Chavez-Meza v. United States

• Decision Date: 18 June 2018
• Docket Number: No. 17–5639.,17–5639.
• Citation: 201 L.Ed.2d 359,138 S.Ct. 1959
• Parties: Adaucto CHAVEZ–MEZA, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

138 S.Ct. 1959

201 L.Ed.2d 359

Adaucto CHAVEZ–MEZA, Petitioner

v.UNITED STATES.

No. 17–5639.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued April 23, 2018.

Decided June 18, 2018.

Todd A. Coberly, Santa Fe, NM, appointed by this Court, for Petitioner.

Rod J. Rosenstein, Baltimore, MD, for Respondent.

Jeffrey T. Green, Derek A. Webb, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, D.C., Sarah O'Rourke Schrup, Northwestern Supreme Court Practicum, Steven J. Horowitz, Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, IL, Todd A. Coberly, A. Nathaniel Chakeres, Coberly & Martinez, LLLP, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.

Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, John P. Cronan, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Eric J. Feigin, Morgan L. Goodspeed, Assistants to the Solicitor General, Alexander P. Robbins, Attorney, Department

of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns a criminal drug offender originally sentenced in accordance with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Subsequently, the Sentencing Commission lowered the applicable Guidelines sentencing range; the offender asked for a sentence reduction in light of the lowered range; and the District Judge reduced his original sentence from 135 months' imprisonment to 114 months'. The offender, believing he should have obtained a yet greater reduction, argues that the District Judge did not adequately explain why he imposed a sentence of 114 months rather than a lower sentence. The Court of Appeals held that the judge's explanation was adequate. And we agree with the Court of Appeals.

I

A

The Sentencing Guidelines require a sentencing judge to consider certain listed characteristics of the offender and the offense for which he was convicted. Those characteristics (and certain other factors) bring the judge to a Guidelines table that sets forth a range of punishments, for example, 135 to 168 months' imprisonment. A sentencing judge often will choose a specific penalty from a Guidelines range. But a judge also has the legal authority to impose a sentence outside the range either because he or she "departs" from the range (as is permitted by certain Guidelines rules) or because he or she chooses to "vary" from the Guidelines by not applying them at all. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258–265, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (holding the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory). The judge, however, must always take account of certain statutory factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (requiring the judge to consider the "seriousness of the offense" and the need to "afford adequate deterrence," among other factors). And, of particular relevance here, the judge "shall state in open court the reasons for [the] imposition of the particular sentence." § 3553(c). If the sentence is outside the Guidelines range (whether because of a "departure" or a "variance"), the judge must state "the specific reason for the imposition of a ... different" sentence. § 3553(c)(2). If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, and the Guidelines range exceeds 24 months, the judge must also state "the reason for imposing a sentence at a particular point within the range." § 3553(c)(1).

B

We here consider one aspect of the judge's obligation to provide reasons. In an earlier case, we set forth the law that governs the explanation requirement at sentencing. In Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007), the offender sought a downward departure from the Guidelines. The record, we said, showed that the sentencing judge "listened to each argument[,] ... considered the supporting evidence[,] ... was fully aware of defendant's various physical ailments[,]" imposed a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range, and, having considered the § 3553(a) factors, said simply that the sentence was " 'appropriate.' " Id., at 358, 127 S.Ct. 2456. We held that where "a matter is as conceptually simple as in the case at hand and the record makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and arguments, we do not believe the law requires the judge to write more extensively." Id., at 359, 127 S.Ct. 2456.

We also discussed more generally the judge's obligation to explain. We wrote that the statute calls

"for the judge to 'state' his 'reasons.' And that requirement reflects sound judicial practice. Judicial decisions are reasoned decisions. Confidence in a judge's use of reason underlies the public's trust in the judicial institution. A public statement of those reasons helps provide the public with the assurance that creates that trust." Id., at 356, 127 S.Ct. 2456.

But, we continued,

"we cannot read the statute (or our precedent) as insisting upon a full opinion in every case. The appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what to say, depends upon circumstances. Sometimes a judicial opinion responds to every argument; sometimes it does not; sometimes a judge simply writes the word 'granted' or 'denied' on the face of a motion while relying upon context and the parties' prior arguments to make the reasons clear. The law leaves much, in this respect, to the judge's own professional judgment." Ibid.

At bottom, the sentencing judge need only "set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority." Ibid.

When a judge applies a sentence within the Guidelines range, he or she often does not need to provide a lengthy explanation. As we said in Rita, "[c]ircumstances may well make clear that the judge rests his decision upon the Commission's own reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is a proper sentence (in terms of § 3553(a) and other congressional mandates) in the typical case, and that the judge has found that the case before him is typical." Id., at 357, 127 S.Ct. 2456.

We have followed this same reasoning in other sentencing cases, including Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007), which we decided the same year as Rita . Cf. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007) (suggesting a district judge's decision to vary from the Guidelines range may be entitled to greater respect when the judge finds a particular case " 'outside the "heartland" ' " of the Guidelines). Indeed, the case before us differs from the Guidelines cases that Rita describes in only one significant respect. It concerns a limited form of re sentencing.

C

The relevant lower court proceedings are not complicated. In 2013, petitioner pleaded guilty to a federal crime, namely, possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it. The judge reviewed the Guidelines, determined that the applicable range was 135 to 168 months' imprisonment and imposed a sentence at the bottom of that range: 135 months. Pursuant to its statutory authority, the Sentencing Commission subsequently lowered the relevant Guidelines range from 135 to 168 months to 108 to 135 months. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual App. C, Amdt. 782 (Supp. Nov. 2012–Nov. 2016) (USSG); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(o ). Petitioner then sought and obtained a sentence modification. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) ; USSG § 1B1.10. He asked the judge to lower his sentence to the bottom of the new range, namely 108 months. But the judge instead lowered it to 114 months, not 108 months. The order was entered on a form issued by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. The form certified the judge had "considered" petitioner's motion and "tak[en] into account" the § 3553(a) factors and the relevant Guidelines policy statement. App. 106–107 (under seal).

Petitioner appealed, claiming that the judge did not adequately explain why he rejected petitioner's 108–month request. The Court of Appeals rejected his argument. 854 F.3d 655 (C.A.10 2017). In its view, "absent any indication the court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors, a district court ... need not explain choosing a particular guidelines-range sentence." Id., at 659. Petitioner sought certiorari, and we granted his petition.

II

A

The Government, pointing out that this is a sentence-modification case, argues that this fact alone should secure it a virtually automatic victory. That is because, unlike an ordinary Guidelines sentencing case, the statute governing sentence-modification motions does not insist that the judge provide a "reason for imposing a sentence at a particular point within the range." Compare § 3553(c)(1) with § 3582(c)(2). It adds that sentence modifications also differ procedurally from sentencing in that the offender is not entitled to be present in court at the time the reduced sentence is imposed. See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 828, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) (citing Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 43(b)(4) ). As we have said before, "Congress intended to authorize only a limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence and not a plenary resentencing proceeding." Dillon, supra, at 826, 130 S.Ct. 2683. These procedural features, the Government asserts, mean that "the court has no duty" to provide an "on-the-record explanation" of its reasons. Brief for United States 12, 19.

We need not go so far. Even assuming (purely for argument's sake) district courts have equivalent duties when initially sentencing a defendant and when later modifying the sentence, what the District Court did here was sufficient. At the original sentencing, the judge "must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review." 552 U.S., at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586 ; see also Rita, 551 U.S., at 356, 127 S.Ct. 2456 ("The sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority"). Just how much of an explanation this requires, however, depends, as we have said, upon the...