. Shamblin, deceased sues the defendant, Chattanooga Cotton-Oil Company, which is in court by summons, for twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) damages, for that heretofore, to wit, on the--day of January, 1896, the defendant wrongfully and negligently killed David L. Shamblin, who left next of kin as follows: A father, G. W. Shamblin; mother, Sarah J. Shamblin; four brothers, John, Joe, Julius, and G. B. Shamblin; four sisters, Maggie, Mary, Annie, and Lucy Shamblin,--for whose use plaintiff brings this suit,--to their damages as aforesaid. Plaintiff herewith exhibits his letters of administration, and demands a jury to try the cause." To this declaration a demurrer was filed, raising the objection that it did not allege a cause of action against the defendant, in that it failed to state any facts or circumstances to put the defendant on notice of the negligence which was complained of, and which the company was required to defend. "Pleading," says Mr. Chitty, "is the statement in a logical and legal form of the facts which constitute the plaintiff's cause of action or the defendant's ground of defense. It is the formal mode of alleging that in the record which would be the support of the action, or the defense of the party in evidence." Continuing, this author adopts and embodies in his text the statement of Mr. Justice Buller that "one of the first principles of pleading" is "that there is only occasion to state facts, which must be done for the purpose of informing the court, whose duty it is to declare the law arising upon those facts, and of apprising the opposite party of what is meant to be proved, in order to give him an opportunity to answer or traverse it." 1 Chit. Pl. *213. Again, under the caption of the "Modes of Stating Facts," he emphasizes it as the "principal rule" of pleading that the facts "must be set forth with certainty, by which term is signified a clear and distinct statement of the facts which constitute the cause of action or ground of defense, so that they may be understood by the party who is to answer them; by the jury, who are to ascertain the truth of the allegations; and by the court, who are [?] to give judgment." Id. *233. The absolute necessity of this rule and for its enforcement has been recognized by many courts. In McCune v. Gas Co., 30 Conn. 521, the plaintiff, in his declaration, alleged that the defendant company was organized to make and sell illuminating gas, with its pipes laid in the streets of the city for the purpose of enabling it to convey gas to its customers; that plaintiff's rooms were supplied with pipes and fixtures, which were connected with the mains of the defendant corporation, and that for a period of time it had supplied him, and that he still desired to continue the use of its gas, and was willing to pay for the same, and that it was the duty of the defendant to supply him, but that in wanton disregard of his duty it declined to do so. With regard to this declaration the court said: "No contract for the supply of gas for an indefinite period is alleged to have been made by the defendant, nor, in fact, any contract at all. The entire foundation of the plaintiff's claim, as it is set out in his declaration, rests upon the supposed legal duty or obligation, independent of any contract, to continue the supply. But no facts are stated from which such duty or obligation arises, and the allegation of a duty or liability is of no avail, and will not help the declaration, unless the facts necessary to raise it are stated. It is but the statement of a legal inference, never traversable, and of no avail in pleadings." Subsequently the same court, in an action for the recovery of damages for a personal injury resulting in death, reannounced this as an essential rule to good pleading. Hewison v. City of New Haven, 34 Conn. 136. In Railroad Co. v. Wilson, 31 Ohio St. 557, and Morrison v. Insurance Co., 69 Tex. 359, 6 S.W. 605, this rule is recognized and applied. In Navigation Co. v. Dandridge, 8 Gill & J. 248, in arresting a judgment rendered upon a declaration, full in every other respect, which failed to allege a consideration for the defendant's promise, the court said: "The object of all pleadings is that the parties litigant may be mutually apprised of the matters in controversy between them. The declaration should substantially present the facts necessary to constitute the plaintiff's right of action, that the defendant, being thereby forewarned of the nature of the proof to be preferred against him, may, if necessary, be prepared to contradict, explain, or avoid it." Madden v. Railway Co., 35 S.C. 381, 14 S.E. 713, was an action to recover for personal injuries. With regard to the pleadings in that case it was said by the court that: "Negligence being a mixed question of law and fact, it is not sufficient to allege in general terms that an injury has been sustained by...