United States v. Hald

• Decision Date: 06 August 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-3195, No. 20-3208, No. 20-3228,20-3195
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. James A. HALD, Defendant - Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Monterial Wesley, Defendant - Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Walter B. Sands, Defendant - Appellant.

8 F.4th 932

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.James A. HALD, Defendant - Appellant.

United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.Monterial Wesley, Defendant - Appellant.

United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.Walter B. Sands, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 20-3195

No. 20-3208

No. 20-3228

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

FILED August 6, 2021

Kayla Gassmann, Appellate Attorney (Melody Brannon, Federal Public Defender, with her on the briefs), Kansas Federal Public Defender's Office, Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant - Appellant James A. Hald.

Monterial Wesley, pro se.

Daniel T. Hansmeier, Appellate Chief (Melody Brannon, Federal Public Defender, with him on the briefs), Kansas Federal Public Defender's Officer, Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant - Appellant Walter B. Sands.

James A. Brown, Assistant United States Attorney (Stephen R. McAllister, United States Attorney, and Jared S. Maag, Assistant United States Attorney, with him on the briefs, and Duston J. Slinkard, Acting United States Attorney, District of Kansas, on the memorandum briefs), District of Kansas, Topeka, Kansas, for Appellee United States of America.

Before HARTZ, HOLMES, and EID, Circuit Judges.

HARTZ, Circuit Judge.

James A. Hald, Monterial Wesley, and Walter B. Sands (Defendants) appeal the denials of their district-court motions for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).¹ They are among the many prisoners who have sought to be released from prison confinement during the COVID-19 pandemic. Each claimed that his underlying health conditions and mounting infections at his correctional facility satisfied the statute's "extraordinary and compelling reasons" requirement for early release.² 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). But before granting a sentence reduction the district court must also consider whether the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) support the reduction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). And each of the Defendants was denied relief by the United States District Court for the District of Kansas based on the court's discretionary analysis of the § 3553(a) factors.

The principal issue on appeal is whether, as argued by Hald and Sands, a district court is permitted to deny relief based on its assessment of the § 3553(a) factors without first making a determination on the existence of "extraordinary and compelling reasons." We reject the argument, holding that district courts are free to deny relief on the basis of any one of § 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s requirements without considering the others. We also reject the other arguments raised by Sands and Wesley.³ Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm denial of all three motions for compassionate release.

I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

"Federal courts are forbidden, as a general matter, to modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed; but the rule of finality is subject to a few narrow exceptions." Freeman v. United States , 564 U.S. 522, 526, 131 S.Ct. 2685, 180 L.Ed.2d 519 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). One such exception is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). From its enactment in 1984 until 2018, § 3582(c)(1)(A) allowed only the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to move for a reduction in a defendant's sentence, making the defendant "wholly dependent upon the Director of the BOP [to do] so on his or her behalf." United States v. McGee , 992 F.3d 1035, 1041 (10th Cir. 2021). This arrangement resulted in infrequent and perhaps uneven application of § 3582(c)(1)(A) —between 1984 and 2013 the Director of the BOP used the process to release an average of only 24 inmates per year. See id .

In 2018 Congress enacted the First Step Act. Relevant here, § 603(b) of the Act, entitled "INCREASING THE USE AND TRANSPARENCY OF COMPASSIONATE RELEASE," amended § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow defendants to seek relief under the statute on their own, rather than depending on the Director of the BOP. See id at 1042. The provision now reads, in relevant part, as follows:

[T]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—

... extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction ...

and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission ....

We recently held that the plain language of the statute creates a "three-step test." McGee , 992 F.3d at 1043 ; see United States v. Maumau , 993 F.3d 821, 831 (10th Cir. 2021). "At step one ... a district court must find whether extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction." McGee , 992 F.3d at 1042 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). "At step two ... a district court must find whether such reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." Id . (brackets, emphasis, and internal quotation marks omitted). "At step three ... § 3582(c)(1)(A) instructs a court to consider any applicable [ 18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by steps one and two is warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case." Id. (original brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); see Maumau , 993 F.3d at 831 (same). We declared (although Hald and Sands contend that our statement was nonbinding dictum) that " ‘district courts may deny compassionate-release motions when any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking and do not need to address the others.’ " McGee , 992 F.3d at 1043 (quoting United States v. Elias , 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2021) ); Maumau , 993 F.3d at 831 n.4 (same). To grant a motion for compassionate release, however, the district court "must of course address all three steps." McGee , 992 F.3d at 1043 (internal quotation marks omitted).⁴

II. PROCEEDINGS BELOW

A. Hald

In October 2011 Hald was indicted in Kansas federal court on one count of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and three substantive counts of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine (100.5 grams, 86.1 grams, and 543.4 grams). After rejecting an initial plea agreement under which Hald would have served 180 months’ imprisonment, the district court approved in March 2012 an agreement under which he would plead guilty to the conspiracy count and be sentenced to 210 months’ imprisonment, with the remaining counts being dismissed.

In July 2020, a little less than halfway through his sentence, Hald filed a motion under § 3582(c)(1)(A) asking the district court to reduce his sentence to time served, although imposing home confinement for five years as a condition of supervised release and adding five years to his five-year term of supervised release. The motion claimed that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant[ed] immediate reduction of his sentence." Hald R., Vol. 1 at 52. He argued that his preexisting health conditions—obesity, hypertension

, and Hepatitis C—put him at high risk of serious illness or death should he become infected with COVID-19 and that the close quarters at his correctional facility, FMC Fort Worth, had led to a high prevalence of the disease.⁵

The government opposed Hald's motion, arguing that his "medical conditions ... when considered collectively [did not] establish extraordinary and compelling circumstances," Hald R., Vol. 1 at 102, and that even if they did, consideration of the § 3553(a) factors would still warrant denial of the motion.

The district court denied Hald's motion. See United States v. Hald , No. 11-10227-01-EFM, 2020 WL 5548826, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 16, 2020). Although it found "that [his] medical conditions, in tandem with the COVID-19 pandemic, may present an extraordinary and compelling reason" for early release, id. at *2, the court decided that no sentence reduction was warranted, id . at *2–3. On consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, it noted the serious nature of Hald's offense, the violent circumstances surrounding the offense, and his lengthy criminal history, concluding "that the 210-month sentence originally imposed remains sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to meet the sentencing factors in § 3553(a) and punish the offense involved." Id. at *3.

B. Wesley

In 2008 Wesley was indicted in Kansas federal court on 13 counts arising out of a conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base (crack). Among the charges was one count of using a firearm "during and in relation to ... [a] drug trafficking crime," in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). After Wesley pleaded guilty (without the benefit of a plea agreement) to the conspiracy count and three counts of using a telephone to facilitate the conspiracy, he went to trial on the nine remaining counts and was ultimately convicted on just two of them, both being charges of attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine. At sentencing, "the district court found that Mr. Wesley was accountable for 150 kilograms of cocaine, had possessed a firearm, and did not qualify for an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility," resulting in a guideline range of 324 to 405 months. United States v. Wesley , 423 F. App'x 838, 839 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) ( Wesley I ). In October 2009 Wesley was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment, to be followed by five years’ supervised release. We affirmed the sentence on direct appeal. S...