Chaussee v. Snohomish County Council

• Decision Date: 16 July 1984
• Docket Number: No. 10363-6-I,10363-6-I
• Citation: 689 P.2d 1084,38 Wn.App. 630
• Parties: Francis L. CHAUSSEE, Appellant, v. SNOHOMISH COUNTY COUNCIL; Snohomish County Planning Department; and Snohomish County Auditor, Respondents.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 630

38 Wn.App. 630

689 P.2d 1084

Francis L. CHAUSSEE, Appellant, v. SNOHOMISH COUNTY COUNCIL; Snohomish County Planning Department; and Snohomish County Auditor, Respondents.

No. 10363-6-I.

Court of Appeals of Washington Division 1.

July 16, 1984.

Terry E. Thomson, Seattle, for appellant.

Seth R. Dawson, Snohomish County Pros. Atty., Evelyn Sue A. Tanner, Deputy Pros. Atty., Everett, for respondents.

CALLOW, Judge.

Francis L. Chaussee appeals the judgment of the superior court, Snohomish County, affirming the administrative decisions of the hearing examiner and County Council of Snohomish County which held that Snohomish County Code, Title 20A (SCC 20A) and the minimum road standards incorporated therein were applicable to a parcel of Chaussee's real property.

The issues presented are:

(1) whether the hearing examiner and County Council had jurisdiction to consider the issue of equitable estoppel;

(2) whether technical compliance with the statutory notice requirements of RCW 36.70.590 prior to the adoption of SCC 20A and its minimum road standards was insufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements of procedural due process;

(3) whether the superior court in reviewing the proceeding below on a writ of certiorari was precluded from consideration of Chaussee's claim of equitable estoppel due to the inadequacy of the administrative record.

Francis L. Chaussee, owner of Framont Construction Co., Inc., is a builder by trade and has also been involved in several land developments. In early February of 1979, Chaussee obtained an option to purchase a 598-acre tract of land known as the Fraley Mountain River Ranch Development. His intent was to subdivide the property into 5-acre tracts for single family residential development. He retained Ruskin Fisher, a professional land surveyor, to subdivide the tract. At that time there was no local ordinance regulating 5-acre tracts. Thereafter, Chaussee spent approximately $100,000 in conducting extensive engineering work including drainage analysis, soil studies, survey of the property, making of boundary markers, purchase of pipes and equipment, and preparation of a detailed topographic map.

On Saturday, June 16, 1979, the Snohomish County Planning Commission (Planning Commission) gave notice pursuant to RCW 36.70.590 of a public hearing to consider adoption of proposed Title 20A of the Snohomish County Code (SCC 20A) regulating subdivisions containing tracts 5 acres or larger in size. SCC § 20A.04.020. Chaussee nor any of his agents received actual notice of or attended the hearing. Following the hearing, the planning commission recommended adoption of SCC 20A as well as a document entitled "Minimum Standards for Private Roads Serving Large Tract Segregations" (minimum road standards) incorporated by reference therein.

On July 30, 1979, SCC 20A and the minimum road standards were adopted by the Board of Snohomish County Commissioners (Board) at its regular 10 a.m. public meeting. No notice was given as none was required by state statute or local ordinance. Chaussee and Fisher, however, knew of the meeting and Fisher was in attendance. Fisher then immediately filed the first of the four sheets of the record of survey for the Fraley Mountain River Ranch Development. On August 28, 1979, the remaining three sheets of the survey were completed and filed with the Snohomish County Auditor. Based on Fisher's mistaken belief that there was a 30-day grace period from July 30, 1979, in which to file the final three sheets of the record of survey and the county auditor's acceptance of those sheets on August 28, 1979, Chaussee proceeded with the project. He spent substantial sums of money to further the development including completion of the necessary engineering, road construction, and the commencement of a sales program in November of 1979. On February 1, 1980, Chaussee exercised his option to purchase the property.

In early 1980, Chaussee learned that although SCC 20A was not applicable to the first survey sheet, that the final three survey sheets were subject to SCC 20A. He was also alerted that the pending rezone of the Arlington area by the Board would, if adopted, result in requirements for larger lot sizes than proposed. On March 31, 1980, the Board adopted zoning for the Arlington Comprehensive Plan area which caused portions of Chaussee's property to be zoned rural conservation, rural 5-acre, and forestry (20-acres minimum lot size).

On May 15, 1980, Chaussee received the planning department's administrative decision that those portions of Chaussee's property not recorded prior to July 30, 1979, must be approved pursuant to SCC 20A and that until such approval, no development permits would be issued. Chaussee appealed this decision to the hearing examiner, the sole issue being the applicability of SCC 20A to those survey sheets filed on August 28, 1979. The hearing before the hearing examiner was conducted on June 24, 1980, and Chaussee was permitted to present evidence on issues of due process and estoppel as well as the actual issue on appeal. On July 2, 1980, the hearing examiner determined that the three survey sheets filed after July 30, 1979, the effective date of SCC 20A, were not exempt, and entered an order which stated:

The Examiner hereby DENIES the appeal of Francis L. Chaussee and thereby sustains the Administrative Determination of the Planning Department. The appellant's issues of due process, effective date of ordinance, adoption of road standards, and estoppel are found by the Examiner to be beyond the scope of his authority and are not decided herein.

Chaussee appealed this determination to the Snohomish County Council (Council), its predecessor being the Board. SCC § 1.04.030.

On August 6, 1980, the Council, limiting its review to the administrative determination that SCC 20A applies to the three final survey sheets, upheld the hearing examiner despite Chaussee's contentions regarding lack of due process and estoppel. Chaussee then filed a statutory writ of certiorari in the Snohomish County Superior Court pursuant to RCW 7.16 and SCC § 2.02.190 for review of the Council's decision.

The superior court affirmed the decision of the hearing examiner and the Council and held that it could consider the issues of due process and equitable estoppel despite the fact that neither was considered below. The superior court further held that sufficient notice was given to comport with procedural due process so as not to render SCC 20A and the minimum road standards incorporated therein constitutionally invalid, but that the administrative record was inadequate to properly decide the presence or lack of equitable estoppel. Chaussee now appeals.

Scope of Review

Initially, it should be noted that "[a] statutory writ of certiorari, RCW 7.16.040, serves to review agency actions only when the agency is exercising quasi-judicial functions", Mentor v. Nelson, 31 Wash.App. 615, 617-18, 644 P.2d 685 (1982), and "may not be used to obtain judicial review of purely legislative, executive or ministerial acts of the agency." Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. State Personnel Bd., 23 Wash.App. 142, 145, 594 P.2d 1375 (1979). The four-part test for determining whether administrative action is quasi-judicial is:

(1) whether a court could have been charged with making the agency's decision; (2) whether the action is one which historically has been performed by courts (3) whether the action involves the application of existing law to past or present facts for the purpose of declaring or enforcing liability; and (4) whether the action resembles the ordinary business of courts as opposed to that of legislators or administrators.

Williams v. Seattle School Dist. 1, 97 Wash.2d 215, 218, 643 P.2d 426 (1982)(quoting Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 23 Wash.App. at 145-46, 594 P.2d 1375).

Here, the various administrative actions fit within these four criteria. The hearing examiner's and Council's actions amounted to the application of law, SCC 20A, to particular facts. Such a function is one historically performed by courts and a court could have been charged with making such decision. The actions further amounted to applying existing law to past or present facts and resembled the ordinary business of the courts. An administrative agency which applies existing legislation and policy to specific individual interests is not legislative, but quasi-judicial in character. See Cooper v. Board of County Comm'rs, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980). Consequently, review by statutory writ of certiorari was proper under RCW 7.16.040.

The superior court's scope of review under a statutory writ of certiorari, RCW 7.16.120, was as follows:

The questions involving the merits to be determined by the court upon the hearing are:

(1) Whether the body or officer had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the determination under review.

(2) Whether the authority, conferred upon the body or officer in relation to that subject matter, has been pursued in the mode required by law, in order to authorize it or to make the determination.

(3) Whether, in making the determination, any rule of law affecting the rights of the parties thereto has been violated to the prejudice of the relator.

(4) Whether there was any competent proof of all the facts necessary to be proved, in order to authorize the making of the determination.

(5) If there was such proof, whether there was, upon all the evidence, such a preponderance of proof, against the existence thereof, rendered in an action in a court, triable by a jury, as would be set aside by the court, as against the weight of evidence.

The first three subsections of this statute govern jurisdiction and the legality of the lower tribunal's decision. The last two subsections govern the court's review of factual matters and encompass, essentially, the arbitrary and capricious standard used in...