Chauncey v. Wass

• Decision Date: 24 December 1886
• Parties: CHAUNCEY v WASS.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

35 Minn. 1

30 N.W. 826

CHAUNCEYvWASS.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

December 24, 1886.

Appeal from district court, St. Louis county.

On rehearing. For the original opinion in this case, see 25 N. W. Rep. 457. P. Ayer, Clark, Eller & How, and John D. Howe, (Gordon E. Cole, of counsel,) for appellant, Chauncey.

Wm. W. Billson and C. A. Congdon, for respondent, Wass.

GILFILLAN, C. J.

After the decision in this case, when first submitted, an application was made in the name of the appellant for leave to reargue the questions involved, and, the case having been brought within the rule established by this court for applications of the kind, such leave was granted. On the reargument the counsel for divers corporations interested in the questions-indeed, all who applied to be heard on the side of appellant-were permitted to take part in the argument. Consequently the questions were more fully argued than in any other case involving the same questions that has come before the court. The construction of the statutes contended for by the appellant would radically change the character of the proceedings established by statute for the collection of taxes upon real estate, as heretofore understood by the courts, the legislature, and, we think, the people; and for that reason, as well as because of the great importance of the questions, we deem it proper to enter in this opinion more at large than we do in ordinary cases into a discussion of the various provisions of the statute. That the courts have always regarded the statute now in force as intending to give to tax sales the sanction of a previous judicial determination of the right to make such sales is apparent from the fact that in many cases the matter of the nature of the proceedings to enforce collection of taxes against real estate has been directly or indirectly before this court, and in no case prior to this one has the court, or any judge of it, intimated any doubt that the judgment directing the land to be sold for the tax mentioned in it is entitled to the same force and effect as judgments in ordinary actions, and that it conclusively determines the right to sell the land as directed by it.

The legislative construction is apparent from the course of legislation. In section 119 of the original act, (Laws 1874, c. 1,) payment and exemption were provided for as defenses to be made in the proceedings. This provision has remained through all changes in the law. By section 125 it was provided that a sale might be set aside on proof “that the court rendering the judgment pursuant to which the sale was made, had not jurisdiction to render the judgment.” This latter provision was struck out in 1875. Gen. Laws, c. 5, § 30, amending section 125, Act 1874. In 1877, (section 22, c. 6,) this section was again amended, not by restoring the provision in the original act, but by inserting a provision that the sale might be set aside “if it shall appear that the taxes for which such sale was made had, prior to such sale, been paid, or that such lands were not subject to taxation.” In the revision of 1878, (Gen. St. 1878, c. 11,) the above-quoted provision from the act of 1874 was restored. Section 85. The above-quoted provision from the act of 1877 was struck out, and a provision inserted (section 80) giving the court power to open or vacate the judgment at any time before the expiration of the period for redemption, and allow a defense to be interposed on the ground that the tax has been paid, or that the land is not subject to taxation. There was then also inserted in the law, for the first time, by section 76, this clause: “And the same presumption in favor of the regularity and validity of said judgment shall be deemed to exist as in respect to judgments in civil actions in said court.”

We must presume that the legislature meant something by these various alterations; that in striking out the clause quoted from the act of 1874 it intended that the sale should not be avoided on the grounds therein stated,-that is, that the judgment should not be thus collaterally assailed; that in inserting the clause quoted from the act of 1877 it intended that the sale should be avoided for the reasons stated in it, and understood it could not be avoided without that clause; and that in the revision of 1878, by striking out that clause, it intended that those reasons should no longer be ground for avoiding the judgment and sale, except as provided in section 80; and that it understood the judgment to be a judicial determination of whatever is involved in, and is necessary to justify, what it directs, to-wit, a sale of the land.

The decision in Chisago Co. v. St. Paul & D. R. Co., 27 Minn. 109, S. C.6 N. W. Rep. 454, in which it was directly decided that the proceeding is one to try and determine the validity of the tax appearing on the list filed, and that the question does not go to the jurisdiction of the court, was filed in August, 1880. The legislature (it has not been slow to make what it deemed proper changes in the tax law) has made no move to change the general law in that particular. It must be presumed that its acquiescence in the construction of the law by that decision was because it considered it to be in accordance with the legislative intention,-with its own construction of the law.

In 1881 it passed an act (Gen. Laws, c. 135) to enforce the payment of taxes which became delinquent in and prior to the year 1879. It provided that the same proceedings for judgment and sale should be had as in the general tax law; but it reserved no right of redemption after sale, no right to apply for a vacation of the judgment after its rendition, on the ground of exemption or payment, as in section 80 of the general law, and it had other features harsher than are in the general law. The list was to be a sort of omnibus list. It might have on it the taxes for many years. It was therefore more liable than the list under the general law to have on it lands for years when it was exempt, and taxes that had been paid. Obviously, for these reasons, there was inserted a provision that the judgment and sale should be void on proof at any time that the land was exempt or the taxes paid. This provision was entirely superfluous, except on the theory that without it the judgment would be conclusive upon those facts, and the insertion of it shows the legislature understood such would otherwise be the effect of the judgment.

Notwithstanding the clause quoted from section 76, (enacted after the case of Eastman v. Linn, 26 Minn. 215, S. C.2 N. W. Rep. 693, arose,) we think the tax judgment may, in a collateral action, be assailed for want of jurisdiction. The provision was enacted by the act which re-enacted the clause quoted from section 125 of the act of 1874. The two provisions must stand and be construed together, if possible, and be held to modify each other, if necessary, in order to avoid rejecting either. So construing them, section 76 attaches to the judgment the same presumption of regularity and validity as in respect to judgments in civil actions in the district court, to-wit, a conclusive presumption, except that, as provided in section 85, want of jurisdiction may be proved.

No one could deny that the legislature has power to provide a judicial proceeding or action in which shall be conclusively determined, before any sale, that the land is or is not legally chargeable with any taxes appearing against it in the books of the proper officers, and to provide on what the jurisdiction of the court shall depend, and how it shall attach, and in what manner the court shall proceed, if the whole proceeding provided for come within the meaning of the term, “due process of law,” as used in the constitution. The legislature has apparently attempted to do this. At least, it has provided, commencing with section 70 of the tax law, (Gen. St. 1878, c. 11,) for a proceeding to be commenced in the district court, to be upon a prescribed notice, to be conducted on pleadings and proofs, and which may be taken to the supreme court for review, and which is to result in what is called a “judgment;” a sale to be had only if the so-called “judgment” so direct, and the land to be discharged of the claim for the tax if the so-called “judgment” so determine.

The character of this proceeding, its nature, scope, purpose, and effect, what the court is to try and determine, and how it shall get jurisdiction so to try and determine, depend on the intention of the legislature, as expressed in the statute. The intention is to be got at by considering the sections of the statute which provide for and regulate the proceeding. There are a great many sections which have no reference to the proceeding in court, but merely prescribe duties of ministerial or administrative officers,-such as assessors, auditors, treasurers, and boards of equalization. The counsel on the side of appellant argue that section 69 is controlling as to the jurisdiction of the court, and as to what is before it for decision. “That,” says one of the briefs, “is the dominant section.” But that section makes no reference whatever to the proceeding in court, its purpose, scope, or character. It assumes only to prescribe certain duties to the county auditor and treasurer. It does not even assume to define a “delinquent tax.” It makes no mention of two essential elements of delinquency. When we are inquiring as to the character of a proceeding in court, provided for by other sections, to go to such a section as 69, and especially to let it control the evident import of such other sections, would violate the most obvious rules of interpretation.

Down to and including section 69 there is nothing from which it might be conjectured that there is to be any action of a court. For aught that thus far appears, the sale is to be made in the same manner as before the act of 1874. Section 70 provides that the auditor shall file, on or before the...