Chaudoin v. State
| Decision Date | 19 February 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 1467,1467 |
| Citation | 118 So.2d 569 |
| Parties | Russell S. CHAUDOIN, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Gordon V. Frederick, Sanford, and Roy Christopher, Mt. Dora, for appellant.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and Edward S. Jaffry, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the allegations of the information and his conviction, because the information charges that appellant 'did wilfully and maliciously break down a part of a fence, to-wit: the gate thereof, belonging to and enclosing the land of another', while the evidence showed that the gate in question was broken down by being rammed by an automobile driven by one 'Punch' Beck at a time when said appellant and others were standing outside the automobile in the vicinity of the gate. On this point, it should be noted that there was ample evidence to establish the fact that appellant was actually present at the time and place of the commission of the felony charged in the information and that he assented to it by counselling with and encouraging the actual perpetrator of the offense by aiding and assisting in the earlier attempts to force open the gate. Furthermore, the appellant immediately entered through the gate after it was broken down and was a party to the hunting expedition within the enclosure along with the actual perpetrator and his other companions. Appellant clearly was a principal in the second degree. The fact that he was charged as a principal in the first degree and the evidence proved him to be a principal in the second degree presents no problem and is not cause for reversal.
Chapter 57-310, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1957, which became effective on October 1, 1957, and is now Section 776.011, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., abolished the technical distinctions between principals in the first degree, principals in the second degree and accessories before the fact and provides 'Whoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, is a principal in the first degree and may be charged, convicted and punished as such, whether he is or is not actually or constructively present at the commission of such offense.'
Even in the absence of Chapter 57-310, supra, the appellant would have no ground for complaint. Said legislative enactment only declared what had been the established law in this State for many years as to the form of charge and required proof necessary to convict principals in the first and second degrees in felony prosecutions. In the case of Neumann v. State, 116 Fla. 98, 156 So. 237, the Supreme Court held that a principal in the second degree may be tried before the principal in the first degree is placed on trial in the discretion of the Court, regardless of which defendant is alleged to have actually committed the felony, and such was the law in Florida as early as the case of Montague v. State, 17 Fla. 662. Also, see Skipper v. State, 150 Fla. 259, 7 So.2d 128. In Jimenez v. State, 158 Fla. 719, 30 So.2d 292, the Supreme Court recognized and affirmed two well-established rules relating to principals in the first and second degrees, namely: (1) that where two or more defendants are charged in the same count as principals in the first degree with the commission of a felony, it is permissible to show under such charge that one defendant actually committed the felony and that the other was present aiding, abetting, etc., the commission thereof, and both may be convicted under such charge and proof, and (2) that where A is charged as a principal in the first degree with the commission of a felony, and by the same count B is charged as a principal in the second degree as being present aiding, abetting, etc., the commission of such felony, each may be convicted, though the evidence establishes that B actually committed the felony and that A was present aiding, abetting etc., the commission thereof. See Brown v. State, 82 Fla. 306, 89 So. 873; Pope v. State, 84 Fla. 428, 94 So. 865; Sons v. State, Fla.App. 2nd Dist., 90 So.2d 888, certiorari denied 357 U.S. 910, 78 S.Ct....
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Thomas v. State, 89-449
...(Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Corporacion Peruana de Aeropuertos y Aviacion Comercial v. Boy, 180 So.2d 503 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965); Chaudoin v. State, 118 So.2d 569 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960); Metropolitan Dade County v. Cox, 453 So.2d 1171 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1984); DeSantis v. Acevedo, 528 So.2d 461, 462 n. 1 (Fla.......
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...is required are: Nobles v. State, 189 Ark. 472, 74 S.W.2d 247, 248; People v. Cavanaugh, 44 Cal.2d 252, 282 P.2d 53, 59; Chaudoin v. State, Fla.App., 118 So.2d 569, 572; Literal v. Commonwealth, 250 Ky. 565, 63 S.W.2d 587, 590; State v. Glasscock, 76 N.M. 367, 415 P.2d 56, 57; People v. Het......
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