Chauser v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 09 December 1937 |
| Citation | 196 A. 137,123 Conn. 413 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | CHAUSER v. NIAGARA FIRE INS. CO. |
Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Arthur F. Ells, Judge.
Action by Albert Chauser against the Niagara Fire Insurance Company to recover upon a policy of fire insurance. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff upon a trial to the jury, and defendant appeals.
No error.
Where all questions were answered in proof of loss under fire policy, true state of title to insured property appeared on face of document, and it did not appear that proof was intended to deceive insurer, fact that proof was made by named insured, who held record title to property, instead of by actual owner and real insured, did not prevent the latter from recovering on policy.
Charles Welles Gross, of Hartford, for appellant.
A Robert Levett and David M. Reilly, both of New Haven, for appellee.
Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, AVERY, BROWN, and JENNINGS JJ.
The plaintiff recovered a verdict for the burning of a building upon which the defendant had issued a fire insurance policy. The defendant has appealed from the denial of the motion to set that verdict aside and from the judgment entered upon it. All questions raised in the latter appeal are involved in that taken from the refusal to set the verdict aside and will be discussed in connection with it. The jury might reasonably have found the following facts:
The plaintiff had owned the property at 138 East Broadway, Myrtle Beach, Milford, at various times, and just prior to October 1931, repurchased it from one Harry Allison. On October 1, 1931, Allison and one Lawrence Howshield, agent and broker for the plaintiff, called at the office of Clarissa M. Fowler in Milford to complete the transfer. Miss Fowler was a title searcher and the agent of the defendant. As such she had previously dealt with the plaintiff in both capacities with reference to this property.
Howshield informed Miss Fowler that although Albert Chauser would be the real owner of the property, he wanted the deed made to Bertha Chichester. Miss Fowler made the deed as directed and it was duly executed. Howshield then asked to have the fire insurance transferred from Allison to Chauser. Miss Fowler, as agent for the companies, replied that she would take care of the insurance for Chauser but that the policy would have to be in the name of the new owner, that is, Bertha Chichester. Howshield assured Miss Fowler that Chauser would pay the premiums. Mrs. Chichester and her husband were in charge of another piece of property owned by the plaintiff in New Haven. She never had any actual connection with the Milford property. She did not even know where it was.
On October 2, 1931, Howshield delivered the deed to Chauser in New Haven. Chauser then talked with Miss Fowler on the telephone, asking to have the insurance in his name. Miss Fowler assured him that everything was all right for him with the insurance in the name of Bertha Chichester On October 3, 1931, the plaintiff had his attorney draw a warranty deed of the same property to Albert Chauser from Bertha Chichester. The deed was executed by her and delivered the same day. The deed from Allison to Chichester was recorded October 8, 1931, but that from Chichester to Chauser was never recorded nor did knowledge of it come to Miss Fowler or the defendant until after the fire. On October 12, 1931, the plaintiff wrote Miss Fowler a letter about balances due from former owners for insurance premiums on the premises. This letter contained the following statement: Bills for insurance premiums were sent to Mrs. Bertha Chichester, care of Albert Chauser, 59 Center street, New Haven, Conn., and paid by him. This policy was renewed by Miss Fowler as of November 18, 1931, and November 18, 1932, without further contract with or information from the plaintiff. On October 16, 1933, the premises in question were damaged by fire.
On October 19, 1933, Mrs. Chichester signed a statement for the state police saying, among other things, that she had nothing to do with the property, had lost nothing, and could not very well file a proof of loss. On November 6, 1933, she signed and swore to a proof of loss which was delivered to the defendant. On December 28, 1933, the defendant notified her that it denied any liability to her on the ground that, at the time of the fire, she was not the owner of the property. On October 8, 1935, the plaintiff sold the property to Dominick Lombardo and it was conveyed to him by a warranty deed executed by Bertha Chichester.
On this state of facts the evidence and memorandum on the motion to set aside the verdict show that what the conversations were between Miss Fowler, Mr. Howshield, and Mr. Chauser on October 1, and 2, 1931, were important issues before the jury. While, as claimed by the defendant, there was a sharp conflict in the testimony on this point, the verdict and answer to the interrogatories definitely fixed the facts to be as claimed by the plaintiff. Canfield v. Sheketoff, 104 Conn. 28, 132 A. 401. The jury could reasonably have reached this conclusion and the trial judge was correct in refusing to substitute his own differing opinion. Without analyzing the testimony in detail, Miss Fowler admitted talking with Howshield and Chauser, she sent the bills to Mrs. Chichester in care of Chauser, and they were paid by him, and the testimony of Alderman squarely contradicted her claim.
It follows that on those dates the plaintiff was in effect the insured. The knowledge of Miss Fowler was the knowledge of the defendant and, in spite of the language of the policy, the defendant was estopped to raise any of the numerous defenses which appear in its brief on this point. MacKay v. Aetna Ins. Co., 118 Conn. 538, 173 A. 783; Back v. People's National Fire Ins. Co., 97 Conn. 336, 340, 116 A. 603. The defendant claims that this situation results in an oral contract of insurance and that the plaintiff is attempting to recover on this oral contract rather than on the written policy. On the contrary, Mrs. Chichester, as the holder of the bare legal title for the benefit of the plaintiff, was trustee of a resulting trust for him and was recognized as such by the defendant. Ward v. Ward, 59 Conn. 188, 195, 22 A. 149; Fox v. Shanley, 94 Conn. 350, 355, 109 A. 249. The plaintiff is suing as the beneficiary of the written contract. He should not be penalized on this ground for following the instructions of the defendant.
The establishment of this claim of the plaintiff was necessary before any further consideration of his case was possible. The contract of insurance actually in force at that time covered the property in question. As stated, the legal and record title was in Mrs. Chichester who held it for the beneficial owner, the plaintiff. It was with knowledge of this state of facts that the defendant was charged. While the renewal policies were technically new contracts, Back v. People's National Fire Ins. Co., supra, 97 Conn. 336, at page 344, 116 A. 603, in the absence of any further communication with the insured, a finding that the original contract was continued is reasonable. The policy itself provided that ‘ this policy may by renewal be continued under the original stipulations in consideration of premium for the renewal term provided that any increase of hazard must be made known to the company at the time of renewal or this policy shall be void.’ See Fitzgerald v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 56 Conn. 116, 128, 13 A. 673,17 A. 411,7 Am.St. Rep. 288; Witherell v. Maine Ins. Co., 49 Me. 200, 203; 5 Cooley, Briefs on Insurance, 2d Ed., p. 4256.
The fundamental objection of the defendant is based on that provision of the policy which provides that it shall be void ‘ If the interest of the insured in the policy be not truly stated therein’ and that that interest was not ‘ unconditional and sole ownership.’ The plaintiff had paid for the property and had the sole equitable interest. Such loss as occurred fell entirely on him.
In Hough v. City Fire Ins. Co., 29 Conn. 10, 76 Am.Dec 581, the policy contained the following condition: The interest of the plaintiff in the property consisted of the parol promise of the holder of the legal title to convey on the performance of certain conditions, some of which had been fulfilled. Under these circumstances it was held that a finding that the plaintiff had an absolute interest was proper. Anderson v. Yaworski, 120 Conn. 390, 397, 181 A. 205, 101 A.L.R. 1232, questions this case but not on the point under discussion. The following definition of unconditional and sole ownership in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Keating, 86 Md. 130, 145, 38 A. 29,63 Am.St.Rep. 499, was approved in Mishiloff v....
To continue reading
Request your trial