Chaudhry v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 16 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 12 C 5838,12 C 5838 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
| Parties | NASEEM M. CHAUDHRY, M.D., Plaintiff, v. PROVIDENT LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY and UNUM GROUP, Defendants. |
AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:
Plaintiff Naseem M. Chaudhry, M.D., suffers from a deteriorative eye condition, which has impaired his ability to drive and treat his psychiatric patients. Defendant Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company ("Provident Life") paid total disability benefits to Plaintiff under a disability insurance policy from mid-2003 to August 2011. After Provident Life terminated Plaintiff's disability benefits on August 15, 2011, Plaintiff sued Provident Life and its parent company, Unum Group, for breach of contract, unreasonable and vexatious conduct, and declaratory relief arising from the termination of his disability benefits. .)
Before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment and Defendants' motion to strike certain materials from Plaintiff's summary judgment submission. For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part as moot Defendants' motion to strike (R. 115), grants in part and denies in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment (R. 98), and denies Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (R. 101).
"For litigants in the Northern District of Illinois, the Rule 56.1 statement is a critical, and required, component of a litigant's response to a motion for summary judgment." Sojka v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 686 F.3d 394, 398 (7th Cir. 2012). Local Rule 56.1 "is designed, in part, to aid the district court, 'which does not have the advantage of the parties' familiarity with the record and often cannot afford to spend the time combing the record to locate the relevant information,' in determining whether trial is necessary." Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). It assists the court by "organizing the evidence, identifying undisputed facts, and demonstrating precisely how each side propose[s] to prove a disputed fact with admissible evidence." Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Br. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 2000).
Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires a party moving for summary judgment to submit "a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law." Cracco v. Vitran Express, Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing L.R. 56.1(a)(3)). Under Local Rule 56.1(b)(3), the opposing party then must submit a "concise response" to each statement of fact, "including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon." See id. (citing L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B)). District courts disregard Local Rule 56.1 statements and responses that do not cite specific portions of the record or that contain irrelevant information, legal arguments, conjecture, or evasive denials. See, e.g., id. at 632; Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 2006); Bordelon, 233 F.3d at 528. "When a responding party's statement fails to dispute the facts set forth in the moving party's statementin the manner dictated by [Local Rule 56.1], those facts are deemed admitted for purposes of the [summary judgment] motion." Cracco, 559 F.3d at 632.
If the party opposing summary judgment wants the court to consider additional facts in deciding the motions, it also must submit a statement of additional facts with supporting citations to the record pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(C). See Ciomber v. Cooperative Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 643 (7th Cir. 2008). "[D]istrict court[s] [are] entitled to expect strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1." Cichon v. Exelon Gen. Co., L.L.C., 401 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). A court, in its discretion, may choose to disregard statements of fact and responses, in full or in part, that do not comply with Local Rule 56.1's requirements. See, e.g., Cracco, 559 F.3d at 632; Cichon, 401 F.3d at 809-10; Cady, 467 F.3d at 1060; Bordelon, 233 F.3d at 528.
In this case, both Plaintiff and Defendants failed to comply with their obligations under Local Rule 56.1. Although Local Rule 56.1(a) requires the parties' statements of facts and statements of additional facts to consist of "short numbered paragraphs," see L.R. 56.1(a)(1), (b)(3)(C) (emphasis added), the parties submitted statements of fact or additional fact that are several sentences and, in some cases, more than a page long. Additionally, the parties included in their Local Rule 56.1 statements facts that are clearly in dispute. Finally, the parties' statements of fact and their responses contain a significant amount of legal argument. The Court has disregarded any legal arguments presented in the parties' statement of facts and responses in determining which, in any, facts are undisputed in this action. The parties' blatant non-compliance with both the letter and spirit of Local Rule 56.1 has substantially increased the Court's burden in resolving the pending motions.
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.1 Plaintiff, a citizen of Illinois, was a board-certified psychiatrist at all times relevant to this case. (Pl. L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1.) Defendant Provident Life, a Tennessee corporation, sells and provides insurance services (id. ¶ 2), and Defendant Unum Group, a Delaware corporation, is Provident Life's parent company.2(Def. L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 5.) Both Defendants have their principal place of business in Chattanooga, Tennessee. (Pl. L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 2-3.) The Court has diversity jurisdiction over this matter because complete diversity exists and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (See id. ¶¶ 1-5.) Defendants do not challenge that the Court has personal jurisdiction over them, and the parties agree that venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. (See id. ¶ 6.)
Provident Life issued Disability Income Policy No. 06-337-4060396 (the "Policy") to Plaintiff effective August 7, 1991. (Id. ¶ 8.) The Policy provides two types of benefits: Total Disability benefits and Residual Disability benefits. (See Second Am. Compl. Ex. A, Policy at 46, 9-10.) Total Disability benefits apply when, due to injury or sickness, the insured (1) is not able to perform the "substantial and material duties of [his] occupation" and (2) "[is] receiving care by a Physician which is appropriate for the condition causing the disability." (Id. at 4.)With some exceptions, the Policy pays a $15,000 Total Disability benefit per month,3 beginning on the 91st day of disability in the period and continuing as long as the insured remains Totally Disabled, up to the applicable maximum benefit period outlined in the Policy. (Id. at 3-4, 6.)
Residual Disability benefits apply when, due to injury or sickness, the insured (1) is not able to do one or more of his "substantial and material daily business duties" or is not able to do his "usual daily business duties for as much time as it would normally take [him] to do it," (2) has a loss of monthly income in his occupation of at least 20%, and (3) is receiving care by a Physician which is appropriate for the condition causing the loss of monthly income.4 (Id. at 9.) To qualify for Residual Disability benefits, the insured must suffer a loss of monthly income of at least 20% due to his disability. (Id. at 9.) If the insured loses over 75% of his prior monthly income due to disability, the Policy deems the insured to have suffered a total loss of income. (Id.) The Policy permits the insurer to require any proof it considers necessary to determine the insured's current and prior monthly incomes for purposes of calculating the Residual Disability benefit due, if any. (Id.)
Under the Policy, the insured's "occupation" is "the occupation (or occupations, if more than one) in which [the insured is] regularly engaged at the time [he] become[s] disabled." (Id.) If the insured's occupation "is limited to a recognized specialty within the scope of [his] degree or license," the Policy deems that specialty to be his occupation. (Id.) Plaintiff listed his occupation as "physician, MD" and his duties as "psychiatric diagnosis and treatment" in his application for the Policy. (Defs. L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 13.)
B. Plaintiff's Disability Claim
In March 1998, Plaintiff was diagnosed with uveitis-associated retinal neovascularization of both eyes. (Pl. L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 12.) This condition causes swelling of the eye tissue, which can lead to blind spots, floaters, difficulty with depth perception, dizziness, difficulty focusing, and diminished peripheral vision. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) Plaintiff began experiencing significant vision loss due to his uveitis on January 1, 2003, which made it difficult for him to read charts, make notes, drive, and diagnose and treat patients. (Id. ¶ 14.)
Plaintiff submitted a claim for disability benefits to Provident Life on May 27, 2003. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff reported that due to his uveitis he suffered from severe blind spots in both eyes, could not drive, and could not read or write normal print. (See R. 78, Sec. Am. Compl. at Ex. B, Claim Application.) Plaintiff's ophthalmologist, Dr. Gieser, submitted an Attending Physician Statement in support of Plaintiff's claim, confirming that Plaintiff suffered from "[d]iminished visual acuity and visual fields" and could not do "[a]nything requiring fine visual discrimination" or "[n]ight driving." (Pl. L.R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 21.)
In his claim application, Plaintiff listed his occupation as "physician-psychiatrist" and described his duties at the time of his disability as "seeing patients at hospital[,] office and...
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