Chaudoin v. Claypool
| Decision Date | 19 October 1933 |
| Docket Number | 24753. |
| Citation | 25 P.2d 1036,174 Wash. 608 |
| Parties | CHAUDOIN v. CLAYPOOL et ux. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2.
Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County; E. D. Hodge, Judge.
Action by Elleanore Chaudoin against Ralph Claypool and wife. From a decree for defendants, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
F. A Kern, of Ellensburg, and B. F. Jacobs, of Tacoma, for appellant.
J. W Selden, of Tacoma, for respondents.
Plaintiff brought this action to quiet title to certain property in Puyallup. From a decree quieting title in defendants plaintiff appeals.
The salient facts are these: Prior to March 6, 1933, appellant was the wife of Singleton E. Chaudoin. Some time prior to March 23, 1932, the Chaudoins acquired the property in question. On the latter date, appellant executed a deed to the property to her husband. This deed carried the express intent to vest title in him as his separate property. February 3, 1933, appellant instituted a suit for divorce against Chaudoin in Kittitas county. In her complaint appellant prayed that the property in question be set aside to her. The divorce case was tried the latter part of the same month and taken under advisement by the trial judge. On March 6, 1933, the trial court entered findings and judgment favorable to appellant, in which he found the property belonged to the community and awarded it to appellant as her sole and separate property. After the trial was had, but Before judgment was entered (counsel for appellant in the divorce action having learned that Chaudoin was negotiating for the sale of the property), a lis pendens was filed in the office of the county auditor of Pierce county. This lis pendens bears the county auditor's filing stamp as of 10:32 a. m., February 25, 1933. At 11:16 a. m. of the same day, Claypool filed a deed to the property running to respondents as grantees. On that same day, counsel for Mrs. Chaudoin in the divorce action learned of the conveyance made by Chaudoin to respondents. He notified the attorney who had examined the title for respondents that a lis pendens in the divorce action had been filed ahead of the Claypool deed. The attorney in turn passed the word on to Claypool. The Claypools did not intervene in the divorce action, nor did appellant take any steps to make them parties thereto.
No question is raised as to the good faith of respondents in purchasing the property. They had the title examined under an abstract certified on February 21st. They paid $750 cash, and assumed a mortgage of $1,100. The deed was executed by Chaudoin at Puyallup at about 10 a. m. of February 25th. Claypool went immediately to Tacoma and filed it for record.
The contention of appellant is simply this: That by reason of the lis pendens having been filed for record prior to the deed, the respondents are bound by the decree of the superior court of Kittitas county awarding the property to appellant. A literal reading of the statute lends color to this contention. The pertinent portion of it reads as follows: 'From the time of the filing only shall the pendency of the action be constructive notice to a purchaser or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, and every person whose conveyance or encumbrance is subsequently executed or subsequently recorded shall be deemed a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer, and shall be bound by all proceedings taken after the filing of such notice to the same extent as if he were a party to the action. * * *' Rem. Rev. Stat. § 243.
However, the decisions of this court have rarely construed the statute literally. It is to be borne in mind at all times that the statute does not create any substantive rights. It is procedural only. Merrick v. Pattison, 85 Wash. 240, 147 P. 1137; State ex rel. Dunbar v. Shokuta, 131 Wash. 291, 230 P. 166. The statute has undergone intensive analysis in the cases of Eldridge v. Stenger, 19 Wash. 697, 54 P. 541; Ellis v. McCoy, 99 Wash. 457, 169 P. 973, 975; and Tallyn v. Cowden, 158 Wash 335, 290 P. 1005. In the case of Ellis v. McCoy, supra, after reviewing the prior decisions, the court said:
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In re Cotton
...property by a husband to his wife makes it thereafter her separate property under our laws.") (cleaned up); Chaudoin v. Claypool , 174 Wash. 608, 611, 25 P.2d 1036 (1933) (wife's quitclaim deed to her husband expressed her intent for title to vest title in him as separate property and was "......
- City of Tacoma v. Peterson, 24604.
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Dunham v. Tabb
...a lis pendens is procedural only; it does not create substantive rights in the person recording the notice. Chaudoin v. Claypool, 174 Wash. 608, 25 P.2d 1036 (1933); Merrick v. Pattison, 85 Wash. 240, 147 P. 1137 (1915). The defendant's lis pendens was not effective to create an equitable I......
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Rich v. Wylie
...omits to do so, it will be at his peril. * * *' To the same effect, see Eldridge v. Stenger, 19 Wash. 697, 54 P. 541; Chaudoin v. Claypool, 174 Wash. 608, 25 P.2d 1036. The effect of the order was to make the appellants parties to the action without affording them an opportunity to be heard......
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Table of Cases
...503 P.2d 460 (1972): 3.2(5)(b) Chase v. Chase,74 Wn.2d 253, 444 P.2d 145 (1968): 3.2(4)(a), 3.2(5)(b), 3.2(6)(a) Chaudoin v.Claypool, 174 Wash. 608, 25 P.2d 1036 (1933): 6.5(4) Chavez v.Chavez, 80 Wn.App. 432, 909 P.2d 314, review denied, 129 Wn.2d 1016(1996): 3.2(5)(a), 3.2(5)(b), 5.6(6) C......
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§6.5 Enforcement of Judgments
...the lis pendens statute is merely procedural and has no effect on the parties actual title to the property. Chaudoin v. Claypool, 174 Wash. 608, 25 P.2d 1036 (1933). In an action that purports to affect community real property, if the notice of lis pendens names both spouses, the filing mak......