Chauncey Hutter Inc. v. Vec

• Decision Date: 06 November 2007
• Docket Number: Record No. 0537-07-2.
• Citation: 50 Va. App. 590,652 S.E.2d 151
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals
• Parties: CHAUNCEY F. HUTTER, INC., d/b/a Pro-Tax v. VIRGINIA EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION.

652 S.E.2d 151

50 Va. App. 590

CHAUNCEY F. HUTTER, INC., d/b/a Pro-Tax v. VIRGINIA EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION.

Record No. 0537-07-2.

Court of Appeals of Virginia, Richmond.

November 6, 2007.

John E. Davidson (Charles M. Henter; Davidson & Kitzmann, on brief), Charlottesville, for appellant.

Elizabeth B. Peay, Assistant Attorney General (Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Present: CLEMENTS, HALEY and BEALES, JJ.

JAMES W. HALEY, JR., Judge.

Code § 60.2-618(1) states, in part, that "[a]n individual shall be disqualified for benefits . . . if the Commission finds such individual is unemployed because he left work voluntarily." The issue here for determination, apparently one of first impression before a Virginia court, is whether an individual who enters into an employment contract for a specific term leaves employment "voluntarily" when that term expires. We conclude such an individual does not, and, accordingly, is entitled to unemployment benefits.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts are undisputed.

Charmine M. Key ("claimant") entered into a written contract of employment as a receptionist with Chauncey F. Hutton, Inc., d/b/a PRO-TAX ("PRO-TAX"), which prepared state and federal tax returns. The letter employment agreement reads in pertinent part: "[B]eginning the week of January 10, 2005. . . . Please keep in mind that we are a seasonal business, and this employment is temporary. However, based upon performance, we may offer you the opportunity to work with us until the end of this tax season on April 15, 2005."

Claimant successfully fulfilled her employment agreement. In her statement to the Virginia Employment Commission ("VEC") on June 15, 2005, claimant reported that "[n]o work was available for her after the 15th." PRO-TAX agreed, in testimony before a VEC appeals examiner on September 12, 2005, stating: "Q. Alright and then nothing else was available for her after [April 15, 2005]? A. No."

Claimant filed for unemployment benefits. Counsel for PRO-TAX responded that "[claimant] effectively resigned because she knew the employment was temporary when she accepted it."

The VEC awarded benefits. By decision dated September 13, 2005, an appeals examiner concluded: "There was no voluntarily leaving on her part. She worked through the agreed upon date and would have continued had work been available for her."

On July 27, 2006, the Commission affirmed:

The fact that this claimant knew when she was hired that her job would only last until April 15, did not transform her separation at the end of the period agreed upon into a voluntary leaving from the layoff it actually was. The fact remains that the claimant became unemployed because the employer no longer needed her services. Such a layoff amounts to a no fault discharge.

The matter was appealed to the circuit court pursuant to the judicial review provisions of Code § 60.2-625, and by letter opinion dated January 23, 2007, the decision of the Commission was affirmed. The court concluded: "Although the Commission's decision appears . . . counterintuitive, this Court recognizes that it is obligated to presume that the actions of the administrative agency are correct."

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issue for resolution is one of law, interpreting the word "voluntarily" within Code § 60.2-618(1). "Because statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law, it is subject to de novo review" by an appellate court. Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227, 623 S.E.2d 922, 925 (2006). "In sum, pure statutory interpretation is the prerogative of the judiciary." Sims Wholesale Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 251 Va. 398, 404, 468 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1996).

As this Court noted in Finnerty v. Thornton Hall, Inc., 42 Va.App. 628, 635, 593 S.E.2d 568, 571 (2004) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1830)), "[t]his axiom stems from basic principles of separation of powers. `It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.'" In such a determination, however, the judiciary is to "ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature." Chase v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 266 Va. 544, 547, 587 S.E.2d 521, 522 (2003).

Subsumed within this congruent principle of deference to legislative intent is an ancillary proposition applicable to administrative law. "It is well settled that where the construction of a statute has been uniform for many years in the administrative practice, and has been acquiesced in by the General Assembly, such construction is entitled to great weight with the courts." Dan River Mills, Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 195 Va. 997, 1002, 81 S.E.2d 620, 623 (1954). See also Purolator Courier Corp. v. Clemons Courier Corp., 236 Va. 394, 400, 374 S.E.2d 42, 45 (1988); Branch v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 219 Va. 609, 612, 249 S.E.2d 180, 183 (1978); Shifflett v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 14 Va.App. 96, 98, 414 S.E.2d 865, 866 (1992).

ANALYSIS

Pervasive in decisions by Virginia courts is the conclusion that the Unemployment Compensation Act is to be liberally and remedially interpreted. Illustrative of that conclusion is Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 191 Va. 812, 63 S.E.2d 28 (1951). There the Commission had awarded unemployment benefits to workers at Ford's Norfolk assembly plant who had been laid off because of a shortage of component parts. These parts were manufactured at Ford's River Rouge plant near Detroit, Michigan. The parts were unavailable in Norfolk because of a strike by workers at River Rouge. Then Code § 60-47(d) prohibited benefits if the unemployment resulted from a labor dispute "at the factory, establishment, or other premises" of the employee. This prohibition did not apply, however, if "separate branches of work" were "commonly conducted as separate businesses." Code § 60-47(d) (1950) (current version at Code § 60.2-612).

The Supreme Court of Virginia found Norfolk and River Rouge, though both owned and operated by Ford, to be "separate establishments" and affirmed the Commission's award of benefits. Ford, 191 Va. at 825, 63 S.E.2d at 34.

In so doing, the Court noted:

The Unemployment Compensation Act was intended to provide temporary financial assistance to workers who become unemployed without fault on their part. The statute as a whole, as well as the particular sections here involved, should be so interpreted as to effectuate that remedial purpose implicit in its enactment.

Id. at 824, 63 S.E.2d at 33-34. See also Virginia Employment Comm'n v. A.I.M. Corp., 225 Va. 338, 346, 302 S.E.2d 534, 539 (1983).

This Court, in reliance on Ford, has repeatedly held that the Unemployment Compensation Act should be construed in a liberal and remedial manner. See Israel v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 7 Va.App. 169, 172, 372 S.E.2d 207, 209 (1988); Johnson v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 8 Va.App. 441, 448-49, 382 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1989); Virginia Employment Comm'n v. Sutphin, 8 Va.App. 325, 327-28, 380 S.E.2d 667, 668-69 (1989).

With respect to the issue before us, we initially note that "[t]he burden is on the employer to prove that the claimant left work voluntarily." Actuarial Benefits & Design Corp. v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 23 Va.App. 640, 645, 478 S.E.2d 735, 738 (1996).

This Court has addressed Code § 60.2-618(1) in factual situations distinct from those here involved. Whitt v. Race Fork Coal Corp., 18 Va.App. 71, 75, 441 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1994) (employee who accepts lump sum workers' compensation settlement, a condition of which he leave employment, has left work voluntarily); Shifflett, 14 Va.App. at 98, 414 S.E.2d at 866 (employee's refusal to work out a notice period, after being notified of a future discharge, is a voluntary leaving); Actuarial, 23 Va.App. at 646, 478 S.E.2d at 738 (discharge by employer with notice of pending resignation is not equivalent to a voluntary leaving for interim period).

In Shuler v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 9 Va.App. 147, 151, 384 S.E.2d 122, 125 (1989), we held that where the uncontradicted evidence showed that claimant properly assumed that a three-day absence was authorized, and sought to return to work, that claimant had not left work voluntarily. In so doing, we stated that "[t]he term `voluntary' connotes `[u]nconstrained by interference; unimpelled by another's influence; spontaneous; acting of oneself . . . [r]esulting from free choice.'" Id. at 150, 384 S.E.2d at 124 (citations omitted). See also Whitt, 18 Va.App. at 75, 441 S.E.2d at 359.

In Bowles v. Cities Service Oil Co., Decision S-10599-10306 (April 4, 1961), aff'd, Commission Decision 3764-C (August 17, 1961), claimant was employed as a messman on a ship owned by employer. An agreement between the Seafarers International Union and employer, incorporated into claimant's contract, limited his term of employment to 60 days if a more senior crewman was available at the end of that term. That turned out to be the case, and claimant was replaced.¹

In awarding unemployment benefits, the appeals examiner wrote:

The claimant was hired for a definite period and, after working the period called for, was replaced by another crew member. He did not leave his job, nor did he quit. The terms of the Contract were at an end, and the work he had agreed to do was done. . . . [T]he Examiner is of the opinion that the claimant did not voluntarily quit his employment and would not be subject to the disqualifying provisions of Section 60-47(a) of the Act.²

Id.

Recognizing the Unemployment Compensation Act is to be liberally construed, referring to our definition of "voluntary" quoted above, and granting appropriate deference to a decision of the Commission related to the issue raised, we hold that when an individual leaves work solely because that individual entered into a contract of employment for a defined term, that individual does not leave work "voluntarily," as that word is used in Code § 60.2-618(1). In the...